Composition as Identity, the Identical With Or Different From Argument in Bodhicaryāvatāra 8.90-103 (and Elsewhere), and Category Mistakes

Composition occurs when one or more objects are parts of another object. The metaphysics of composition concerns the nature of composition – i.e. what it is, and how it works. Some of the more important questions philosophers have regarding the metaphysics of composition are the following: (1) When does composition occur? This is van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question’. Four prominent answers to this question include: (i) objects compose another object when those former objects are in contact; (ii) any two or more objects compose another object; (iii) objects never compose another object; (iv) objects compose another object when the activities of the former objects constitute a life. (2) Are composite objects identical with their parts? Proponents of ‘composition as identity’ answer ‘yes’ to this question. There are two primary variants of composition as identity, ‘strong’ composition as identity and ‘weak’ composition as identity. The most prominent objection to strong composition as identity is an objection from Leibniz’s Law: composite objects cannot be identical with their parts, since they seem to have properties which their parts do not have. (3) Is it possible for one object to constitute another object? Here ‘constitution’ is the relation which is alleged to obtain between, for example, a clay statue and the lump of clay from which it is formed. We can distinguish between the thesis that constitution is identity, and the thesis that constitution is not identity. The chief motivation which leads some philosophers to reject the thesis that constitution is not identity is the ‘grounding problem’ for that thesis. (4) Are there, in addition to composite objects, the ‘forms’ of those objects, and if so, what is the relationship between composite objects and their forms? We can distinguish between (at least) two variants of hylomorphism (the thesis that objects have forms), with the main distinction between the two views being whether or not they regard forms as being among the parts of composite objects.

Download Full-text

Ryle and Strawson on Category Mistakes

Ryle on Mind and Language ◽

10.1057/9781137476203.0005 ◽

2015 ◽

Author(s):

Jonathan Dancy

Keyword(s):

Category Mistakes

Download Full-text

Composition as Identity in the Parmenides and Sophist

Plato on Parts and Wholes ◽

10.1093/0198236751.003.0003 ◽

2002 ◽

pp. 48-116

Author(s):

Verity Harte

Keyword(s):

Composition As Identity

Download Full-text

The illusion of technique: sustained enterprise innovation as an aspirational problem

International Journal of Innovation Science ◽

10.1108/ijis-06-2017-0057 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (2) ◽

pp. 162-176

Author(s):

Thomas Duening

Keyword(s):

Category Mistake ◽

Blind Alley ◽

Content Type ◽

Operational Problem ◽

The Face ◽

Enterprise Innovation ◽

Increasing Demand ◽

Research Frameworks ◽

The Impact ◽

Category Mistakes

Purpose This paper is based on insights from philosophy of science, centered in Gilbert Ryle’s notion of “category mistakes”. A category mistake occurs in a science when scholars have been thinking of a phenomenon as of a certain sort, when it is really nothing of the kind. This paper aims to claim that regarding sustained enterprise innovation (SEI) as a strictly operational problem commits such a category mistake. Instead, SEI is an aspirational problem and thus requires scholars to examine it from that perspective as well. Design/methodology/approach This paper begins by explicating Ryle’s notion of a category mistake. It develops the suggestion that innovation scholars have made such a mistake by thinking of innovation as a strictly operational problem. In reality, it is as much an aspirational problem. The paper then builds on the metaphor made famous by Isaiah Berlin, distinguishing between hedgehogs and foxes. A hedgehog is a leader who copes with the non-predictive nature of innovation. The paper builds on the findings from positive psychology and virtue epistemology to highlight how humans can act rationally in the face of non-predictive outcomes. Four virtues of hedgehog leadership are proposed and defined. Findings The paper concludes that hedgehog leadership is necessary for sustained enterprise innovation. It also concludes that hedgehogs can act rationally in pursuit of non-predictive outcomes by practicing a set of governing virtues. Research limitations/implications Further research needs to be conducted to validate the proposed governing virtues, to illuminate the optimal hedgehog/fox balance within the enterprise, and to validate through longitudinal work the impact of hedgehogs on sustained enterprise innovation. Practical implications Based on the continuing interest in innovation expressed by enterprise leaders around the world, hedgehogs are in increasing demand. Fortunately, hedgehogs can be made (and self-made) via deliberate practice of the governing virtues. Aspiring and current hedgehogs can be confident that practicing these virtues and becoming increasingly adept at their application will promote and effect enterprise innovation. Originality/value Very little research has been conducted on the aspirational aspect of SEI. This is an insidious gap in the literature, as it affects scholars and practitioners alike. Scholars are trapped in the “normal science” paradigm that treats the innovation problem as if it can be solved through operational techniques. This paper contends that this ubiquitous category mistake has led scholars down a blind alley. Instead, it is important for scholars and practitioners alike to view SEI as an aspirational problem that requires vastly different research frameworks and practitioner prescriptions.

Download Full-text