The Golden Age of Philosophy of Science, 1945 to 2000: Logical Reconstruction, Descriptivism, Normative, Naturalism, and Foundationalism by John Losee

2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-414
Author(s):  
Daniel J. McKaughan
2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 170-193
Author(s):  
Elías Manuel Capriles

Buddhism has always produced epistemological systems, and those of the Mahāyāna, in particular, always showed knowledge and perception to be inherently delusive. “Higher” forms of Buddhism have a degenerative philosophy of history according to which a sort of Golden Age was disrupted by the rise and gradual development of knowledge and the delusion inherent in it, which have reached their apex in our time – the final phase of the “Era of Darkness.” From this standpoint, this paper intends to show science, in which Marcuse saw an inherent instrumental/technological interest, to have been developed by delusion and to have simultaneously furthered the development of delusion, to the point at which they begot the deadly ecological crisis proper to this concluding phase of the Era of Darkness – which reveals as such the delusion at its root, achieving the latter’s empirical reductio ad absurdum and offering us the possibility of eradicating it and thus healing our minds and, hopefully, our world.


1989 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Mouck

Developments in accounting methodology during the 1960s are contrasted with concurrent developments in philosophy of science. The 1960s was a decade characterized by the widespread adoption of “the scientific method” in accounting methodology. The same decade was characterized by the degeneration of any semblance of consensus among philosophers of science regarding the nature of scientific inquiry. The irony of these incongruous but simultaneous developments is highlighted with the intent of weakening the current atmosphere of uncritical reverence for science and “the scientific method” in accounting research. A more contemporary (and more open) view of science — the postempiricist view — also is discussed.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Losee ◽  
Paul Dicken ◽  
Jeffrey Koperski

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 416-447
Author(s):  
Brian A. Rutherford

Purpose The received wisdom on classical accounting thought is that its early stages were methodologically vacuous, while, in its “golden” age, it espoused the methods and philosophical commitments of received-view hypothetico-deductivism but actually remained methodologically incoherent. The purpose of this paper is to argue, to the contrary, that classical accounting thought possesses a coherent constitutional structure that qualifies as a methodology and unifies it as a body of argument. Design/methodology/approach The paper draws on Cartwright’s metaphysical nomological pluralism, which holds that we should attend to the actual practices of successful inquiry and the methodologies and metaphysical presuppositions that support it. Findings The paper argues that accounting does achieve disciplinary success and that classical accounting thought, using the methodology of defeasible postulationism, provides the theoretical infrastructure that supports that success. The accounting domain is a world of “dappled realism”, in which theories are useful in the construction of reporting schemes and inform our understanding of the nature of the domain. Research limitations/implications Applying metaphysical nomological pluralism rescues classical accounting thought from the charge of methodological incoherence and metaphysical naivety. Originality/value The paper justifies a place for classical accounting theorising in the endeavours of modern accounting scholarship and moves the analysis of classical accounting thought within a philosophy of science framework towards an approach with a contemporary resonance.


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