Davy Crockett: A Handbook by Richard Boyd Hauck

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-74
Author(s):  
Jane H. Maddock
Keyword(s):  
Richard Boyd

Revisiting the Theory-Constitutive Metaphor

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ii (15) ◽  
pp. 36-55
Author(s):  
Bent Sørensen ◽  
Torkild Thellefsen ◽  
Amalia Dewi
Keyword(s):  
Theory Change ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
Richard Boyd ◽  
Seminal Article

In his seminal article “Metaphor and Theory Change: What is `Metaphor ́ a metaphor for?” (1993, [1979]), Richard Boyd describes a certain class of metaphors within science, namely, the theory-constitutive metaphors (henceforth the TCMs); this class of metaphors, Boyd explains, plays an important role in the formulation and development of theories because they express explanatory claims which, at least for the time being, cannot be conceived in any other known (literal) way. Hence, TCMs become a part of scientific thought and the development of concepts. TCMs can fix reference to casual relations in the physical world, even though they have an open-endedness (vagueness and are not fully explicated); the TCMs, therefore, have a programmatic character or they invite further research. In the following we try to add more characteristics to the TCMs from a Peircean perspective, namely, that the TCMs depend on abduction – this 1) makes them both creative and explanatory, 2) relates them to guessing and anchors them in instinct, whereby 3) their plausibility concerns an affinity between mind and nature.

Rousseau's Discriminating Defense of Compassion

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-739 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN MARKS
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Amitai Etzioni ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Richard Boyd

Political theorists from Martha Nussbaum to Amitai Etzioni appeal to compassion as a basis that liberalism otherwise lacks for refraining from exploiting and even for helping others. However, critics like Clifford Orwin and Richard Boyd have raised this question: is compassion too weak and undiscriminating to rely on in politics? Jean-Jacques Rousseau's account of compassion helps answer it. Rousseau understands compassion as a useful manifestation of the otherwise dangerous desire to extend the self and show signs of power. Consequently, he considers compassion's relative weakness a strength and explains how it can be supplemented and complemented by other, independent motives for serving others, including gratitude, friendship, and obligation. Compassion's weakness also makes it less likely than self-love, narrowly conceived, to overwhelm reason. Rousseau excels compassion's contemporary defenders in his awareness of the complex relationship between compassion and other social passions and of the dangers that his understanding of compassion addresses.

Is Marx a Moral Consequentialist?

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 541-563
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Vogel
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Social Criticism ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Political Views ◽  
The Social ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Richard Boyd ◽  
Sophisticated Version

Derek Allen, Richard Boyd, and Alan Gilbert have suggested that Marx’s normative political views should be reconstructed as a sophisticated version of moral consequentialism. This paper investigates whether Marx’s ostensible anti-moralism differs in any interesting way from Mill’s sophisticated utilitarianism plus some Marxist social science. I present an account of the social meaning and implications of moral language and argument, based on Marx’s description of morality as a social practice based on distinctive motives, emotions and sanctions, to explain why Marx would reject moral consequentialism. This account will explain how Marx can consistently reject morality yet retain a normative basis for his social criticism.

scholarly journals From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step

1996 ◽  
Vol 28 (83) ◽  
pp. 3-39
Author(s):  
Terry Horgan ◽  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
Richard Boyd ◽  
David Brink ◽  
Peter Railton

En años recientes, las defensas del realismo moral han adoptado lo que llamamos la “semántica moral de la nueva ola”, la cual analiza las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos morales tales como “bueno” y “correcto” semejantes a las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos para clases naturales en la ciencia, y se inspira también en temas funcionalistas de la filosofía de la mente. Este tipo de perspectiva semántica que encontramos en las perspectivas metaéticas de David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton y otros, es el cimiento semántico crucial de una clase naturalística de realismo moral que estos filósofos apoyan —una perspectiva que promete dar una forma fuerte de realismo moral. Nosotros sostenemos que la semántica moral de la nueva ola nos conduce, de una u otra forma, al relativismo moral —una perspectiva que no es compatible con el tipo de realismo moral que estos filósofos pretenden defender. Es así que nuestra discusión muestra que si la semántica moral de la nueva ola es la mejor esperanza para defender el realismo moral naturalístico, entonces este tipo de perspectiva es insostenible. Nuestro trabajo está dividido en 7 secciones además de una conclusión. En la sección 1, explicamos la motivación que hay detrás de la semántica moral de la nueva ola. En la sección 2, pasamos al trabajo de Brink y Boyd cuyas perspectivas combinadas producen una perspectiva metaética, según la cual los términos morales como “bueno” y “correcto” quieren referir rígidamente a las propiedades funcionales de segundo orden cuya esencia funcional la revela cualquier teoría moral que surge de la aplicación correcta de la metodología coherentista. La perspectiva Brink- Boyd toma como modelo al psicofuncionalismo de la filosofía de la mente para entender las propiedades morales. En la sección 3, diferenciamos las diferentes formas del relativismo, arguyendo que ciertas formas son culpables de chauvinismo, y luego, en la sección 4, sostenemos que el psicofuncionalismo de la filosofía de la mente es culpable de una forma chauvinista de relativismo conceptual. En la sección 5, mostramos entonces cómo la versión Brink-Boyd de la semántica moral de la nueva ola también es culpable de un relativismo conceptual chauvinista en la ética. En la sección 6, pasamos a la propuesta de Railton (inspirada por la versión de la teoría de identidad psicofísica defendida por D.M. Armstrong y David Lewis) de que hay que comprender los términos morales en tanto que refieren no-rígidamente a las propiedades naturales. En la sección 7, sostenemos que en una interpretación de la propuesta de Railton, su perspectiva es culpable de un relativismo conceptual chauvinista, y en una interpretación alternativa, su perspectiva es culpable de una indeterminación moral radical. Ambos modos, tanto la perspectiva de Railton como la perspectiva de Brink-Boyd, no ayudan en la defensa de una forma fuerte de realismo moral: irónicamente, la semántica moral de la nueva ola nos conduce a un relativismo moral. [Traducción: Claudia Chávez A.]

scholarly journals Convergent realism on truth, progress and referentiality

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-71
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Zoric
Keyword(s):  
Large Degree ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Successful Theory ◽  
Richard Boyd

In this paper we shall explore the position of convergent realism trough the work of two of its most important proponents, Richard Boyd and Hillary Putnam. We shall examine their views on questions of truth, progress and referentiality in order to determine the success with which realistic position withstands the scrutiny of anti-realistic objections. It will be shown that claims of truthlikeness and progress are to a large degree dependent on a successful theory of reference and that the image of science painted by the realists does indeed offer preferable explanation of science only if the ?no miracles? argument can be given a firm foundation.

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