Soldiers, Civilians, and Scholars: Making Sense of the Relationship Between Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Policy

2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-232
Author(s):  
Noboru Yamaguchi ◽  
David A. Welch
Author(s):  
Asli Ü. Bâli

This chapter examines the reversal of Turkey’s trajectory over the last fifteen years. It addresses the domestic transformation of Turkey through constitutional reforms, shifting civil–military relations, economic growth, corruption, ethnic conflict, and the relationship between religion and state. Examining these issues helps to explain why Turkish politics has become more polarized, and how this has been manipulated by the governing party to consolidate a majoritarian system and to crack down on dissent. The chapter then traces changes in Turkey’s foreign policy as it moves away from prioritizing relations with Washington and Brussels and seeks to forge a more multifaceted set of regional policies. This has failed for a number of reasons, including the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war. Instead, the government has embraced a “Eurasianist” turn aligning Turkey with authoritarian regimes in the Caucasus and the Arabian Gulf, in keeping with the country’s increasingly repressive domestic politics.


Author(s):  
Risa Brooks

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.


Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
Stephen Jones

The balance between civil and military structures is central to understanding the development of Georgian statehood since the beginning of the 20th century. The first modern independent Georgian state was established after the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence in May 1918. In February 1921, the young republic was incorporated into the Soviet state and had no separate army of its own. Since regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia has experienced multiple administrations, and despite significantly different policies on the military, the overall pattern has been one of civilian (though not always democratic) control. Georgian militias and paramilitaries, between 1918 and 1921 and again between 1991 and 1995, played important roles in determining political power at times of revolutionary or constitutional crises. Since 1991 there have been three presidents - Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Mikheil Saakashvili - with strong executive authority. In 2013, the position of president was made semi-ceremonial and a prime-ministerial system was instituted. Since 2013, there have been multiple prime ministers. Bidzina Ivanishvili was the first and the most powerful. All of Georgia’s leaders have shifted from a Soviet to pro-Western orientation. Since the second half of the 1990s, the relationship with NATO has grown closer, which has had a major impact on the structure of the Georgian armed forces and on their relationship with Georgia’s civil authorities. The 2008 war with Russia had a major impact on the Georgian military, and, since then, the level of professionalization of the Georgian armed forces has increased dramatically. Samuel Huntington, Eric Nordlinger, and other Western students of civil-military relations have pointed to the important balance required between civil and military authorities for a stable democracy. Georgia still displays continuing features of nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and dominant political personalities, which has significant consequences for the independence of the Georgian military and for civil-military relations more generally. Western states such as the United States and Germany, and international organizations like NATO continue to urge reform and provide training to the Georgian armed forces


Author(s):  
Kai Michael Kenkel

Latin American states have become major providers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since the early 2000s. MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti), the UN mission in Haiti, 55% of whose troops were from the region, was a major watershed for local security cooperation and PKO contributions. Led by Brazil, these states were able to develop a specific approach to peacebuilding that reflects regional strengths and experiences, rooted in minimizing the use of force and bringing successful domestic development policies to bear abroad. This approach also reflects the common security and intervention culture that underpins policy in the region. Two states in particular have taken on a role as major providers of peacekeeping contingents. Tiny Uruguay, with a population of 3 million people, has maintained over 2,000 troops deployed on UN PKOs (more than 10% of its armed forces) since 2005. While Uruguay’s motivations are mostly economic—UN reimbursements exceed the country’s costs—Brazil’s ascendance as a major peacekeeping provider during MINUSTAH was part of a larger emerging-power foreign policy project. Participating in peacebuilding allowed the country to provide security through actions in the development realm, bridging a key gap in many rising states’ capabilities, and to mount an incipient challenge to the Western-led peacebuilding paradigm. The remaining states of Latin America show considerable diversity in their peacekeeping engagement, with many others sending small or token contributions and some no troops at all. Latin American states’ involvement in PKOs cannot be understood without looking at their interaction with patterns of civil–military relations in the region. In the case of such states, the effect of peacekeeping participation on civil–military relations, while a key point in need of monitoring, has not been decisive, as other factors prevail. Finally, PKOs have served as the locus for a significant increase in policy coordination and cooperation in the defense arena in the region. As the UN moves toward stabilization operations which privilege counterterrorism measures over the peacebuilding paradigm that is a strength of Latin American countries, PKOs may lose attractiveness as a foreign policy avenue in the region. Additionally, the swing to the right in recent elections may serve to reduce the appeal of a practice which came to the fore under previous left-wing governments.


