Self-Knowledge and the Approximation of Divine Judgment: Conscience in the Practical Philosophy and Moral Theology of Immanuel Kant

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Morgan
Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Belov ◽  
◽  
Aleksandra Yu. Berdnikova ◽  
Yulia G. Karagod ◽  
◽  
...  

The article analyzes the main characteristic features of the philosophy of religion of the founder of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism Hermann Cohen. Special attention is paid to Cohen’s criticism and reinterpretation of Kant’s “practical philosophy” from the point of view of the philosophy of religion: Cohen supplements and expands Kant’s provisions on moral law and moral duty, interpreting them as divine commandments. The authors emphasize the fundamental importance for Cohen of the “internal similarity” between Kant’s ethical teaching and the main provisions of Judaism. The sources of Kant’s own ideas about the Jewish tradition are shown, which include the work of Moses Mendelssohn “Jerusalem” and the “Theologicalpolitical treatise” by Baruch Spinoza. Cohen’s criticism of these works is analyzed an much attention is paid to the consideration of Cohen’s attitude to Spinoza’s philosophical legacy in general. The interpretation of the postulates of Judaism by Cohen (and their “inner kinship” with Kant’s moral philosophy) in ethical, logical, and political contexts is presented. Cohen’s understanding of such religious-philosophical and doctrinal phenomena as law, grace, Revelation, teaching, the Torah, messianism, freedom, the Old Testament and the New Testament, etc. is provided and analyzed. The main points of Cohen’s religious teaching as “ethical monotheism” are considered; in particular, the authors analyze his understanding of the idea of God as “the only one”, which is highlighted in the works of Paul Natorp. It is concluded that Cohen’s philosophy of religion, which is based on the postulates of Judaism as well as Kant’s “practical philosophy”, could be characterized by the terms “ethical monotheism”, “universalism” and “humanism”.


2018 ◽  
pp. 203-224
Author(s):  
Steen Nepper Larsen

In his late work Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), Immanuel Kant depicts the internal processes in the brain as something that cannot have the interest of a pragmatic anthropology. His profound teleology of nature does not bind the idea of man’s selfperfection to the nature of the brain. In her work Que faire de notre cerveau? (What Should We Do With Our Brain?) from 2004, Catherine Malabou argues that this question of what we should do with our brain needs a self-conscious and political answer. We can and should try to regain control of the processes that mold the cerebral constitution of man. This article discusses the arguments behind the two opposite ʻpositions’ in practical philosophy in a broader philosophical anthropological perspective. What are the limits of Kant’s approach to the brain and does Malabou’s normative project find its take-off in voluntarism?


Romanticism ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-200
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Ford

One way of describing late Romanticism involves looking at how Romanticism ended. Here, I examine a cluster of epistemological breaks that occurred at the end of the 1830s, and which concerned computers, communism and climate change. As three things that have happened to us but not to the Romantics, these can be recognised as determinate indications of our defining post-Romanticism. I show how ideas, tropes and figures of atmospheric Romanticism were repurposed and transformed in each of these three cases to inspire radically different currents of thought. With Charles Babbage, atmosphere became a computational platform for moral theology; with Karl Marx, it became an epistemological material of social revolution; and with John Ruskin, it became a global infrastructure of scientific self-knowledge. In each case, the break paradoxically involved a formalisation of a Romantic principle: that a description of an atmosphere is also a self-description.


Author(s):  
Katrin A. Flikschuh

This chapter examines the political ideas of Immanuel Kant. Kant is widely regarded as a precursor to current political liberalism. There are many aspects of Kant's political philosophy, including his property argument, that remain poorly understood and unjustly neglected. Many other aspects, including his cosmopolitanism, reveal Kant as perhaps one of the most systematic and consistent political thinkers. Underlying all these aspects of his political philosophy is an abiding commitment to his epistemological method of transcendental idealism. After providing a short biography of Kant, this chapter considers his epistemology as well as the relationship between virtue and justice in his practical philosophy. It also explores a number of themes in Kant's political thinking, including the idea of external freedom, the nature of political obligation, the vindication of property rights, the denial of a right to revolution, and the cosmopolitan scope of Kantian justice.


1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem J. Ouweneel

At the time when Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen are credited with having founded anthropology as a separate branch of philosophy, Herman Dooyeweerd deserves the merit of having created a total view (Gesamtanschauung) of the human person on the basis not of a humanistic but a Christian cosmology.2 He was deeply conscious of the fact that philosophy as such is not capable of fathoming the essence of humankind. Philosophy, in his opinion, is bound to the temporal horizon, while the human ego transcends this horizon. The philosopher acquires a view of this ego only in its relation to God. Since this relation is religious in nature, the knowledge of self is also religious in nature. This true self-knowledge is effected by the revelation of God’s Word in the heart, the religious centre of human existence, through the power of the Holy Spirit. Dooyeweerd’s anthropology is therefore a transcendental anthropology, founded as it is on this transcendental critique of theoretical thought. In this transcendental critique the point of synthesis of theoretical thought is not found in some transcendental logical ego, in the sense of Immanuel Kant, but in the transcendent-religious ego of the human person.


Author(s):  
Laura Papish

Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform explores the cognitive dimensions of evil and moral reform in Immanuel Kant’s mature ethical theory. Its questions include what self-deception is for Kant, why and how it is connected to evil, and how we achieve the self-knowledge that should take the place of self-deceit. Crucial related issues discussed in the book include the role of hedonism in Kant’s practical philosophy, the adequacy of Kant’s theory of character, Kant’s accounts of moral weakness and moral strength, the alleged universality of evil in human nature, how social institutions and interpersonal relationships facilitate self-knowledge, and the role of the ethical community in moral reform. Working with both Kant’s core texts on ethics and materials less often cited within scholarship on Kant’s practical philosophy (such as Kant’s logic lectures), this book addresses a significant gap in the existing literature, which generally favors—but does not adequately discuss or defend—Kant’s repeat allusions to the idea that evil requires self-deceit. Through its exploration of how self-deceptive rationalization and self-cognition relate, respectively, to evil and its overcoming, this book investigates, defends, and provides a new lens for understanding Kant’s treatment of evil while engaging the most influential—and often scathing—of Kant’s critics.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This book presents a volume of writings on knowledge, perception, and meaning from this millennium. The volume opens with introductory pieces on the practice of philosophy. Some of the chapters are epistemological, including new approaches to questions about perception and knowledge. Others examine self-knowledge and knowledge of one’s own actions, with links with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Immanuel Kant. One chapter presents an attempt to say in the simplest, least-cluttered terms exactly what Kant’s transcendental deduction is really meant to do. There are three chapters about the nature and reality of colours. Another chapter is about Kant and Gottlob Frege and necessary truth. Two more consider meaning and understanding, first in Wittgenstein and then in both Donald Davidson and Wittgenstein. The final chapter attempts, among other things, to connect questions of meaning with questions of evaluation and morality.


Author(s):  
P. S. Dreyer

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Protestant theological structures Kant’s critical epistemology destroyed the idea of scientific metaphysics (valid up to Wolff) as the foundation of theology. Kant, however, reconstructed his own metaphysics on the basis of practical reason. In this scheme metaphysics and ethics are interwoven and culminate in a religion exclusively based on and conditioned by pure reason, usually known as Kant’s moral theology or rational religion. The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to give a very short exposition of the basic concepts of Kant’s moral theology, and secondly, to show its decisive influence on post Kantian protestant view of religion.


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