scholarly journals A legitimação moral dos direitos humanos: uma análise dos princípios de justiça de John Rawls / The moral legitimation of human rights: an analysis on John Rawls’ principles of justice

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Paula Barbosa-Fohrmann
Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Nir Ben-Moshe

Abstract John Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge – to an impartial spectator account: (a) the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device that does not take seriously the distinction between persons; (b) the account does not guarantee that the principles of justice will be derived from it; (c) the notion of impartiality in the account is the wrong one, since it does not define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves; (d) the account would offer a comprehensive, rather than a political, form of liberalism. The narrow aim of the article is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's impartial spectator account can rise to Rawls's challenges. The broader aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political form of liberalism.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
A. Khudori Soleh

Rawls' justice theory is based on three basic concepts: concept of property from John Locke, social contract from Rousseau, and imperative categories from Kant. This Rawls' justice conception itself emerges as a respond for social injustice in society as well as i nequitable behavior affected by the ethics of utilitarianism. Furthermore, according to Rawls, justice is fairness. The principles of justice are, (1) equal and maximum feasible liberty for all, (2) power and wealth to be distributed equally, except where inequalities; would work for the adage of all and where all would have equal opportunity to attain the higher position. The first principle supposes as permanent principle and, which cannot be interpreted. On the other hand, the second principle degrades two formulas: (a) everyone’s  advantage (b) equally open. So forth, from formula (a) can be degraded two possibilities: principle of efficiency and principle of differentiation, whereas from formula (b) also can be degraded two possibilities: equality as careers open to talents and equality as equality of fair opportunity): Hencefonh, from possibility of (a) and (b) yielded four possibilities of justice interpretation: natural freedom, free equality, free aristocracy and the equality democratize.  


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
Iqbal Hasanuddin

ABSTRACT: This paper tries to give a philosophical foundation to the rights to freedom of religion/belief. So far, the rights to freedom of religion/belief have been considered legitimated because resulted in General Assembly of the United Nations as mutual consensus of all nations around the world. Although, the normativity of the rights to freedom of religion/belief based on that mutual consensus is not ethical-philosophical, but political. By the justice argument of John Rawls and the self-ownership argument of Robert Nozick, this paper tries to give a moral foundation to the guarantee of respect and protection of the freedom of religion/belief. KEYWORDS: freedom of religion/belief, human rights instruments, forum internum, forum eksternum, justice, slef-ownership.ABSTRAK: Tujuan makalah ini adalah memberikan pendasaran filosofis bagi hak atas kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan. Sejauh ini, hak atas kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan (KBB) dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang bersifat normatif, karena dihasilkan dalam sidang-sidang Majelis Umum Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa (PBB) sehingga telah menjadi konsensus bersama bangsa-bangsa di seluruh dunia. Namun demikian, normativitas hak atas KBB yang didasarkan pada konsensus bersama itu masih bersifat politis, belum memiliki dasar etis-filosofis. Melalui argumen keadilan yang didasarkan pada pemikiran John Rawls dan argumen kepemilikan-diri yang didasarkan pada pemikiran Robert Nozick, makalah ini mencoba memberikan landasan moral bagi jaminan penghormatan dan perlindungan bagi kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan. KATA-KATA KUNCI: kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan, instrumen-instrumen HAM, forum internum, forum eksternum, keadilan, kepemilikan-diri.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 148-160
Author(s):  
Rainer Forst

John Rawls famously claimed that “the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance” are “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” Luck egalitarians believe that a conception of justice that eliminates the effects of circumstance but not of choice captures that intuition better than Rawls’s own principles of justice. This chapter argues that the opposite is the case. We can learn from Rawls that one cannot overcome moral arbitrariness in social life by using a morally arbitrary distinction between choice and circumstance. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the incompatibility between these two approaches points to a deeper difference between a deontological and a teleological paradigm that is crucial for the debate between relational and nonrelational notions of political and social justice.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 53-60

What is the relation between political theory and political practice? In what ways can political philosophy help people to address real injustices in the world? John Rawls argues that an important role of political philosophy is to identify the ideal standards of justice at which we should aim in political practice. Other philosophers challenge this approach, arguing that Rawls’s idealizations are not useful as a guide for action or, worse, that they are an impediment to addressing actual injustices in the world. They argue, instead, that political philosophy ought to be focused on theorizing about the elimination of existing injustice. Still others argue that principles of justice should be identified without any constraint concerning the possibility of implementation or regulation in the real world at all....


Author(s):  
Konstantinos Margaritis

In the present paper the constitutional provisions granting a special procedure to the members of the cabinet and parliament will be examined. Their problematic aspects will be revealed and possible solutions will be proposed. In this context, the application of those provisions in practice will be underlined with the examination of specific cases as well as case law from the European Court of Human Rights. For the extent that the privileges could be justified, the principles of reasonable inequalities developed by John Rawls will be used.


Author(s):  
Sonja C. Grover

This article argues for the entitlement of discrete refugee groups to collective reparations for targeted state-perpetrated blanket grievous human rights violations against their group whether by the home, transit or prospective asylum state. A review of selected international law and international principles of justice are discussed as a grounding for the applicability of collective reparations in such a refugee context. The example is discussed of children from Central America who accompanied their parent or parents to the US-Mexican border in search of refugee asylum most of whom, but not all, crossed the US border irregularly and then were separated from their parents as a result of President Trump’s so-called ‘zero-tolerance’ migration policy and held in US custody. Over 500 of these children are still, at the time of writing, separated from their parents and for a significant number of those, their parents have been deported without them.


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