Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions from Mental Birth Control

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei A. Buckareff
Keyword(s):  
Birth Control ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Mental Actions ◽  
Orthodox View

Many, I suspect most, philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I will examine and critique one such challenge. I will consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I will defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Epistemology Of Perception ◽  
Mental Actions

This book is an exploration of the reorientations that take place when attention is given priority in the analysis of mind. In this book it is argued that attention has an explanatory role in understanding the concept of the intentionality or directedness of the mental; the nature of mental action in general; of specific mental actions such as intending, remembering, introspecting, and empathizing; the character of the phenomenal and of cognitive access; the unity of consciousness; the epistemology of perception; the nature of persons and their identity; the distinction between self and other, and the moral psychology that rests upon it.

scholarly journals ПСИХОЛІНГВІСТИЧНІ ОСНОВИ НАВЧАННЯ ПУНКТУАЦІЇ В ШКОЛІ

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (11(41)) ◽  
pp. 13-18
Author(s):  
Павлюк Н. П.
Keyword(s):  
Mental Action ◽  
Psychological Operations ◽  
Mental Actions

In the article the question of the poetapnogo forming of mental actions is affected, maintenance of psychological operations, which lie in the basis of opening of properties and signs of basic pounctouatsiynih concepts, and also forming of pounctouatsiynih skills, is found out; the structure of mental action is described on mastering of pounctouatsiynih rules and making of skills of competent letter.

Drifting and Directed Minds: The Significance of Mind-Wandering for Mental Agency

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (11) ◽  
pp. 614-644
Author(s):  
Zachary C. Irving ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Attentional Guidance ◽  
Analogous Question ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Mental Agency ◽  
Directed Thought

Perhaps the central question in action theory is this: what ingredient of bodily action is missing in mere behavior? But what is an analogous question for mental action? I ask this: what ingredient of active, goal-directed thought is missing in mind-wandering? My answer: attentional guidance. Attention is guided when you would feel pulled back from distractions. In contrast, mind-wandering drifts between topics unchecked. My unique starting point motivates new accounts of four central topics about mental action. First, its causal basis. Mind-wandering is a case study that allows us to tease apart two causes of mental action––guidance and motivation. Second, its experiential character. Goals are rarely the objects of awareness; rather, goals are “phenomenological frames” that carve experience into felt distractions and relevant information. Third, its scope. Intentional mind-wandering is a limit case of action where one actively cultivates passivity. Fourth, my theory offers a novel response to mental action skeptics like Strawson.

scholarly journals Drifting and Directed Minds: The Significance of Mind-Wandering for Mental Action

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Irving
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Analogous Question ◽  
Directed Thought ◽  
Action Guidance ◽  
Action Goals

Perhaps the central question in action theory is this: what ingredient of bodily action is missing in mere behaviour? But what is an analogous question for mental action? I ask the following: what ingredient of active, goal-directed, thought is missing in mind-wandering? I answer that guidance is the missing ingredient that separates mind-wandering and directed thinking. I define mind-wandering as unguided attention. Roughly speaking, attention is guided when you would feel pulled back, were you distracted. In contrast, a wandering attention drifts from topic to topic unchecked. From my discussion of mind-wandering, I extract general lessons about the causal basis, experiential character, and limits of mental action. Mind-wandering is a case study that allows us to tease apart two causal bases of mental action––guidance and motivation––that often track together and are thus easy to conflate. The contrast between mind-wandering and active thinking also sheds light on how goals are experienced during mental action. Goals are rarely the objects of awareness; rather, goals are “phenomenological frames” that carve experience into felt distractions (which we are guided away from) and relevant information (which we are guided towards). Finally, I account for a puzzling case of mental action that psychologists call “intentional mind-wandering”.

Attention, Not Self

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Social World ◽  
States Of Mind ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Directed Attention ◽  
The World ◽  
Epistemic Standing

Attention is of fundamental importance in the philosophy of mind, in epistemology, in action theory, and in ethics. This book presents an account in which attention, not self, explains the experiential and normative situatedness of human beings in the world. Attention consists in an organization of awareness and action at the centre of which there is neither a practical will nor a phenomenological witness. Attention performs two roles in experience, a selective role of placing and a focal role of access. Attention improves our epistemic standing, because it is in the nature of attention to settle on what is real and to shun what is not real. When attention is informed by expertise, it is sufficient for knowledge. That gives attention a reach beyond the perceptual: for attention is a determinable whose determinates include the episodic memory from which our narrative identities are made, the empathy for others that situates us in a social world, and the introspection that makes us self-aware. Empathy is other-directed attention, placed on you and focused on your states of mind; it is akin to listening. Empathetic attention is central to a range of experiences that constitutively require a contrast between oneself and others, all of which involve an awareness of oneself as the object of another’s attention. An analysis of attention as mental action gainsays authorial conceptions of self, because it is the nature of intending itself, effortful attention in action, to settle on what to do and to shun what not to do.

scholarly journals Mental action and event structure in the semantics of 'try'

2015 ◽  
pp. 426
Author(s):  
Thomas Grano
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Event Structure ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Progressive Aspect ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Action Stage ◽  
Aspectual Meaning

Sharvit (2003) proposes a semantics for 'try' inspired by Landman's (1992) account of progressive aspect. This paper discusses two empirical shortcomings of Sharvit's analysis and proposes a new solution that retains Sharvit's insight that 'try' has an aspectual meaning but argues that (a) as suggested by much work in action theory, volitional events include an initial stage corresponding to a `mental action' and (b) 'try' picks out the 'mental action' stage of an event. The proposal is formalized by adapting Condoravdi's (2009) theory of progressive meaning.

scholarly journals Habit and the Explanation of Action

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar Lizardo
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Core Concept ◽  
The Core ◽  
Unitary Concept ◽  
The Way

In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific “historical” way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit‐based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention‐based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members.

