Pirates, Kings and Reasons to Ad: Moral Motivation and the Role of Sanctions in Locke's Moral Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Sheridan

Locke's moral theory consists of two explicit and distinct elements — a broadly rationalist theory of natural law and a hedonistic conception of moral good. The rationalist account, which we find most prominently in his early Essays on the Law of Nature, is generally taken to consist in three things. First, Locke holds that our moral rules are founded on universal, divine natural laws. Second, such moral laws are taken to be discoverable by reason. Third, by dint of their divine authorship, moral laws are obligatory and rationally discernible as such. Locke's hedonism, which is developed most fully in his later Essay Concerning Human Understanding, consists in the view that all good amounts to pleasure, with specifically moral good taken to consist in the pleasurable consequences of discharging one's moral duties.

Locke Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 177-237
Author(s):  
Giuliana Di Biase

Between 1670 and 1687, Locke wrote some classifications of the branches of knowledge and some adversaria containing guidelines for the writing of commonplace books. Both are to be found in his notebooks and journals. Locke’s classifications represent an important source for investigating the role and relevance he attributed to traditional academic disciplines such as Theologia, Metaphysica, and Physica, and, in particular, his manner of conceiving of the object of theology. With reference to the latter, the classifications show important modifications over time: the first schemes (1670–72) are representative of a naturalistic approach to theology, whereas later schemes (1681) are more sensitive to the model introduced by the theological systems of Reformed theologians such as Polanus and Ames, who insisted on the practical dimension of the discipline. ‘Ethica sive lex naturae’, one of the subheadings of Theologia in Locke’s earlier classifications, is absent from those he wrote in 1681, having been substituted by ‘Moralia’: this substitution seems to be motivated by Locke’s intention to emphasize the relevance of the performance of moral duties, the objects of ‘Moralia’, in Christian life. In a later scheme dating from c.1686–7, Locke remoulds his manner of classifying completely—the outline is similar in some respects to the division of the sciences on the last pages of the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Theologia is subsumed under Physica, whereas Politia and Prudentia, two of the main headings in Locke’s earlier classifications, are positioned under a new heading, Practica, inspired by the Aristotelian model. Ethics is located under this heading, before Politia and Prudentia. This ordering might be due to Locke’s intention to emphasize the priority of ethics and its basis, natural law, with respect to politics and civil law, a priority which was not clearly represented in his previous schemes. In order to investigate the role and relevance attributed to ethics and natural law in Locke’s various classifications, I will focus on each scheme separately; in the conclusion, attention will be drawn to another, later outline of Theologia which Locke composed in 1694, where ethics is once again one of the branches of theology but there is no longer any mention of natural law. Revelation, not natural law, appears to be the basis of ethics in this later scheme.


2019 ◽  
pp. 67-80
Author(s):  
Fred Dallmayr

The chapter considers the origin and meaning of “natural law” and “natural rightness,” the core of right conduct, whose origin is sometimes placed in the cogito. This chapter emphasizes, instead, the role of contextual “relationality” in rules, whether “positive” social norms or “divine” rules, such as the Mosaic “laws” which were not imposed unilaterally by a divine potentate but reflected the people’s experience and “common sense” of right conduct. The chapter extends this argument to the work of Thomas Hobbes for whom transit from the “state of nature” to the “civil state” depended on reciprocal and relational “natural laws,” which he called “immutable and eternal” because they originate at the experiential boundary between life and death. Relationality prevails even when human norms are set aside in favor of “higher” rules—as revealed by Antigone of Thebes who appealed beyond state rules to the relationality between brother and sister.


1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Philip Stratton-Lake

It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Kant has influenced contemporary ethics. Whether or not one is sympathetic to his moral theory, one cannot ignore it, or the various ethical theories which draw their inspiration from it. Debates which have centred on Kantian themes include debates about whether moral requirements are categorical imperatives, whether they have an overriding authority, whether the various moral judgements we make can be codified, the role of duty in moral motivation, whether there are moral actions which are beyond the call of duty, the relation of morality to autonomy, and the very nature of moral judgement. The pervasiveness of Kant's influence makes it very difficult to write anything comprehensive on his relation to contemporary ethics, and I do not intend to attempt such an ambitious task here. Rather, in what follows I shall focus mainly on three distinctive features of Kant's ethics, which correspond roughly to the three chapters of the Groundwork.


Dialogue ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.B. Drury

In the seventeenth century, the concept of natural law was linked with that of “innate ideas”. Natural laws were said to be ideas imprinted by nature or by God on men's minds and were the very foundation of religion and morality. Locke's attack on innate ideas in the first book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is therefore considered to be an assault on natural law. Modern critics like Peter Laslett, W. von Leyden and Philip Abrams are of the opinion that Locke's critique of innate ideas in the Essay cannot be reconciled with the concept of natural law in the Two Treatises of Government.


