scholarly journals Human freedom and the problem of evil

2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-181
Author(s):  
HASKER William
Perichoresis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Kenneth D. Keathley

Abstract Philosopher Greg Welty contributed a chapter entitled ‘Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin’, to a book devoted to answering the charge that Calvinism makes God the author of sin (Calvinism and the Problem of Evil). Welty argues that Molinism has the same problems as Calvinism concerning God’s relationship to sin, regardless of what view of human freedom Molinism may affirm. The Molinist believes that God generally uses his knowledge of the possible choices of libertarianly free creatures in order to accomplish his will. (This knowledge is typically categorized as residing within God’s middle knowledge.) But affirming libertarian freedom for humans, he argues, does not help in dealing with the question of God’s relationship to evil. Therefore, Molinism is no better than Calvinism, at least concerning this issue. In response to Welty, (1) I agree with him that Molinism does not have a moral advantage over what he calls ‘mysterian, apophatic’ Calvinism, but Molinists don’t claim that it does, and (2) I argue that, contra Welty, Molinism indeed does have a moral advantage over the Calvinist versions that do employ causal determinism. Welty does not take ‘intentions’ into consideration in his argument, and this is a serious flaw. In the libertarian model of Molinism, intent originates in the doer of evil. However, in the compatibilist model of causal determinism, ultimately God implants intent. Thus, adherents of causal determinism have difficulty not laying responsibility at the feet of God.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 347
Author(s):  
Michael Douglas Beaty

In this essay, I affirm the univocity thesis while discussing some alternative positions that avoid the problem of evil by rejecting the univocity thesis. I reject Sterba’s assumption that God’s governance of creation is adequately understood as an analogy to good governance of a politically liberal democracy. I suggest that Sterba’s commitment to the Pauline principle forces a dilemma between significant human freedom and meticulous divine intervention. Finally, I argue that the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God, given a compensatory response to the problem of evil.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.


Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).


Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

This chapter provides a detailed characterization of the various meanings of the term “divine hiddenness,” carefully and rigorously articulates the version of the problem of divine hiddenness that has dominated contemporary philosophical discussion for the past twenty-five years, and then explains the relationship between that problem and the problem of evil.


Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.


Author(s):  
John Bishop

The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.


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