Behavioral Taxonomy of Undergraduate Pilot Training Tasks and Skills

1975 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-270
Author(s):  
Robert P. Meyer ◽  
Jack I. Laveson ◽  
Neal S. Weissman ◽  
Edward E. Eddowes
Keyword(s):  
Air Force ◽  
Data Retrieval ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Pilot Training ◽  
Classification Rules ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Motor Action ◽  
Action Sequences ◽  
Motor Actions ◽  
Mental Actions

The analysis and specification of fundamental flying abilities which comprise the training objectives of Air Force undergraduate pilot training (UPT) was performed. The taxonomy of UPT tasks and skills is an analytical tool of considerable generality that can be used to aid in understanding the essential requirements of flying training. Surface analyses of fifty UPT maneuvers generated task element descriptions subdivided into a series of cue, mental action, and motor action sequences. The resulting task information was used to identify the pilot skills required to execute the flying tasks described. A set of classification rules organized the skills into a taxonornic cubic concept in which cues, mental actions, and motor actions represented cube faces. The classification rules were validated empirically and used to verify all surface analyses. The required task skills were then organized into a matrix system for simple data retrieval operations.

scholarly journals Mental action and event structure in the semantics of 'try'

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Grano
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Event Structure ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Progressive Aspect ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Action Stage ◽  
Aspectual Meaning

Sharvit (2003) proposes a semantics for 'try' inspired by Landman's (1992) account of progressive aspect. This paper discusses two empirical shortcomings of Sharvit's analysis and proposes a new solution that retains Sharvit's insight that 'try' has an aspectual meaning but argues that (a) as suggested by much work in action theory, volitional events include an initial stage corresponding to a `mental action' and (b) 'try' picks out the 'mental action' stage of an event. The proposal is formalized by adapting Condoravdi's (2009) theory of progressive meaning.

scholarly journals Identifying the structure of students’ argumentation in covariational reasoning of constructing graphs

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Sutini Sutini ◽  
Iffana Fitrotul Aaidati ◽  
Kusaeri Kusaeri
Keyword(s):  
Average Rate ◽  
Rate Of Change ◽  
Interview Data ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mental Action ◽  
Instantaneous Rate ◽  
Covariational Reasoning ◽  
Mental Actions ◽  
Grade 11

[English]: This study aimed to identify students’ claim, evidence, and reasoning in covariational reasoning of constructing the graphs of a function. Covariational reasoning is one of the approaches to solve the problems of function. The study involved thirty grade 11 students. Data was collected through a covariation test and interview. The results of the test were grouped based on the criteria of mental action of covariational reasoning (Carlson et al., 2002), then the students who solve correctly two or three problems in the test were selected as the subjects. The interview data were analyzed to confirm and further dig students' structure of argumentation. The findings of this study indicate that only one student fulfils five mental actions of covariational reasoning; meanwhile, the other three students have similar components of argumentation which do not meet the mental actions. The claim and reasoning used by the latter students in covariational reasoning to construct graph are not identified in mental action 5 and the evidence is not found in mental action 3 (major coordination of change), mental action 4 (coordination the average rate of change), and mental action 5 (coordination of the instantaneous rate of change). Keywords: Argumentation, Claim, Evidence, Reasoning, Covariational reasoning [Bahasa]: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi klaim, bukti, dan alasan siswa pada penalaran kovariasional dalam mengonstruk grafik fungsi. Penalaran kovariasional merupakan salah satu pendekatan dalam menyelesaikan permasalahan fungsi. Penelitian ini melibatkan 30 siswa kelas 11. Pengumpulan data dilakukan menggunakan tes kovariasi dan wawancara. Data hasil hasil tes kovariasi siswa dikelompokkan berdasarkan kriteria aksi mental penalaran kovariasional (Carlson et al., 2002), kemudian dipilih siswa yang mampu menyelesaikan minimal dua soal kovariasi. Data hasil wawancara dianalisis untuk mengonfirmasi dan menggali lebih dalam argumentasi siswa. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan hanya satu siswa yang memenuhi lima aksi mental penalaran kovariasional sedangkan ketiga siswa lain memiliki persamaan komponen argumentasi yang tidak memenuhi aksi mental. Untuk ketiga siswa tersebut, klaim dan alasan yang digunakan dalam membangun grafik fungsi tidak berada pada aksi mental 5 sedangkan bukti tidak berada pada aksi mental 3 (koordinasi besar perubahan), aksi mental 4 (koordinasi laju perubahan rata-rata), dan aksi mental 5 (koordinasi laju perubahan sesaat). Kata kunci: Argumentasi, Klaim, Bukti, Alasan, Penalaran kovariasional

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