Narrative Identity and Narrative Imperialism: A Response to Galen Strawson and James Phelan

Narrative ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul John Eakin
2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-373
Author(s):  
Andreea Deciu Ritivoi

In this paper I review some of the key elements of Alasdair MacIntyre’s conception of narrative identity. I focus on his notions of tradition and unified self, which have been interpreted by some critics as signs of a political conservatism and elitism. My argument proceeds by reviewing the critiques offered by Galen Strawson and Hilde Lindemann Nelson, both concerned with the conflict between tradition and choice. While Strawson and Nelson believe that traditions are oppressive at least to some individuals, MacIntyre offers a more complex understanding of tradition, emphasizing that traditions embody conflicts. In proposing a different reading of these concepts, one I claim is more accurate, I suggest that MacIntyre’s concept of narrative selfhood can serve as foundation of a political theory that is utopian in a standard liberal way.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-89
Author(s):  
Kristofer Camilo Arca

As narrative conceptions of selfhood have gained more acceptance within various disciplines including philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences, so too have these conceptions been critically appraised. Chief among those who are suspicious of the overall viability of ‘narrative identity’ is the philosopher, Galen Strawson. In this paper, I develop five arguments underlying Strawson’s critique of narrative identity, and respond to each argument from the perspective of the hermeneutic phenomenology of Paul Ricœur. Though intuitive, I demonstrate that none of Strawson’s arguments are cogent. The confrontation between these two figures highlights a deep conceptual disagreement about our epistemic access to the self, which has thus far gone unrecognized in the Anglo-American discussion, so that it raises a new problem for the metaphysics of personal identity.


Author(s):  
Thomas DeGloma ◽  
Erin F. Johnston

This chapter explores the ways individuals account for cognitive migrations—significant changes of mind and consciousness that are often expressed as powerful discoveries, transformative experiences, and newly embraced worldviews. It outlines three ideal typical forms of cognitive migration: awakenings, self-actualizations, and ongoing quests. Building on prior approaches to such personal transformations, it develops the notion of cognitive migration to argue the following set of interrelated points. First, cognitive migrations take autobiographical form, which is to say they manifest as the narrative identity work of individuals who undergo them. Second, such narrative identity work provides a reflexive foundation for an individual’s understanding of self and identity in relation to other possible selves and identities—for seeing oneself as a relationally situated character. Third, individuals who articulate cognitive migrations use the plot structure and cultural coding at the root of their narratives to express their allegiance to a new sociomental community. They thereby take on new cognitive norms and identity-defining conventions while rejecting potential alternatives, locating themselves within a broader sociomental field. The spatial metaphor of cognitive migrations draws explicit attention to the broader sociomental field in which such radical changes of mind take place. Finally, such narrative identity work links self-understandings to the often-contested meanings of broadly relevant issues, events, and experiences; when individuals account for their cognitive migrations, they also advance claims that reach well-beyond their personal lives.


Author(s):  
Kateřina Glumbíková

Abstract Discourse on the normative use of reflexivity predominates in the professional literature. Expert articles on the topic of non-normative use of reflexivity, which is based on the presumption that social workers do not use reflexivity to improve their work quality, but rather its functions for themselves to fulfil specific purposes, is missing, with some exceptions in the literature. The presented article therefore aims to understand the use of reflexivity in the practice of social work with families in its non-normative concept and to determine the implications for social work. Using the abduction method (in which Schechtman’s narrative identity theory was applied to data analysis), the following four categories of the use of reflexivity in a non-normative way were saturated with data obtained from initial interviews, field observations and subsequent reflection of field observations with social workers: personal interest, survival, moral responsibility and compensation. The non-normative concept of reflexivity is further discussed in the context of specific implications for education and practice of social work.


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