The New Sexual Violence Legislation in the Congo: Dressing Indelible Scars on Human Dignity

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dunia Prince Zongwe

Abstract:This article describes a legal thread running from the commission of massive sexual violence in the eastern provinces of the Congo since 1996 to the enactment of liberal legislation in 2006 to combat sexual violence throughout the country, especially in eastern Congo. In doing so, the article fills a gap in the nascent legal literature on systematic sexual violence. It finds that the new rape law is progressive, liberal, gender-neutral, and in keeping with international law. However, an unfortunate lapse in legislative drafting puts in doubt the authority of the courts to use the new rape law to prosecute systematic sexual violence. Despite this weakness, as well as harsh realities such as resource limitations and institutionalized corruption, the new sexual violence law, “the law of shameful acts,” nonetheless provides a framework on the basis of which the state and rape survivors can prosecute perpetrators. It is a necessary step in upholding accountability and preparing for the more daunting task of healing communities affected by a devastating regional war.

2021 ◽  
pp. 104-109
Author(s):  
Anatoly Yu. Olimpiev ◽  
◽  
Irina A. Strelnikova ◽  

The problematic issues of ensuring cybersecurity in the Russian Federation are investigated in the article. Based on the analysis of legal literature and normative legal acts on crimes in the field of computer information in the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation and countering them, several judgments are made. The state of crime in the field of computer information is largely determined by the level of economic development of any state, including the Russian Federation as a subject of international law. Computer information, as social interaction, is protected by the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation. Counteraction in the field of computer information involves the formation of special units in a number of law enforcement agencies (first of all, in the state security bodies and in the internal affairs bodies) staffed with employees with additional competencies in the field of computer technology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-103
Author(s):  
Komang Sukaniasa

International agreements are agreements between international subjects that give rise to binding obligations in international rights, which can be bilateral or multilateral. Based on these opinions, an understanding can be taken that international treaties are agreements or agreements entered into by two or more countries as subjects of international law that aim to cause certain legal consequences. International agreements, whether ratified or through approval or acceptance or accession, or other methods that are permitted, have the same binding force as ratified international treaties established in the Ratification Law of International Treaties. Once again, it is equally valid and binding on the state. Therefore, the authors consider that the position of international treaties are not made in the form of the Ratification Act of the International Agreement but are binding and apply to Indonesia. Then Damos Dumoli Agusman argues that ratification originates from the conception of international treaty law which is interpreted as an act of confirmation from a country of the legal acts of its envoys or representatives who have signed an agreement as a sign of agreement to be bound by the agreement.


Author(s):  
Chiedza Simbo

Despite the recent enactment of the Zimbabwean Constitution which provides for the right to basic education, complaints, reminiscent of a failed basic education system, have marred the education system in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding glaring violations of the right to basic education by the government, no person has taken the government to court for failure to comply with its section 75(1)(a) constitutional obligations, and neither has the government conceded any failures or wrongdoings. Two ultimate questions arise: Does the state know what compliance with section 75(1)(a) entails? And do the citizens know the scope and content of their rights as provided for by section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe? Whilst it is progressive that the Education Act of Zimbabwe as amended in 2020 has addressed some aspects relating to section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution, it has still not provided an international law compliant scope and content of the right to basic education neither have any clarifications been provided by the courts. Using an international law approach, this article suggests what the scope and content of section 75(1)(a) might be.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article examines the features of the formation (genesis) of legal responsibility of judges in Ukraine (from Kievan Rus to the present day). It has been proven that at present there are many problems regarding the criminal (legal) responsibility of judges. It was found that judges are insufficiently protected from manifestations of criminal prosecution, which, in turn, affects the increase in loyalty to the prosecution, in contrast to the defense in the criminal process. It has been established that today there are no perfect mechanisms for appealing the inaction of judges in court. It was determined that bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility in the High Council of Justice does not fully comply with the requirements of the European Charter on the Status of Judges. Based on the results of the legal analysis of the activities of the institutions of judicial responsibility, it was found that modern methods of bringing judges to justice in Ukraine are imperfect, often contradictory, and in some cases allow judges to avoid responsibility. It has been established that the issue of civil liability of judges for carrying out wrong actions against citizens today requires an urgent solution, since the legal literature does not fully disclose the provisions that govern the conditions, grounds and procedure for holding judges accountable for resolving unfair sentences and implementing illegal actions that entail material and/or moral damage to citizens. It has been determined that for harm caused as a result of an unjust court decision made by a judge, as well as due to the judge's inaction, property liability is imposed on the state, since the judge conducting the proceedings acts on behalf of the state, that is, Ukraine. It was found that today a judge can be brought to disciplinary responsibility in cases determined in accordance with the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges».


