scholarly journals FORMS OF MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE IN UZBEKISTAN: SCIENTIFIC AND THEORETICAL BASIS OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 50-60
Author(s):  
Dilorom Tadjibaeva
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Definition Of

During the early years of independence (1990s), agricultural and institutional changes in Uzbekistan were made based on the specific characteristics of our country. During transformation, almost nothing has changed in terms of effectivity in regards to transformation of state farms to collective farms still did not make these farms profitable. Only with the formation of dehkan farms (a form of individual farming) after 2004 did agricultural entities started becoming profitable. How can this be explained? Why are these agricultural forms of management more efficient and coincide with the mentality of our population? In this article, using the neo-institutional theory, we have discussed these questions in an attempt to answer these questions by justifying a theoretical point. This theory shows that major issue property rights and transaction costs play main role in the definition of forms of farms management. Statistical analysis of transaction costs and local specifics resulted in a conclusion that the dehkan farming form has significant advantages.

scholarly journals How should we model property? Thinking with my critics

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENITO ARRUÑADA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Private Ordering ◽  
Single Exchange ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Dimensions

AbstractInspired by comments made by Allen (2017), Lueck (2017), Ménard (2017) and Smith (2017), this response clarifies and deepens the analysis in Arruñada (2017a). Its main argument is that to deal with the complexity of property we must abstract secondary elements, such as the physical dimensions of some types of assets, and focus on the interaction between transactions. This sequential-exchange framework captures the main problem of property in the current environment of impersonal markets. It also provides criteria to compare private and public ordering, as well as to organize public solutions that enable new forms of private ordering. The analysis applies the lessons in Coase (1960) to property by not only comparing realities but also maintaining his separate definition of property rights and transaction costs. However, it replaces his contractual, single-exchange, framework for one in which contracts interact, causing exchange externalities.

Does the Colour of the Cat Matter? The Red Hat Strategy in China's Private Enterprises

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenhong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Organizational Dynamics ◽  
Social Embeddedness ◽  
Private Enterprises ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
The Public

The proliferation of new property rights regimes in transitional economies provided an opportunity to examine the interaction between institutions and organizations. Some private enterprises in China developed the Red Hat strategy whereby they disguised their private ownership by registering as a public-owned organization. Drawing on a national survey, this study investigated how institutional variations, transaction costs and social embeddedness affected the firms’ Red Hat strategy. The findings suggest that private firms preferred a fuzzy property rights arrangement in the early years of market transition. The temporal and regional variation of the institutional environment contributed to the adoption of the Red Hat strategy. High transaction costs — networking cost and resource constraints — were positively related to the adoption of the Red Hat strategy. Social embeddedness also played an important role. The reliance on transaction partners in the public sector increased the pressure to adopt the Red Hat, while connections with high-ranking cadres facilitated the process. However, private firms opted for clearly delineated property rights as the institutional environment improved. In turn, the decisions of individual firms affected the institutional environment at the aggregate level. The Red Hat strategy exemplifies the co-evolution of institutional change and organizational dynamics.

Property Rights Through Social Movements: The Case of Plantations in Kerala, India

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-168
Author(s):  
Deepa Kylasam Iyer
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Transformation ◽  
Land Occupation ◽  
Title Deed ◽  
Grassroots Level ◽  
Land Use Rights

Globally, increased investor interest in land is confronting various types of political mobilisations from communities at the grassroots level. This article examines the case study of a land occupation movement called Chengara struggle in the largest corporate plantation in southern India. The movement is led by the historically dispossessed scheduled caste and scheduled tribe communities. The objective of the study is to understand the type of institutional transformation of property rights that the movement is calibrating. Institutional theory is used to determine the nature and direction of transformation using the framework of economic and political transaction costs. The article concludes that the central demand of the struggle for individual title deed has higher private gains for right-holders, but has overall negative gains for agricultural productivity. The article concludes that productivity-oriented demands to restructure land-use rights within plantations might converge in the land struggles of the future.

scholarly journals The Coase theorem: coherent, logical, and not disproved

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Adequate Definition ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract:There exists a long line of challengers to the ‘Coase Theorem’. All of these rest on fundamental misconceptions of property rights, transaction costs, and their interaction. Here I examine two attacks that have gone unchallenged: one by Halpin, the other by Usher. I argue that both, in failing to either use or understand an adequate definition of transaction costs, fail to deliver a fatal blow to Coase's famous idea.

Legal Regulation of Carbon Market and Construction of Carbon Market Legal System in China

2012 ◽  
Vol 524-527 ◽  
pp. 2368-2371
Author(s):  
Jing Zhen
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Carbon Market ◽  
Definition Of

Coming from policies and laws, carbon market, should be legally regulated. Because its transactional objects, definition of property rights and rules setting and supervision are special. This paper describes the development of carbon market, analyzes the theoretical basis of legal regulation of carbon market, discusses the path of legal regulation of carbon market, and finally points out the key problems which should be solved in the construction of carbon market legal system.

Post-Soviet Privatization in the Light of the Coase Theorem (Transaction Costs and Governance Costs)

2003 ◽  
pp. 120-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Andreff
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Initial Distribution ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Firm Boundaries ◽  
Governance Costs ◽  
The Relationship

A Coasian theoretical perspective is assumed to be in the background of most post-Soviet economies' privatization drives. The assumption of zero transaction costs underlying the Coase theorem guarantees an efficient reallocation of property rights whatever is their initial distribution. Once this assumption is relaxed, the result predicted by the Coase theorem is less certain and clashes with the nature of the firm as it has been analyzed earlier by Coase himself. This preliminary presentation is used as a critical driver to provide a non-mainstream assessment of privatization objectives in Russia that became so obviously high in the early years of the transition process. A Coasian analysis also helps to figure out the post-privatization firm boundaries and to design in-house restructuring as well as industrial restructuring - between industrial branches. The issue of the firm boundaries is crucial in the relationship between privatization and restructuring. Finally, we come to terms with the analysis of post-privatization property rights and corporate governance and their possible (governance) costs for in-house restructuring. The last section is devoted to an evaluation of standard and non-standard methods of privatization.

scholarly journals Property as sequential exchange: definition and language issues

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
State Involvement ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Language Issues

AbstractBenito Arrunãda's paper on the transaction cost problems involved with land, provides an excellent explanation of land legal institutions. This explanation revolves around the fact that land exists through time, and that various exchanges made with respect to land at one time affect exchanges in other times. Arrunãda refers to this as ‘sequential exchange’, and he argues that sequential exchange provides the explanation for state involvement in titling and the default nature of in rem rights. Unfortunately, Arrunãda frames his argument with an inappropriate notion of transaction costs. This creates a confusing language, and a faulty interpretation of Coasean logic. Reframing the first sections of his paper using the ‘property rights’ definition of transaction costs brings brevity and clarity to the ultimate point he is trying to make.

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

Implications

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Property ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Taking Action ◽  
Disadvantaged People

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.

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