Author(s):  
Julian Gonzalez-Guyer

During the last quarter of a century, Uruguay has contributed more to UN peacekeeping operations than any other South American nation and was one of the top twenty countries in the ranking of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) between 2001 and 2016. This is striking when one bears in mind that Uruguay’s population is less than 3.5 million and that the size of its armed forces has been steadily reduced since 1985. With these credentials, Uruguay secured a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council between 2016 and 2017, a position it had only previously held between 1965 and 1966. Contributing to peace operations has been a novelty in Uruguay’s foreign policy in the post-dictatorship era, though without breaking with the traditional principles of its foreign policy and strategic identity. Indeed, multilateralism and an adherence to the principles of non-intervention and negotiated conflict resolution have been consistent elements of Uruguayan foreign policy since the beginning of the 20th century. In fact, the motivations for Uruguay’s striking level of commitment to the UN peace operations are mainly linked to the evolution of civil–military relations after the dictatorship of 1973–1985.


Unity Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Pragya Ghimire

Military diplomacy has been an important security and foreign policy tool for many centuries. However, in the age of globalization, its importance has grown more rapidly than ever because of the recognition that country’s survival and development also depend on a peaceful and stable national and regional environment. Some of the significant practices in the past reflect that various tools of military diplomacy could be implemented to strengthen country’s overall diplomacy, including bilateral and multi-lateral contacts of military and civilian defence officials of foreign countries; preparing bilateral/multilateral security and defence agreements; exchanging experience with foreign military and civilian defence officials; providing military assistance and support to other countries, such as aid, materials and equipment when there is need and request during the disaster or humanitarian crises. However, these tools of strengthening military diplomacy will not be as effective as expected if there is no effective civil-military relations and synergies between a country’s national security and foreign policy. Moreover, it will require strong expertise and good command of civilian diplomats on security issues and military diplomats on foreign policy issues. To strengthen its military diplomacy to contribute to Nepal’s overall diplomacy and foreign policy, it will require more military attaché in Nepal foreign diplomatic missions of vital security and development interest. Moreover, Nepal should continue building synergies between its national security, foreign and development policies as well as strengthening military diplomacy both at bilateral and regional levels.


1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mónica Serrano

AbstractThis article explores the relationship between civil-military relations and political change. Transitions to democracy in Latin America have led scholars to focus attention on the legacy of military rule and those efforts aimed at securing democratic control of the military. The article examines the foundations of civilian supremacy in Mexico, established within the context of a hegemonic party system. Changes brought about in the civil-military balance as a result of shifts in the division of labour between civilians and soldiers, as well as the impact of political liberalisation, are also analysed. Drawing on the experience of other transitions to democracy, the article discusses some of the issues raised by the dismantling of hegemonic rule for civil-military relations in Mexico.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110227
Author(s):  
Zachary Zwald ◽  
Jeffrey D. Berejikian

The presumed “gap” in fundamental foreign policy beliefs between what Huntington (1957) described as “liberal society” and the “conservative military mind” lies at the core of research on civil–military relations. However, we still know surprisingly little about the precise nature of differences between the two groups’ core foreign policy orientations. This study presents the first empirically grounded evaluation of the public–military gap. We deployed a unique survey to directly compare the views of 470 active-duty US military officers against a representative sample of the American public. Our study included beliefs concerning the appropriate role of military force and of US engagement in global affairs, the likely direction of US national security in the coming decade, and the causes and costs of future military conflicts. While we confirm aspects of Huntington’s dichotomy, we also observe critical differences between the two groups that diverge from the traditional conceptualization of a “civil–military gap.”


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document