The insurance effect of IPO underpricing on litigation risk revisit: a discussion of instrumental variables

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 458
Author(s):  
Yun Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Insurance Effect

An Empirical Investigation of IPO Underpricing and the Change to the LLP Organization of Audit Firms

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Muzatko ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone ◽  
Brian W. Mayhew ◽  
Larry E. Rittenberg
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Offering

This paper examines the relationship between the 1994 change in audit firm legal structure from general partnerships to limited liability partnerships (LLPs) on underpricing in the initial public offering (IPO) market. The change in legal structure of audit firms reduces an audit firm's wealth at risk from litigation damages and reduces the incentives for intrafirm monitoring by partners within an audit firm. Prior research suggests that underpricing protects underwriters from litigation damages, and that the level of underpricing varies inversely with both the amount of implicit insurance provided by the audit firm and the quality of the audit services provided. We hypothesize the change in audit firm legal structure reduced the assets available from audit firms in IPO-related litigation and indirectly reduced audit quality by lowering intrafirm monitoring. As a result, underwriters have incentives as a joint and several defendant with the audit firms to increase IPO underpricing, particularly for high-litigation-risk IPOs, following audit firms' shifts to LLP status. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis.

The Insurance Hypothesis: An Examination of KPMG's Audit Clients around the Investigation and Settlement of the Tax Shelter Case

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl L. Brown ◽  
Susan Z. Shu ◽  
Billy S. Soo ◽  
Gregory M. Trompeter
Keyword(s):  
Financial Distress ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Natural Setting ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
News Reports ◽  
Insurance Hypothesis ◽  
Insurance Effect ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
The U.S

SUMMARY Although prior literature has suggested that independent audits provide an implicit form of insurance against investor losses (the “insurance hypothesis”), it has been challenging to isolate the “insurance” effect. In this paper, we use a unique setting to examine this effect. In 2002, KPMG was investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to tax shelters sold by the firm. From then until early 2005, several news reports suggested that KPMG would be indicted and suffer potentially the same fate as Arthur Andersen. However, in August of 2005 KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, which ended widespread speculation of an impending federal indictment against the accounting firm. Because the investigation centered around tax services offered by the firm, we argue that the circumstances surrounding the investigation and settlement provide a natural setting to test the insurance value provided by auditors. We show that KPMG audit client firms experienced significant negative abnormal market returns when it appeared more likely that KPMG would face criminal charges, but earned significantly positive abnormal returns following news reports of an impending settlement. Further, these abnormal returns appear to be driven by KPMG client firms in greater financial distress or subject to greater litigation risk. These findings are consistent with the insurance hypothesis. Although we cannot completely eliminate other explanations such as an assurance effect or switching costs, we argue that such explanations are unlikely to drive our main findings.

Litigation risk and IPO underpricing

2002 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Lowry ◽  
Susan Shu
Keyword(s):  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Ipo Underpricing

Can textual analysis solve the underpricing puzzle? A US REIT study

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nino Martin Paulus ◽  
Marina Koelbl ◽  
Wolfgang Schaefers
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Textual Analysis ◽  
Real Estate Investment Trust ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Qualitative Information ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Practical Implications

PurposeAlthough many theories aim to explain initial public offering (IPO) underpricing, initial-day returns of US Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs remain a “puzzle”. The literature on REIT IPOs has focused on indirect quantitative proxies for information asymmetries between REITs and investors to determine IPO underpricing. This study, however, proposes textual analysis to exploit the qualitative information, revealed through one of the most important documents during the IPO process – Form S-11 – as a direct measure of information asymmetries.Design/methodology/approachThis study determines the level of uncertain language in the prospectus, as well as its similarity to recently filed registration statements, to assess whether textual features can solve the underpricing puzzle. It assumes that uncertain language makes it more difficult for potential investors to price the issue and thus increases underpricing. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that a higher similarity to previous filings indicates that the prospectus provides little useful information and thus does not resolve existing information asymmetries, leading to increased underpricing.FindingsContrary to expectations, this research does not find a statistically significant association between uncertain language in Form S-11 and initial-day returns. This result is interpreted as suggesting that uncertain language in the prospectus does not reflect the issuer's expectations about the company's future prospects, but rather is necessary because of forecasting difficulties and litigation risk. Analyzing disclosure similarity instead, this study finds a statistically and economically significant impact of qualitative information on initial-day returns. Thus, REIT managers may reduce underpricing by voluntarily providing more information to potential investors in Form S-11.Practical implicationsThe results demonstrate that textual analysis can in fact help to explain underpricing of US REIT IPOs, as qualitative information in Forms S-11 decreases information asymmetries between US REIT managers and investors, thus reducing underpricing. Consequently, REIT managers are incentivized to provide as much information as possible to reduce underpricing, while investors could use textual analysis to identify offerings that promise the highest returns.Originality/valueThis is the first study which applies textual analysis to corporate disclosures of US REITs in order to explain IPO underpricing.

Economic Determinants and Consequences of the Proactive Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediation Progress in IPOs

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudipta Basu ◽  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jong Eun Lee ◽  
Yinqi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Going Public ◽  
Economic Determinants ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This study investigates (1) why some IPO firms proactively disclose internal control weaknesses (ICWs) and remediation progress in their prospectuses before going public, despite being exempt from the requirements of Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at the time of IPO, and (2) the association of such disclosures with IPO underpricing (i.e., the first-day return). We find that IPO firms that proactively disclose ICWs and remediation progress have higher litigation risk, are audited by industry specialist auditors, and are more likely to have audit committees prior to the IPO, compared with firms that do not disclose such information, after controlling for the ex ante probability of having ICWs. IPO underpricing is lower for firms that disclose ICWs and remediation progress, consistent with the conjecture that the disclosure of ICWs and remediation progress signals extensive premarket due diligence, thus reducing the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. JEL Classifications: G24; K22; M13; M41; M42; M49.

Legal opportunism, litigation risk, and IPO underpricing

2015 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Walker ◽  
Harry J. Turtle ◽  
Kuntara Pukthuanthong ◽  
Dolruedee Thiengtham
Keyword(s):  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Ipo Underpricing
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