Author(s):  
John Linarelli ◽  
Margot E Salomon ◽  
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah

This chapter offers an argument on why the international law on trade, investment, and finance is subject to the demands of justice. It also looks at how those demands are greater than the basic minimums often suggested as applicable outside the state. International law is subject to the demands of justice because of its role as an institution essential to global cooperation, because it affects how people live their lives, because of its historic role in perpetuating and legitimizing moral wrongs, and because it can lead to domination and the deprivation of freedom. After elaborating these grounds, this chapter proceeds to a theory of justice for international law. International law must meet a standard of respect and ‘justification to’ each person, particularly those in weaker positions. International law cannot treat any person as only a passive recipient or supplicant to rules that benefit those in power or stronger positions.


This collection brings together scholars of jurisprudence and political theory to probe the question of ‘legitimacy’. It offers discussions that interrogate the nature of legitimacy, how legitimacy is intertwined with notions of statehood, and how legitimacy reaches beyond the state into supranational institutions and international law. Chapter I considers benefit-based, merit-based, and will-based theories of state legitimacy. Chapter II examines the relationship between expertise and legitimate political authority. Chapter III attempts to make sense of John Rawls’s account of legitimacy in his later work. Chapter IV observes that state sovereignty persists, since no alternative is available, and that the success of the assortment of international organizations that challenge state sovereignty depends on their ability to attract loyalty. Chapter V argues that, to be complete, an account of a state’s legitimacy must evaluate not only its powers and its institutions, but also its officials. Chapter VI covers the rule of law and state legitimacy. Chapter VII considers the legitimation of the nation state in a post-national world. Chapter VIII contends that legitimacy beyond the state should be understood as a subject-conferred attribute of specific norms that generates no more than a duty to respect those norms. Chapter IX is a reply to critics of attempts to ground the legitimacy of suprastate institutions in constitutionalism. Chapter X examines Joseph Raz’s perfectionist liberalism. Chapter XI attempts to bring some order to debates about the legitimacy of international courts.


Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

This book offers a qualified defense of a territorial states system. It argues that three core values—occupancy, basic justice, and collective self-determination—are served by an international system made up of self-governing, spatially defined political units. The defense is qualified because the book does not actually justify all of the sovereignty rights states currently claim and that are recognized in international law. Instead, the book proposes important changes to states’ sovereign prerogatives, particularly with respect to internal autonomy for political minorities, immigration, and natural resources. Part I of the book argues for a right of occupancy, holding that a legitimate function of the international system is to specify and protect people’s preinstitutional claims to specific geographical places. Part II turns to the question of how a state might acquire legitimate jurisdiction over a population of occupants. It argues that the state will have a right to rule a population and its territory if it satisfies conditions of basic justice and facilitates its people’s collective self-determination. Finally, Parts III and IV of this book argue that the exclusionary sovereignty rights to control over borders and natural resources that can plausibly be justified on the basis of the three core values are more limited than has traditionally been thought.


Author(s):  
Rowan Nicholson

If the term were given its literal meaning, international law would be law between ‘nations’. It is often described instead as being primarily between states. But this conceals the diversity of the nations or state-like entities that have personality in international law or that have had it historically. This book reconceptualizes statehood by positioning it within that wider family of state-like entities. An important conclusion of the book is that states themselves have diverse legal underpinnings. Practice in cases such as Somalia and broader principles indicate that international law provides not one but two alternative methods of qualifying as a state: subject to exceptions connected with territorial integrity and peremptory norms, an entity can be a state either on the ground that it meets criteria of effectiveness or on the ground that it is recognized by all other states. Another conclusion is that states, in the strict legal sense in which the word is used today, have never been the only state-like entities with personality in international law. Others from the past and present include imperial China in the period when it was unreceptive to Western norms; pre-colonial African chiefdoms; ‘states-in-context’, an example of which may be Palestine, which have the attributes of statehood relative to states that recognize them; and entities such as Hong Kong.


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