Conquered: Why the Army of Tennessee Failed by Larry J. Daniel

2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 512-514
Author(s):  
Patrick A. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
1995 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 613
Author(s):  
Charles F. Bryan Jr. ◽  
Glenna R. Schroeder-Lein
Keyword(s):  

1999 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 416
Author(s):  
Philip L. Secrist ◽  
Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr.
Keyword(s):  

Conquered ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 303-311
Author(s):  
Larry J. Daniel

There were several reasons the Army of Tennessee kept fighting despite demoralizing losses. Some considered the war a fight to the death; that is, being brought back into the Union was not an option. Others hoped for foreign intervention, but most knew this was unlikely. Some found comfort in rumors of international recognition. Others believed the war would bankrupt the North. The re-election of Republican Abraham Lincoln ended hopes that a Democrat in office would end the war and grant the south its wishes. In general, the Army of Tennessee believed that they could keep fighting until the North was too war-weary to continue. There was no talk of surrender.


Conquered ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Larry J. Daniel

Beginning in May 1864, the Army of Tennessee engaged in several confrontations with Sherman’s Union forces. At the Battle of New Hope Church, the Union sustained 1,732 casualties while the Confederates only sustained 448. The battle was dubbed “The Hell Hole” because of the gruesome sight of so many dead Union soldiers. In a subsequent battle, Sherman lost 1,600 and Cleburne’s division only lost 500. Despite these victories, Johnston and the Army of Tennessee were gradually pushed back to Atlanta. Officer Hood replaced Johnston after Davis and other military officials expressed displeasure at Johnston’s constant retreating and lack of plan for defending Atlanta. After several engagements throughout August and July, the Confederates lost Atlanta.


Conquered ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 277-284
Author(s):  
Larry J. Daniel

The sight of refugees and damaged towns and countryside often lowered troop morale. Some historians argue that after mid-1863, the Union adopted an unofficial strategy that consisted of destroying private property, which took a significant toll on civilians. Labor shortages left non-slave holding Whites in a tough position, and many women and children faced poverty with the men in their familial units absent. Many men in the Army of Tennessee suffered from severe homesickness and expressed this in letters to their families.


Conquered ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 213-228
Author(s):  
Larry J. Daniel

Feeding the men and animals of the Army of Tennessee required thousands of tons of food to be transported by wagon, train, and steamboat. In addition to transportation, feeding the army proved difficult because its food supply had to be shared with other branches of the Confederate Army. Soldiers often complained of monotonous rations. Capt. Moses H. Wright’s Atlanta Arsenal supplied most of the Army of Tennessee’s ammunition. However, the Atlanta Arsenal struggled to keep up with demand, and army personnel complained about defective equipment. An attempt to uniformly equip soldiers with weapons ultimately failed. The Atlanta Quartermaster Depot made shoes exclusively for the Army of Tennessee. This depot also made clothing for the army. Shortages of clothing and shoes persisted. The Army of Tennessee relied on the Western & Atlantic railroad to transport materials from Atlanta, which at times did not have enough engines to provide adequate supplies. Overall, the Army of Tennessee had industrial assets, but an inadequate transportation system led to meat shortages, which decreased morale and resulted in desertions. Additionally, the poor transportation system prevented additional troops from reaching the disastrous Battle of Chickamauga.


Conquered ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 146-157
Author(s):  
Larry J. Daniel

Two revivals occurred in the Army of Tennessee: The first in spring 1863 and the second in Winter 1864. Before the revivals, the army was generally apathetic toward religion. The war had been dragging on with no victory in sight, and some thought individual soldiers must begin behaving more righteously to ensure God’s favor for the cause. Then, in late April and early May, visiting ministers inspired a revival. The ministers were not very focused on dogma or denominationalism, but believed because slavery was part of God’s design that he would ensure a Confederate victory. Bragg was not swept up in revivals but did get baptised in June. Ultimately, the new religious fervor boosted morale. The revival in February 1864 coincided with enlistment.


Author(s):  
Earl J. Hess

When Hood replaced Johnston on July 18, the Army of Tennessee launched three tactical offensives in an attempt to prevent Sherman from snipping the rail lines feeding Atlanta. Temporary field fortifications played an important role in all three engagements. At Peach Tree Creek, on July 20, the Confederates took the Army of the Cumberland by surprise as it was crossing the stream but hasty breastworks shielded most Federal units as they repelled the attack. At the battle of Atlanta, on July 22, the Confederates very nearly crushed Sherman’s left flank but 17th Corps troops were able to hold on because they fought from both sides of their earthworks as needed to repel attacks from different directions. At Ezra Church on July 28, 15th Corps troops barely held on to their position on top of a low ridge with minimal breastworks to help them. In all three cases, hasty fieldworks added an important element in defensive capability that made a difference in the outcome of the battles.


Author(s):  
William Glenn Robertson

This chapter describes Braxton Bragg’s evacuation of Chattanooga and the movement of the Army of Tennessee southeastward from the city. It also describes the pause of William Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland because of supply delays and a dearth of information about Confederate movements. Nevertheless, some Federal units began to ascend Lookout Mountain. Elsewhere, Confederate units from both east and west began to move toward Chattanooga to reinforce the Army of Tennessee.


Author(s):  
William Glenn Robertson

This chapter describes both the completion of and collapse of the Bridgeport bridge, throwing William Rosecrans’s timetable for the advance of the Army of the Cumberland beyond the Tennessee River into serious disarray. Unaware of Rosecrans’s logistical problems, Braxton Bragg continued to concentrate the Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga for offensive movement. While Bragg pondered his options, units of the Army of the Cumberland crossed another major terrain feature, Sand Mountain, and headed for the next obstacle, Lookout Mountain. A Federal crossing of Lookout Mountain would effectively outflank Bragg in Chattanooga.


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