Reformed Virtue after Barth: Developing Moral Virtue Ethics in the Reformed Tradition by Kirk J. Nolan

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-214
Author(s):  
Amos Winarto Oei
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Reformed Tradition

Aristotelian Virtue and Its Limitations

Philosophy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 69 (269) ◽  
pp. 291-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christipher Cordner
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Living Well ◽  
The World ◽  
Good Will ◽  
The Will

‘Virtue ethics’ is prominent, if not pre-eminent, in contemporary moral philosophy. The philosophical model for most of those urging a ‘virtues approach’ to ethics is of course Aristotle. Some features, at least, of the motivation to this renewed concern with Aristotelian ethical thought are fairly clear. Notoriously, Kant held that the only thing good without qualification is the good will; and he then made it difficult to grasp what made the will good when he denied that it could be its preoccupation with or attention to anything in the world. The idea of the good will then seems to be an idea of something which transcends the world, and therefore to be no easier to make sense of, or to believe in, than Plato′s form of the good is usually thought to be. The first obvious attraction of Aristotle′s ethics, then—at least to those of an empiricist or worldly cast of mind—is that it promises an understanding of the ethical which locates that robustly within the world. Aristotle′s virtues are real this-worldly existences. They are, moreover, qualities whose place in our lives seems to be explained readily, and attractively, in Aristotelian terms. Moral virtue is essentially connected with eudaimonia, a concept variously construed as happiness, as living well, or even as flourishing. Morality is important because of the contribution it makes to the living of a fully human life. And a ‘fully human’ life is characterizable in what modernity calls ‘humanist’, or sometimes ‘naturalistic’, terms: it requires no invocation of transcendence or other-worldliness.

scholarly journals The Possibility of Virtue

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Alzola
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Observational Equivalence ◽  
Business Context ◽  
Overt Behavior

ABSTRACT:To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing.

Humility and Human Flourishing

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael W. Austin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
New Testament ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Spiritual Disciplines ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theology ◽  
Spiritual Life ◽  
Human Flourishing

In many Christian traditions, humility is often thought to play a central role in the moral and spiritual life. In this study of the moral virtue of humility, the methods of analytic philosophy are applied to the field of moral theology in order to analyze this virtue and its connections to human flourishing. The book is therefore best characterized as a work in analytic moral theology, and has two primary aims. First, it articulates and defends a particular Christian conception of the virtue of humility. It offers a Christological account of this trait, one that is grounded in the gospel accounts of the life of Christ as well as other key New Testament passages. The view of humility it offers and defends is biblically grounded, theologically informed, and philosophically sound. Second, this book describes ways in which humility is constitutive of and conducive to human flourishing, Christianly understood. It argues that humility is rational, benefits its possessor, and contributes to its possessor being good qua human. It also examines several issues in applied virtue ethics. It considers some of the ways in which humility is relevant to several of the classic spiritual disciplines, such as prayer, fasting, solitude, silence, and service. It considers humility’s relevance to issues related to religious pluralism and tolerance. Finally, the book concludes with a discussion of the relevance of humility for family life and how it can function as a virtue in the context of sport.

Geulincx

2020 ◽  
pp. 183-217
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Underlying Assumption ◽  
Body Interaction ◽  
Underlying Theory ◽  
Christian Teaching

Chapter 5 shows how Geulincx uses occasionalism to develop a virtue ethics that is consistent with both Cartesian metaphysics and Christian teaching. Section 5.1 surveys Geulincx’s main arguments for occasionalism, and argues that Geulincx did not see occasionalism as providing an explanation of mind–body interaction. Section 5.2 focuses on an underlying assumption of one of Geulincx’s arguments, namely the principle, “Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis.” Section 5.2 argues that Geulincx takes this principle to be self-evident (and not justified on the basis of an underlying theory of causation, on which all agency is volitional). Section 5.3 shows how Geulincx took this principle to cohere with Cartesianism, and explains the role of occasionalism in his account of the virtue of humility. Section 5.4 concludes that Geulincx uses occasionalism to defend the compatibility of Cartesian metaphysics with Christian theology, and to supplement Cartesianism with a theory of moral virtue.

