Alasdair MacIntyre ed. by Mark C. Murphy

2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-650
Author(s):  
Christopher Stephen Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Alasdair Macintyre

An Ethical Postlude

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Teubner
Keyword(s):  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Ethical Reflection ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
Critical Engagement

‘An Ethical Postlude’ returns to reflect directly on an understanding of tradition that frames how Boethius and Benedict relate to Augustine vis-à-vis the theme of prayer. This final chapter reflects on the kinematics of tradition, that is, on the actual motions qua motions of the act of tradition. This chapter engages the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jeffrey Stout, both of whom have offered challenges to religious ethicists to broaden their historical horizons. Through critical engagement with MacIntyre and Stout, this chapter presents a case for an historical approach to Christian existence which can still give rise to meaningful moral and ethical reflection without having to accept (consciously or unconsciously) a Hegelian metaphysics of history.

Faith and Reason: Reflections on MacIntyre's ‘Tradition-constituted Enquiry’

1991 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Ian Markham
Keyword(s):  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Modern Problem ◽  
Faith And Reason

The problem at the heart of the faith/reason relationship can be set out as follows. Faith implies total commitment whilst reason requires a certain detachment. One cannot be totally committed yet rationally detached at the same time. Therefore faith and reason are two mutually exclusive approaches to religion. Alasdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? has offered a very interesting perspective on this problem. He has argued, albeit indirectly, that this faith/reason question is a modern problem generated by a certain set of liberal and relativist presuppositions. This paper will summarize Maclntyre's contribution to the discussion, and then point to some of the inadequacies of his account. I will be arguing that commitment to a tradition is largely justified by internal explanations for disagreement. Faith seems to need an intolerant explanation for different traditions. Therefore, MacIntyre is, in fact, handling liberalized forms of the traditions. By tackling MacIntyre's work from the faith/reason angle, I hope to show certain more fundamental problems with his work.

The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture

1990 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alasdair MacIntyre
Keyword(s):  
Continuing Education ◽  
Associate Professor ◽  
Christian Ethics ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Inaugural Address ◽  
Inaugural Lecture ◽  
University Of Notre Dame ◽  
The University

Alasdair MacIntyre was installed in 1989 as the first occupant of the McMahon/Hank Chair in Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. On April 18, 1990, he delivered his inaugural lecture, “The Privatization of Good,” before a large and appreciative audience in Notre Dame's Center for Continuing Education. He invited three Notre Dame colleagues to comment on his presentation: Donald P. Kommers, Professor of Law and Government, and Editor of The Review of Politics; William David Solomon, Associate Professor of Philosophy; and Richard McCormick, S.J., John A. O'Brien Professor of Christian Ethics. The following pages include the inaugural address, the remarks of two of the three commentators, and Professor Maclntyre's response. The editors wish to thank Professor MacIntyre for his cooperation in publishing his inaugural address.

Desacuerdos profundos, elección de criterios y exigencia de coherencia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Julio Robledo Bordas
Keyword(s):  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Ad Hominem

Este trabajo trata de ahondar en la noción de desacuerdo profundo propuesta por Robert Fogelin, comparando la idea de Fogelin de que los desacuerdos profundos emergen del choque entre dos marcos o trasfondos conceptuales (e incluso vitales) con el concepto kuhniano de inconmensurabilidad entre paradigmas. A su vez, argumento que ciertos elementos de dichos trasfondos no son enteramente revisables por medios puramente lógicos (dándole la razón a Fogelin) y dependen de una elección voluntaria fundamental entre distintos criterios sobre los que hacer pivotar la propia posición (siguiendo a Alasdair MacIntyre). Por último, contra Fogelin, propongo un método de resolución racional (parcial) de los desacuerdos profundos basado en la argumentación ad hominem en el sentido de Henry Johnstone y en la argumentación por analogía, que llamo «exigencia de coherencia».

scholarly journals Intelligent machines, care work and the nature of practical reasoning

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1906-1916 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus Robson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Assistive Technologies ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Intelligent Machines ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Care Robots

Background: The debate over the ethical implications of care robots has raised a range of concerns, including the possibility that such technologies could disrupt caregiving as a core human moral activity. At the same time, academics in information ethics have argued that we should extend our ideas of moral agency and rights to include intelligent machines. Research objectives: This article explores issues of the moral status and limitations of machines in the context of care. Design: A conceptual argument is developed, through a four-part scheme derived from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. No empirical data are used. Ethical consideration: No primary data were gathered for this study. Secondary sources and authorship have been acknowledged throughout. Findings / discussion: Certain kinds of social experience, including the narrative unity of a life, and the giving and receiving of care, are essential for moral development. Machines, no matter how advanced, cannot participate in such experiences in key respects, and thus cannot develop as practical reasoners. Conclusion: It follows that they cannot be moral agents and that they cannot care. There are, it seems, no such things as care robots. In view of the institutional power of tech companies and commissioning bodies, care practitioners need to take more of a lead in developing new assistive technologies which are appropriate to their practice.

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Wallach
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Local Communities ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
The Political ◽  
History Of ◽  
Liberal Individualism

This essay discusses the contribution of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981) to a generation of moral theory. Pitched as a critique of liberal individualism (e.g., Rawls), modernity (e.g., amoral bureaucracies), and the antagonism toward the history of moral theory evinced by analytical philosophers, MacIntyre’s book urges a return toward moral traditions embedded in local communities as the best route to avoid what he regards as the soullessness of modernity and the abyss of Nietzschean philosophy. But his failure to reflect on the political valence of traditions in general or the Aristotelian and Thomist ones he values, seriously compromises his complaints about modernity and his suggestions for ways out.

scholarly journals Ciência, ética e sociedade: a regulação da prática científica

Caderno CRH ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (spe2) ◽  
pp. 161-167
Author(s):  
Telma de Souza Birchal
Keyword(s):  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Modus Operandi

Neste texto, pretendemos mostrar como, nas últimas décadas, a relação entre a ciência e a ética tornou-se central na prática científica. Questões recentes desafiam o comprometimento do conhecimento científico com uma visão objetiva das coisas e com a promoção da felicidade. Para pensar tais questões, tomamos de empréstimo o conceito de prática, tal como explicitado pelo filósofo moral escocês Alasdair MacIntyre, no intuito de compreender a relação entre as questões propriamente ligadas ao conhecimento científico e as questões ligadas à utilidade da ciência. Como conclusão, julgamos que cabe destacar uma tarefa atual para os cientistas: a de defender não só os clássicos valores intrínsecos da ciência, definidores de sua própria prática, mas também de atentar para o lugar vital que a ciência ocupa em nossa sociedade e para os seus chamados valores extrínsecos, que, na verdade, fazem parte de seu modus operandi.

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