Author(s):  
Anatolii P. Zaiets ◽  
Zoya O. Pohoryelova

The article analyzes the formation of the idea of natural law, which has an important theoretical and applied significance, as it makes it possible to better understand the essence of law, its connection with egalitarian and humanistic teachings. The research is based on modern philosophical worldview approaches, such general scientific research methods as axiological, anthropological, phenomenological, comparative-historical, comparative-legal, system-structural, hermeneutical, functional, institutional, as well as formal-legal method are used. The article examines the works of representatives of the Milesian school founded by Thales in the first half of the 6th century BC, whose analysis of human consciousness, human ability to create, transform the world, formulate ideas and implement them led to the idea of a universal Logos, a universal divine Mind, and the Law of Nature. The article reveals the contribution of sophists to the development of the idea of the natural law who justified the differences between natural and human law, defended the idea of equality of all people, called for not discriminating against citizens, depending on their origin, and denied slavery. The role of representatives of the stoicism school in substantiating the idea of natural law based on awareness of the fundamental difference between human nature and nature, justifying the existence of the unchangeable law of nature (lex naturale) in the form of common sense, equality of all people, recognition of slavery contrary to human nature, the need for recognition of human rights by law to preserve human dignity is highlighted. The article examines the influence of the ideas of the philosophers of Ancient Greece on the development of Roman law, the role of the Scipio group in this influence, and the essence of the then rational understanding of natural law as a true law, namely, common sense, which, in accordance with nature, concerns all people, is unchangeable and eternal


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Esther Gunawan

Ketika berhadapan dengan fenomena penderitaan manusia, kecenderungan yang dilakukan oleh kaum injili adalah meneropong penderitaan manusia tersebut berdasarkan kacamata kedaulatan dan providensia Allah yang tidak terelakkan atas diri manusia. Sikap pasrah berkaitan dengan kedaulatan Allah yang mutlak tersebut, tanpa disadari sebenarnya telah memunculkan konsep “fatalisme praktis.” Akibatnya, relasi erat antara hukum alam dan tanggung jawab manusia pada akhirnya menjadi hal yang terabaikan. Studi tentang konsep teodise C.S. Lewis ini diharapkan mampu memberikan paradigma baru bagi kaum injili di Indonesia dalam memandang masalah penderitaan manusia. Paradigma baru tersebut adalah cara pandang yang aktif dan positif terhadap peran hukum-hukum alam sebagai wahyu umum di balik fenomena penderitaan tersebut. Konteks natural kehidupan manusia dengan hukum-hukum alam yang tetap dan beraturan diharapkan dapat menjadi “kunci” untuk membuka “pintu rahasia” fenomena penderitaan manusia.  Kata-kata kunci: Clive S. Lewis, Teodise, Masalah Penderitaan, Hukum Alam, Wahyu Umum English : When faced with the phenomena of human suffering the default of the evangelical community is to examine human suffering through the lens of God’s sovereignty and providence which are inevitable forces faced by human beings. An attitude of fate, which arises as a direct response to God’s absolute sovereignty, actually leads to a concept of practical fatalism. The close relationship between natural law and human responsibility is ultimately neglected. It is hoped that a study of C. S. Lewis’ concept of theodicy can provide a new paradigm for the Indonesian evangelical community as it pertains to the problem of human suffering. This new paradigm proffers an active and positive estimation of the role of natural law as general revelation underlying the phenomena of suffering by positing the idea about the natural context of human life and the idea of fixed and uniform natural laws as a key to understanding the phenomena of human suffering. Keywords: Clive S. Lewis, Theodicy, The Problem of Suffering, Natural Law, Common Revelation


2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muzaffar Iqbal

This article attempts to present a comparative study of the role of two twentieth-century English translations of the Qur'an: cAbdullah Yūsuf cAlī's The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'ān and Muḥammad Asad's The Message of the Qur'ān. No two men could have been more different in their background, social and political milieu and life experiences than Yūsuf cAlī and Asad. Yūsuf 'Alī was born and raised in British India and had a brilliant but traditional middle-class academic career. Asad traversed a vast cultural and geographical terrain: from a highly-disciplined childhood in Europe to the deserts of Arabia. Both men lived ‘intensely’ and with deep spiritual yearning. At some time in each of their lives they decided to embark upon the translation of the Qur'an. Their efforts have provided us with two incredibly rich monumental works, which both reflect their own unique approaches and the effects of the times and circumstances in which they lived. A comparative study of these two translations can provide rich insights into the exegesis and the phenomenon of human understanding of the divine text.


Author(s):  
Mark S. Massa

This chapter presents an examination of the thoughts and writings of Lisa Sowle Cahill, a moral theologian at Boston College. Taking issue with both Germain Grisez and Jean Porter, Cahill seeks to construct a new paradigm of natural law that addresses feminist and poststructural scholars. Cahill believed that any paradigm of intercultural or interreligious ethics that purported to be describing moral duties in the real world must begin by exploring how ethical questions are intimately tied to the concrete experiences in specific (often religiously diverse) communities. Her paradigm addressed the concerns of feminist and postimperialist scholars in moving beyond the “false universalism” offered by paradigms like that of neo-scholasticism, while offering a “realist” understanding of social ethics that remained true to the realist impulses in Catholic moral theology.


The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 613
Author(s):  
Christopher Tollefsen

Critics of the “New” Natural Law (NNL) theory have raised questions about the role of the divine in that theory. This paper considers that role in regard to its account of human rights: can the NNL account of human rights be sustained without a more or less explicit advertence to “the question of God’s existence or nature or will”? It might seem that Finnis’s “elaborate sketch” includes a full theory of human rights even prior to the introduction of his reflections on the divine in the concluding chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights. But in this essay, I argue that an adequate account of human rights cannot, in fact, be sustained without some role for God’s creative activity in two dimensions, the ontological and the motivational. These dimensions must be distinguished from the epistemological dimension of human rights, that is, the question of whether epistemological access to truths about human rights is possible without reference to God’s existence, nature, or will. The NNL view is that such access is possible. However, I will argue, the epistemological cannot be entirely cabined off from the relevant ontological and motivational issues and the NNL framework can accommodate this fact without difficulty.


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