The Game Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Tax and Subsidy

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (0) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Xinran Li ◽  
Rong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiment ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Materials ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

scholarly journals Game Model of Retailers Leading Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Guarantee Modes

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 71-78
Author(s):  
Wu Mei-xiang ◽  
Shi Cheng-dong ◽  
Sun Qiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Mode Selection ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Common ◽  
Cost Parameters ◽  
Guarantee Period

—In order to study the retailer-led differentiated guarantee behavior of CLSC's remanufactured products, assuming that demand is influenced by differentiated guarantee period of remanufactured products and consumers' willingness to pay, three game models of unguaranteed, manufacturer's guarantee and retailer's guarantee are constructed respectively to discuss the influence of guarantee mode selection and guarantee cost parameters on each member's decision. The results show that differentiated guarantees for remanufactured products are beneficial to extending the guarantee period, reducing the price of remanufactured products, improving CLSC members and overall profits. When consumers are less sensitive to differentiated guarantee for remanufactured products, CLSC decision in each mode has little to do with guarantee cost parameters and guarantor selection. When consumers are more sensitive, the advantages of each guarantee mode are significantly different, and manufacturer guarantee is the common choice of both parties. Finally, an example is given to further verify the conclusion.

scholarly journals Research on Services Decision-Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Dominated by a Logistics Provider

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Fei Chen ◽  
Liurui Deng ◽  
Yiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Equipment Manufacturer ◽  
Manufactured Products ◽  
The Given

Abstract In this paper, we assume that a closed-loop supply chain consists of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new products from raw materials, a remanufacturer producing re-manufactured products from used items directly collected from customers and a logistics provider which sells and distributes two products as a monopolist in the given market. By constructing game model in which logistics provider is a leader, OEM and remanufacturer are the equal status followers, we solve chain members’ optimal services decision-making. Finally, we analyze influence of service elasticities and intensities of service competition of two manufacturers on members’ equilibrium decision-making.

scholarly journals Research on Third-Party Collecting Game Model with Competition in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Complex Systems Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yuehong Guo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This paper studied system dynamics characteristics of closed-loop supply chain using repeated game theory and complex system theory. It established decentralized decision-making game model and centralized decision-making game model and then established and analyzed the corresponding continuity system. Drew the region local stability of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, and a series of chaotic system characteristics, have an detail analysis of the Lyapunov index which is under the condition of different parameter combination. According to the limited rational expectations theory, it established repeated game model based on collection price and marginal profits. Further, this paper analyzed the influence of the parameters by numerical simulations and concluded three conclusions. First, when the collection price is to a critical value, the system will be into chaos state. Second, when the sale price of remanufacturing products is more than a critical value, the system will be in chaos state. Last, the initial value of the collection price is sensitive, small changes may cause fluctuations of market price. These conclusions guide enterprises in making the best decisions in each phase to achieve maximize profits.

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