scholarly journals Epistemologia Kanta jako rozwiązanie sporu empiryzmu z racjonalizmem

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland

The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-90
Author(s):  
Syed Alam Shah

Heidegger’s reading of Kant is deciphered to have illuminated his own project concerning the basic question of Ontology, Time, Space and History [Temporality, Spatiality and Historicity] embodying the novel description of Human reality in terms of Mit-Dasein and Mit-welt [Subjectivity with the public face]. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason led Heidegger develop his own project of Existential Phenomenology contrary to Husserilian Phenomenology. We will discuss the Kantian Heidegger following the two main issues: one, Heidegger appreciates Kant on his identifying and exploring the difference of ontic/ontological. Two, Kant prioritizes time over space. Heidegger would explore the subject of ontic/ontological difference in the sense that ontic knowledge is the knowledge of particular beings, whereas ontological knowledge is described as the a priori condition inferring the ontic knowledge. In this sense ontological knowledge pertains to question of being rather than beings. This is how Heidegger’s Kant interpretation would differ from the Neo-Kantianism of Marburg School which argued that Critique of Pure Reason is a work of epistemology. In contrast to this position, Heidegger held that Critique is a unique work of transcendental philosophy; it is theory of ontological knowledge but not ontic knowledge. Ontic knowledge of beings must conform to Being of beings [ontological foundation]. Heidegger holds that this should be Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”. However, Heidegger would appropriate the Kantian notion of time in the form of temporality of Dasein. Being manifests itself on beings through Being-there [Human reality] who purely understands Being. For Heidegger, temporality of Dasein is the foundation of ontological knowledge indeed.


2021 ◽  
Vol V (2) ◽  
pp. 143-190
Author(s):  
Alexey Kruglov

The paper demonstrates the significance of commemorative and anniversary philosophical medals that are seen as a special visual aid for problematic issues in the history of philosophy specification. The author puts forward the thesis that such medals can clarify the perception of philosophical doctrine and the context of philosophical doctrine consideration at a particular time. So, they greatly assist as an additional historical and philosophical source, but they can hardly be helpful with the interpretation of either various aspects of a philosophical doctrine or a particular statement of a particular philosopher. The rationale for the thesis presents the analysis of four philosophical medals: the medal commemorating the foundation of the alethophile society (1740), A. Abramsonʼs medal in honor of I. Kantʼs sixtieth anniversary (1784), A. Abramsonʼs medal for the death of I. Kant (1804), A.L. Heldʼs medals in honor of the sixtieth anniversary of G.W.F. Hegel (1830). If the first three medals contribute to a better understanding of the philosophical traits of the German Enlightenment, the reasons for appealing to Horace's words “sapere aude”, Kant's peculiarity as an Enlightenmentist, philosophical meaning of the Kantian Copernican Revolution and the transformation of the perception of the “Critique of Pure Reason” in the late 18th century, expectations regarding the fourth medal has proved misplaced. It cannot clarify the Hegelian phrase about reason as a rose on the cross of modernity and reconciliation with reality. In addition, in the course of clarifying the meaning of the four aforementioned medals, the author also turns to the commemorative medal of Chr. Wolff by J. Dassier (c. 1733), the medal for the return of Chr. Wolff to Halle by J.Chr. Koch (1740) and the medal for Kantʼs death by F.W. Loos (1804).


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Lukic

In this paper, the author explores Kant?s Copernican revolution that departs from philosophical tradition. Kant challenges a view that the existence of the world (with the totality of all laws that hold in it) is independent of the knower. In view of that, the main focus is on Kant?s analysis of the meaning of a priori knowledge and the critique of old (dogmatic) metaphysics. The aim of this critique, however, was not the dismissal of metaphysics as such, but rather the transcendental foundation of a new one.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Reinhard Brandt

AbstractRecent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be?


Author(s):  
Robert Audi

Abstract Kant influentially distinguished analytic from synthetic a priori propositions, and he took certain propositions in the latter category to be of immense philosophical importance. His distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been accepted by many and attacked by others; but despite its importance, a number of discussions of it since at least W. V. Quine’s have paid insufficient attention to some of the passages in which Kant draws the distinction. This paper seeks to clarify what appear to be three distinct conceptions of the analytic (and implicitly of the synthetic) that are presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in some other Kantian texts. The conceptions are important in themselves, and their differences are significant even if they are extensionally equivalent. The paper is also aimed at showing how the proposed understanding of these conceptions—and especially the one that has received insufficient attention from philosophers—may bear on how we should conceive the synthetic a priori, in and beyond Kant’s own writings.


Author(s):  
Jauhan Budiwan

Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. This portion will focus on his metaphysics and epistemology in one of his most important works. The Critique of Pure Reason, A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the -natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access to the empirical realm of space and time. In order to understand Kant's position, we must understand the philosophical background that he was reacting to. First, 1 will present a brief overview of his predecessor's positions with a brief statement of Kant's objections, then I will return to a more detailed exposition of Kant's arguments. There are two major historical movements in the early modem period of philosophy that had a significant impact on Kant; Empiricism and Rationalism,


2019 ◽  
pp. 145-191
Author(s):  
Sanford Shieh

This chapter takes up two further issues about Frege’s attitude towards modality. First, Frege doesn’t simply reject the relativization of truth. He gives amodalist explanations of linguistic phenomena that seem to show that truth is relative to time, and of talk of truth in various circumstances. Second, Frege’s truth-absolutism is not incompatible with two analyses of modality prominent in the history of philosophy: in terms of a priori knowledge and in terms of analytic truth. But Frege construes apriority and analyticity in logical terms. Thus, ultimately, Frege’s view is that if there are any modal distinctions, they amount to nothing more than logical distinctions. An interesting consequence of Frege’s accounts of apriority, analyticity, and modality is that they allow not only for synthetic a priori truths, but also necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths.


Author(s):  
Paul K. Moser

A prominent term in theory of knowledge since the seventeenth century, ‘a posteriori’ signifies a kind of knowledge or justification that depends on evidence, or warrant, from sensory experience. A posteriori truth is truth that cannot be known or justified independently of evidence from sensory experience, and a posteriori concepts are concepts that cannot be understood independently of reference to sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge contrasts with a priori knowledge, knowledge that does not require evidence from sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge is empirical, experience-based knowledge, whereas a priori knowledge is non-empirical knowledge. Standard examples of a posteriori truths are the truths of ordinary perceptual experience and the natural sciences; standard examples of a priori truths are the truths of logic and mathematics. The common understanding of the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge as the distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge comes from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787).


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-242
Author(s):  
Michael Oberst

AbstractThe so-called ‘possibility proof’ in Kant's pre-Critical Beweisgrund has been widely discussed in the literature, and it is a common view that he never really abandoned it. As I shall argue, this reading is mistaken. I aim to show that the natural illusion in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is usually taken to be the possibility proof turned into a transcendental illusion, has both a different conclusion and a different argument than the possibility proof. Rather, what remains from Beweisgrund is what I will call the ‘proof a posteriori’, which the Critique turns into a transcendental illusion that is of regulative use for reason.


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