Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency (review)

2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-134
Author(s):  
Henry Southgate
Keyword(s):  
Logic Of Agency

scholarly journals On the Axiomatisation of Elgesem's Logic of Agency and Ability

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Antonino Rotolo
Keyword(s):  
Logic Of Agency

On the Dynamic Logic of Agency and Action

Studia Logica ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chrysafis Hartonas
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Logic ◽  
Logic Of Agency

Anselm’s Logic of Agency

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 248-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara L. Uckelman
Keyword(s):  
Logic Of Agency

Time and modality in the logic of agency

Studia Logica ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 51 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 485-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Chellas
Keyword(s):  
Logic Of Agency

scholarly journals Some Forms of Collectively Bringing About or ‘Seeing to it that’

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Sergot
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Collective Agency ◽  
Individual Agent ◽  
Joint Actions ◽  
Logic Of Agency ◽  
Joint Intention

AbstractOne of the best known approaches to the logic of agency are the ‘stit’ (‘seeing to it that’) logics. Often, it is not the actions of an individual agent that bring about a certain outcome but the joint actions of a set of agents, collectively. Collective agency has received comparatively little attention in ‘stit’. The paper maps out several different forms, several different senses in which a particular set of agents, collectively, can be said to bring about a certain outcome, and examines how these forms can be expressed in ‘stit’ and stit-like logics. The outcome that is brought about may be unintentional, and perhaps even accidental; the account deliberately ignores aspects such as joint intention, communication between agents, awareness of other agents’ intentions and capabilities, even the awareness of another agent’s existence. The aim is to investigate what can be said about collective agency when all such considerations are ignored, besides mere consequences of joint actions. The account will be related to the ‘strictly stit’ of Belnap and Perloff (Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 9(1–2), 25–48 1993) and their suggestions concerning ‘inessential members’ and ‘mere bystanders’. We will adjust some of those conjectures and distinguish further between ‘potentially contributing bystanders’ and ‘impotent bystanders’.

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