Organizational Management of Groundwater by Farmers for the Sustainable Utilization of Water Resource in Jaffna District of Northern Sri Lanka

2016 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 944-948
Author(s):  
Tharmendra, P ◽  
Sivakumar, S.S

Groundwater is categorized as a common pool resource and is characterized by exclusion and substractbility. Given the nature of groundwater, user exclusion is an extremely difficult task. The cost of exclusion measures could outweigh the benefits generated from the use of the resource.

Hydrology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Francisco Muñoz-Arriola ◽  
Tarik Abdel-Monem ◽  
Alessandro Amaranto

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-Rui Chen ◽  
Yuan Yuan ◽  
Xu Xiao

The Resource Tax Law was officially implemented on September 1, 2020, in China. This law presents the “Fee-to-Tax” reform of water resources. This article compares the effects of the “Fee-to-Tax” reform under asymmetric duopoly conditions with perfect information. The mechanisms of the two policies are different when all firms simultaneously respond to water resources: the water resource fee affects output by reducing market size, while the water resource tax reduces output by amplifying the weighted cost difference effects between companies. Water resource taxes work better than fees for eliminating backward production capacity. A comparison of the situation when companies respond sequentially is also carried out. When a low-cost firm is in the leading position, the collection of fees actually reduces the output difference, whereas the tax improves it. When a high-cost firm acts as a leader, the effects depend on the cost difference. When the cost difference between firms is small, the first-move advantage of high-cost firms dominates the cost advantages of low-cost firms. Therefore, a higher tax rate yields a smaller output difference. When cost differences are relatively larger, the cost advantage of low-cost firms dominates the first-move advantage of high-cost firms. As the operational cost for reducing water consumption increases, the reduced water consumption first increases and then decreases.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-rui Chen ◽  
Pu-yan Nie

Abstract Background: The Resource Tax Law has been officially implemented on September 1, 2020 in China. This law presents the “Fee-to-Tax” reform of water resources. Methods: This article compares the effects of the “Fee-to-Tax” reform under an asymmetric duopoly with perfect information. Results: First, an analysis when all firms simultaneously respond to the water resource policy is conducted. The mechanisms of the two policies are different: the water resource fee affects output by reducing market size, while the water resource tax reduces output by amplifying the weighted cost difference effects between companies. It is shown that the tax works better than the fee for eliminating backward production capacity. Then, a comparison of the situation when companies respond sequentially is carried out. When a low-cost firm is in the leading position, the collection of fees actually reduces the output difference, whereas the tax improves it. When a high-cost firm acts as a leader, the effects depend on the cost difference. When the cost difference between firms is small, the first-move advantage of high-cost firms dominates the cost advantages of low-cost firms. Therefore, a higher tax rate yields a smaller output difference. Conclusions: When cost differences are relatively larger, the cost advantage of low-cost firms dominates the first-move advantage of high-cost firms. Therefore, the “Fee-to-Tax” reform provides some benefits to maintain the environmental development of some water-mining or related industries.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Forrest D Fleischman ◽  
Brent Loken ◽  
Gustavo A. Garcia-Lopez ◽  
Sergio Villamayor-Tomas

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