The Illusion of Freedom Separated From Moral Virtue

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Raymond L. Dennehy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Moral Vision ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Individual

This essay proposes that liberal democracy cannot survive unless a monistic virtue ethics permeates its culture, A monistic philosophical conception of virtue ethics has its roots in natural law theory and, for that reason, offers a rationally defensible basis for a unified moral vision in a pluralistic society. Such a monistic virtue ethics--insofar as it is a virtue ethics--forms individual character so that a person not only knows how to act, but desires to act that way and, moreover, possesses the integration of character to be able to act that way. This is a crucial consideration, for immoral choices create a bad character that inclines the individual to increasingly worse choices, A nation whose members lack moral virtue cannot sustain its commitment to freedom and equality for all.

The Westminster Standards and the possibility of a Reformed virtue ethic

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Hunsicker
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Virtue Ethic ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Divine Sovereignty ◽  
Reformed Tradition ◽  
Material Content ◽  
Divine Agency

AbstractThe renaissance of virtue ethics in Christian moral discourse has led a handful of Reformed theologians to consider whether or not the Reformed tradition is compatible with classical and medieval concepts of virtue. Barthians, in particular, express doubt regarding the prospect of such a retrieval, arguing that classical notions of virtue compromise the Reformed hallmark of divine sovereignty and Luther's dictumsimul justus et peccator.This essay counters that the Reformed tradition is broad enough to find more productive ways to engage virtue ethics. In particular, the Westminster Standards provideboththe formal space for a significant theological exploration of human agencyandthe material content for the development of something like a classical virtue ethic. Barthian concerns regarding divine sovereignty and moral progress are satisfied by a demonstration that Westminster's attention to human agency is always within the context of a greater emphasis on divine agency.

scholarly journals ’n Etiek van liefde: Die etiese perspektiewe van die Heidelbergse Kategismus

2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Koos Vorster
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Reformed Tradition ◽  
Moral Conduct ◽  
Ten Commandments ◽  
Ministry Of The Word

Hierdie artikel behandel die etiese perspektiewe van die Heidelbergse Kategismus – een van die prominente belydenisskrifte in die gereformeerde tradisie. Die etiese relevansie is ingebed in die konfessie se verklaring van die tien gebooie. Die artikel verduidelik dat die etiek van die Heidelbergse Kategismus ten diepste ’n karakteretiek is en dat dit gelowiges oproep tot ’n etiek van liefde. Hierdie liefde sluit in liefde vir die verbondsgemeenskap, die bediening van die Woord, die heiligheid van God en die waardigheid van mense, die gemeenskap van die gelowiges, gesag, die lewe, die huwelik, privaatbesit en arbeid asook waarheid en geregtigheid. As gevolg van die sinekdogeekarakter van die wet is hierdie etiek van liefde vandag baie relevant.This article deals with the ethical relevance of one of the prominent confessions in the reformed tradition, namely the Heidelberg Cathechism. The ethical relevance lies in the confession’s elucidation of the ten commandments and its application to moral conduct. The article explains that the ethics of the Heidelberg Catechism is essentially a virtue ethics calling for an ethics of love. This love should include love for the covenantal communion, ministry of the Word, the holiness of God and the dignity of people, the communion of the saints, authority, life, marriage, private property and labour, and truth and justice. Due to the synecdochical character of the ten commandments this ethics of love is highy relevant in the present times.

It Ain’t Necessarily So

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomy Arpaly
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Virtuous Life ◽  
Main Thing ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Rule Out

According to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, the virtuous life constitutes or is the main thing required for flourishing or the good life. This chapter argues that while it might be plausible that, as Rosalind Hursthouse claims, moral virtue is a better bet than moral vice for the person who wants to flourish, the neo-Aristotelian fails to rule out the possibility that a morally mediocre life could be better than either.

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