Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies

2003 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jude C. Hays
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Economic Globalization ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Capital Taxation ◽  
Qualitative Evidence ◽  
Capital Tax ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship

This article contributes to the growing literature on the role that domestic political institutions play in mediating globalization pressures by arguing that the capital tax constraints arising from international economic integration are the most severe for countries with majoritarian political institutions. In doing so, the author solves a tax puzzle that challenges conventional thinking about how institutions condition the relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics. He presents a formal, game-theoretic model to sharpen the basic logic of his argument and then tests some of the model's predictions empirically using both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292091120
Author(s):  
Muhammet A. Bas ◽  
Elena V. McLean
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Commitment Problems

This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment problems and cause conflict even before any disasters take place. Our approach represents a shift of focus from previous research, which investigates the effect of actual disasters and ignores rational expectations regarding future events. We use a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the commitment problem caused by disaster risks. We then discuss and apply an empirical strategy enabling us to disentangle effects of disaster proneness from effects of actual disaster events. Our results indicate that greater disaster risks are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of interstate conflict.

Alliances and the High Politics of International Trade

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-611
Author(s):  
Scott Wolford ◽  
Moonhawk Kim
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Security Cooperation ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Dyadic Data ◽  
Military Alliances ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship

What is the role of trade policy in military alliances? We analyze and test a game-theoretic model of economic and security cooperation in which allies hold different interests across the security and commercial aspects of the relationship. In equilibrium, allies with little market power who are valuable politically to larger states engage in sociallysuboptimal protectionism, as their allies’ threats of retaliation are incredible. Stable cooperation emerges in the form of unretaliated protection rather than mutually low trade barriers. We test the model’s implications against a dyadic data set of antidumping petitions from 1980 to 2013 and find that larger allies are more likely to tolerate protectionism by smaller allies by denying domestic petitions to retaliate against dumping measures by the latter.

A Formal Game-Theoretic Model for Rational Exchange Protocol

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 2033-2040
Author(s):  
Xiu Ting Tao ◽  
Yong Gen Gu ◽  
Guo Qiang Li
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Formal Definition ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Game Tree ◽  
Extensive Game ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship

A rational exchange protocol is a useful protocol in which two (or more) strange parties exchange their items successfully in a way that every rational party has enough reasons to follow the protocol faithfully rather than deviate from it. This means neither parties of the protocol can gain an advantage by deviating from the protocol, but he may bring a disadvantage to the other party even if who is correctly behaving party. We introduce game theory as a formal framework in this paper. We give a formal definition for the rational exchange related to the concept of the subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game. We use our model to analyze the Syverson protocol by the game tree and show the relationship with Buttyan's Model.

Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention

2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIBERIU DRAGU
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Privacy And Security ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Terrorism Prevention

I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, and more important, the antiterrorist agency will always want less privacy. The very agency whose expertise affords it disproportionate influence on policy making will prefer a reduction in privacy protections even when that reduction harms security from terrorism. The analysis has implications for understanding the relationship between government powers and civil liberties in the context of terrorism prevention and times of emergencies more generally.

On repression and its effectiveness

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Security Policies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Terrorist Threat ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Democratic Societies ◽  
The Relationship

Do electoral incentives to stop a terrorist attack before the next election induce democratic governments to undertake ineffective counterterrorism policies? This article shows that shortsighted electoral motivations are not a sufficient explanation for why governments engage in counterproductive repression when responding to electoral pressures to safeguard security. It develops a game-theoretic model to show that limitations on observability of counterterrorism activities are an important factor for understanding why electoral pressures might induce democratic governments to choose ineffective security policies. The model also allows us to systematically investigate the conditions under which repressive counterterrorism is more likely to aggravate the terrorist threat, and has empirical and policy implications regarding the relationship between repression and its (in)effectiveness when democratic societies strive to counter the threat of terrorism.

A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Geddes
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Administrative Reform ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

In this article I develop a simple game-theoretic model of administrative reform in Latin American democracies. The model, which is based on the incentives facing the politicians who must initiate reforms if any are to occur, yields two predictions: (1) reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable. Attention to the incentives facing legislators and party leaders also results in the expectation that certain political institutions, such as open list proportional representation and electoral rules that minimize party control over candidate lists, reduce the probability of reform. I test these predictions and expectations on a set of Latin American democracies and find them consistent with historical events.

scholarly journals The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: Germany and the European Debt Crisis

2017 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina J. Schneider ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Citizen Preferences ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Distributional Conflicts ◽  
Regional Elections ◽  
To Receive

AbstractInternational cooperation can fail even though governments have no distributional conflicts or incentives to free-ride, face no informational or credibility problems, and even agree on the policies that need to be implemented. Germany's refusal to cooperate with the Eurogroup members on the Greek bailout in 2010 until the crisis threatened to derail the entire Eurozone is puzzling in that regard especially because Germany is the main beneficiary of the euro. It was alleged at the time that this was a dilatory tactic designed to postpone a domestically unpopular decision until after crucial regional elections. But why would voters allow themselves to be misled like that? And why did Merkel agree to the bailout before the elections took place? To analyze how citizen preferences affect international cooperation, we develop a game-theoretic model of the four-way interaction between two governments that must coordinate a response to a crisis affecting both countries but who also must face the polls domestically with an electorate that might be uncertain whether a response is necessary. We find that, paradoxically, governments that stand to receive the greatest benefits from international cooperation face the greatest obstacles to implementing the required policies even when voters would want them to. We show how the model can rationalize Merkel's electoral strategy and why her party suffered at the polls when the strategy went off the rails.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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