scholarly journals Gwarancje proceduralne na wypadek wydalenia cudzoziemca w systemie Europejskiej konwencji praw człowieka

2019 ◽  
pp. 61-96
Author(s):  
Rafał Mizerski

The author discusses the legal basis, the cope of application, the content and the concurrence of procedural guarantees in the event of an expulsion of an alien under the European Convention. These guarantees stem from Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, Articles 13 and 34 of the Convention as well as from the concepts of positive obligations and tests of legality and necessity, developed in the case law of the Strasbourg Court. Guarantees under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 are the only ones that are applicable regardless of whether an expulsion results in the violation of an alien’s rights or the limitation of the freedoms arising from the Convention. Moreover, they do not apply to extradition proceedings, whereas the other guarantees do. However, in the context of the guarantees resulting from Article 13 of the Convention and the concepts of positive obligations as well as the tests of legality and necessity, a common standard of procedural requirements in an event of an expulsion of an alien seems to have emerged. It includes the alien’s right to information on the specifi c reasons for expulsion; available remedies and a possibility of obtaining legal assistance; the right to submit arguments against expulsion; the right to be represented; the right to have the case reviewed; the right to an independent and impartial authority competent to decide in the case. In the event where an expulsion puts an alien in danger of irreversible damage to his/her rights, the person concerned should have, in addition, access to a remedy with automatic suspensive eff ect. This standard is also quite common to guarantees stemming from Articles 1 of Protocol No. 7 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. However, since “competent authority” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 need not be the authority with whom the fi nal decision on expulsion rests and because it is possible to expel an alien before the exercise of his/her rights under this Article, the author is of the opinion that the latter should apply only to expulsions that do not threaten conventional rights.

1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (S3) ◽  
pp. 101s-106s ◽  
Author(s):  
AM Dougin

SummaryThe European Convention of Human Rights recognises a certain number of rights and freedoms for persons within States' jurisdiction. For those confined in psychiatric hospitals, this legal protection concerns first of all the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty, which must conform to the conditions laid down by the Convention as interpreted by the case-law of the Convention organs (the Commission and Court of Human Rights). The Convention also guarantees to person deprived of their liberty further rights: the right to information, the right to appear before a court, the right to compensation and also the right to the respect of privacy and correspondence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 188-204
Author(s):  
Mykhailo Buromenskyi ◽  
Vitalii Gutnyk

Abstract The European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights have a significant impact not only on national legal order but also on international criminal courts. The article is dedicated to analyzing that impact in the context of the right to legal assistance. We ascertain the purpose of the establishment of international criminal courts, the specificity of the right to legal assistance in the European system of human rights protection, the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on the drafting of statutes of the international criminal courts and influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the interpretation of the right to legal assistance in the international criminal courts. Also the primacy of the right to legal assistance is proved, which is provided in the ECHR to the statutes of international criminal courts. At the same time, the international criminal courts, taking into account the purpose of their establishment and jurisdiction, give additional guarantees of the right to legal assistance.


Author(s):  
Thomas Weigend

This chapter focuses on the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in interpreting the defense rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and other European legal systems. In particular, it considers one aspect of European Union Member States’ compliance with ECtHR case law: the rights of suspects and defendants under Article 6 ECHR. The chapter first discusses the right of a suspect to be informed about the accusation against him, the right to legal assistance at the early stages of the criminal process, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to examine adverse witnesses. It then explores how the European Court’s jurisprudence has been received by the legislation and judge-made law in France and Germany. It shows that Article 6 ECHR and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on various clauses of that article exerted an influence on domestic laws, at least in France and Germany.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-147
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina

This paper attempts to answer whether section 24(2) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act conforms, or is in conflict, with the right to a public hearing under section 39(3) of the Constitution of Malta and Article 10(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It reviews case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to a public hearing and concludes that Strasbourg case law has developed to allow restrictions upon this right even if they are not written down in this Convention. On the other hand, from a comparative exercise carried out with seven similar laws to the Maltese Official Secrets Act, it transpires that the Maltese provision is unique, does not find any counterpart in these seven laws surveyed and, worse still, appears to conflict with Article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Janne Rothmar Herrmann

This chapter discusses the right to avoid procreation and the regulation of pregnancy from a European perspective. The legal basis for a right to avoid procreation can be said to fall within the scope of several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an instrument that is binding for all European countries. Here, Article 12 of the ECHR gives men and women of marriageable age the right to marry and found a family in accordance with the national laws governing this right. However, Article 12 protects some elements of the right not to procreate, but for couples only. The lack of common European consensus in this area highlights how matters relating to the right to decide on the number and spacing of children touch on aspects that differ from country to country even in what could appear to be a homogenous region. In fact, the cultural, moral, and historical milieus that surround these rights differ considerably with diverse national perceptions of the role of the family, gender equality, religious and moral obligations, and so on.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorg Sladič

Legal privilege and professional secrecy of attorneys relate to the right to a fair trial (Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) as well as to the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The reason for protecting the lawyer via fundamental rights is the protection of fundamental rights of the lawyer’s clients. All legal orders apply legal privileges and professional secrecy; however, the contents of such are not identical. Traditionally there is an important difference between common and civil law. The professional secrecy of an attorney in civil law jurisdictions is his right and at the same time his obligation based on his membership of the Bar (that is his legal profession). In common law legal privilege comprises the contents of documents issued by an attorney to the client. Professional secrecy of attorneys in civil law jurisdictions applies solely to independent lawyers; in-house lawyers are usually not allowed to benefit from rules on professional secrecy (exceptions in the Netherlands and Belgium). On the other hand, common law jurisdictions apply legal professional privilege, recognized also to in-house lawyers. Slovenian law follows the traditional civil law concept of professional secrecy and sets a limited privilege to in-house lawyers. The article then discusses Slovenian law of civil procedure and compares the position of professional secrecy in lawsuits before State’s courts and in arbitration.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


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