The Political Economy of Postwar Family Policy in Japan: Economic Imperatives and Electoral Incentives

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priscilla A. Lambert
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Family Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Incentives

The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takaaki Masaki
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Geographical Distribution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Development Projects ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Aid Allocation ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Swing Voters

Abstract:This article utilizes a newly available dataset on the geographical distribution of development projects in Zambia to test whether electoral incentives shape aid allocation at the subnational level. Based on this dataset, it argues that when political elites have limited information to target distributive goods specifically to swing voters, they allocate more donor projects to districts where opposition to the incumbent is strong, as opposed to districts where the incumbent enjoys greater popularity.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1316-1334 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADITYA DASGUPTA ◽  
DEVESH KAPUR
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rural Development ◽  
Nationwide Survey ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Government Programs ◽  
Quantitative Evidence ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Administrative Units ◽  
Bureaucratic Behavior

Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for poor implementation emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture. This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload: local bureaucrats are often heavily under-resourced relative to their responsibilities. We advance a two-step theory explaining why bureaucratic overload is detrimental to implementation as well as why politicians under-invest in local bureaucracy, emphasizing a lack of electoral incentives. Drawing on a nationwide survey of local rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries that measure their daily behavior, we provide quantitative evidence that (i) officials with fewer resources are worse at implementing rural development programs, plausibly because they are unable to allocate enough time to managerial tasks and (ii) fewer resources are provided in administrative units where political responsibility for implementation is less clear. The findings shed light on the political economy and bureaucratic behavior underpinning weak local state capacity.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Dasgupta ◽  
Devesh Kapur
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rural Development ◽  
Nationwide Survey ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Government Programs ◽  
Quantitative Evidence ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Administrative Units ◽  
Bureaucratic Behavior

Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for poor implementation emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture. This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload: local bureaucrats are often heavily under-resourced relative to their responsibilities. We advance a two-step theory explaining why bureaucratic overload is detrimental to implementation as well as why politicians under-invest in local bureaucracy, emphasizing a lack of electoral incentives. Drawing on a nationwide survey of local rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries that measure their daily behavior, we provide quantitative evidence that (i) officials with fewer resources are worse at implementing rural development programs, plausibly because they are unable to allocate enough time to managerial tasks and (ii) fewer resources are provided in administrative units where political responsibility for implementation is less clear. The findings shed light on the political economy and bureaucratic behavior underpinning weak local state capacity.

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