scholarly journals Minimal Frames and Transparent Frames for Risk, Time, and Uncertainty

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (9) ◽  
pp. 4318-4335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan W. Leland ◽  
Mark Schneider ◽  
Nathaniel T. Wilcox

Behavior differs between transparent and nontransparent presentations of decisions, but “transparent presentation” has not been precisely defined. We formally define “transparent frames” for risk and time, establish their uniqueness, provide algorithms for constructing them, and compare them with “standard” presentation formats. A logic emerges for predicting systematic shifts in choice under risk and over time, and how violations of rational choice theory will depend on frames. An experiment verifies most of those predictions in choice under risk. We extend results to choice under uncertainty and also predict frame dependence of ambiguity aversion, a result supported by recent experimental evidence. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.

Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

Against the background of rational choice theory, this chapter provides an overview of the behavioral sub-disciplines informing behavioral law and economics—including judgment and decision-making studies, parts of social psychology, moral psychology, experimental game theory, and behavioral ethics. The chapter discusses deviations from cognitive and motivational rationality, including studies of people’s moral judgments. It begins with probability assessments and related issues. It critically describes phenomena related to prospect theory, phenomena associated with motivated reasoning and egocentrism, and those related to reference-dependence. It also summarizes studies of bounded willpower. Some attention is given to studies that show that most people do not share the consequentialist outlook that prioritizes the maximization of human welfare over all other values. Finally, the chapter discusses several issues that cut across various phenomena: individual differences in judgment and decision-making; the significance of professional training, experience, and expertise; deciding for others; group decision-making; cultural differences; and debiasing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shankha Basu ◽  
Krishna Savani

When choosing among multiple options, people can view the options either one at a time or all together. In this article, we review an emerging stream of research that examines the ways in which viewing options sequentially as opposed to simultaneously influences people’s decisions. Multiple studies support the idea that viewing options simultaneously encourages people to compare the options and to focus on the ways in which the options differ from each other. In contrast, viewing options sequentially encourages people to process each option holistically by comparing the option with previously encountered options or a subjective reference point. Integrating research from judgment and decision making, consumer behavior, experimental economics, and eyewitness identification, we identify ways in which the different processing styles elicited by sequential- and simultaneous-presentation formats influence people’s judgment and decision making. This issue is particularly important because presenting options either sequentially or simultaneously is a key element of choice architecture.


Author(s):  
Marie-Therese Claes ◽  
Thibault Jacquemin

In today's post-bureaucratic organization, where decision-making is decentralized, most managers are confronted with highly complex situations where time-constraint and availability of information makes the decision-making process essential. Studies show that a great amount of decisions are not taken after a rational decision-making process but rather rely on instinct, emotion or quickly processed information. After briefly describing the journey of thoughts from Rational Choice Theory to the emergence of Behavioral Economics, this chapter will elaborate on the mechanisms that are at play in decision-making in an attempt to understand the root causes of cognitive biases, using the theory of Kahneman's (2011) System 1 and System 2. It will discuss the linkage between the complexity of decision-making and post-bureaucratic organization.


2021 ◽  
pp. 309-326
Author(s):  
Christopher Brett Jaeger ◽  
Jennifer S. Trueblood

Researchers have documented numerous cognitive biases that are difficult to reconcile with rational choice theory. But is there a more general set of decision-making rules that might account for these cognitive biases and ‘rational’ decisions alike? Psychologists in search of such rules have developed a theory of quantum decision making. This chapter introduces quantum decision making to a legal audience, explains its intellectual origins, and identifies some contexts in which it provides useful tools for legal theorists. Using the example of a juror evaluating a criminal case, the chapter illustrates how quantum decision making explains and predicts phenomena that are difficult to reconcile with other theories of choice. More generally, quantum decision making highlights the importance of sequence in shaping judgments and decisions—and thus, its importance in law’s choice architecture.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 783-815
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Jacobs ◽  
Michael Cherbonneau

Objectives: We explore negativism in the context of auto theft and examine its broader phenomenological significance for Rational Choice Theory. Methods: Data were drawn from qualitative, in-depth interviews with 35 active auto thieves operating out of a large Midwestern U.S. city. Results: Negativistic offending is malicious, spiteful, and/or destructive conduct whose purpose is typically more hedonic (i.e., short-term gratification) than instrumental (i.e., resource-generating) or normative (i.e., moralistic). It is made possible by the notion of ownership without responsibility: Offenders controlled a vehicle that was not theirs, promoting consequence irrelevance which in turn unleashed reckless conduct. Conclusions: Consequence irrelevance clarifies negativism’s logic and permits linkage between affect-based and rational choice decision-making models.


2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin W. Schulz

Abstract:I address an overlooked question about the structure of the cognitive/conative model of the mind that underlies much of the work in economics, psychology and philosophy: namely, whether conative states are fundamentally monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like). I argue that two seemingly promising sets of theoretical considerations – namely, the structure of Rational Choice Theory, and considerations of computational efficiency – are unable to resolve this debate. Given this, I suggest that a consideration that speaks in favour of the preference-based view is the fact that it makes it easier to explain certain empirically observed patterns in decision making.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 143-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shlomo Benartzi ◽  
Alessandro Previtero ◽  
Richard H Thaler

In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech given in 1985, Franco Modigliani drew attention to the “annuitization puzzle”: that annuity contracts, other than pensions through group insurance, are extremely rare. Rational choice theory predicts that households will find annuities attractive at the onset of retirement because they address the risk of outliving one's income, but in fact, relatively few of those facing retirement choose to annuitize a substantial portion of their wealth. There is now a substantial literature on the behavioral economics of retirement saving, which has stressed that both behavioral and institutional factors play an important role in determining a household's saving accumulations. Self-control problems, inertia, and a lack of financial sophistication inhibit some households from providing an adequate retirement nest egg. However, interventions such as automatic enrollment and automatic escalation of saving over time as wages rise (the “save more tomorrow” plan) have shown success in overcoming these obstacles. We will show that the same behavioral and institutional factors that help explain savings behavior are also important in understanding 1) how families handle the process of decumulation once retirement commences and 2) why there seems to be so little demand to annuitize wealth at retirement.


Author(s):  
Scott H. Ainsworth

Rational choice theory builds from a very simple foundation. To wit: individuals are presumed to pursue goal-oriented behavior stemming from rational preferences. Rational choice theory benefits from the very precise formulations of its assumptions. Individual-level rationality is generally defined as having complete and transitive preferences. Both completeness and transitivity have precise, formal definitions. From complete and transitive preferences, one can develop utility function presentations reflecting those preferences. Utility functions have the advantage of establishing a measure and allowing one to assess attitudes toward risk. That is, utility functions can reflect risk acceptance, risk neutrality, or risk aversion. Although some rational choice theorists focus on individual-level decision making, most rational choice theorists consider the ways in which individuals’ decisions are aggregated into some sort of social outcome or social preference order. The aggregation of individuals’ preferences occurs in both social choice and game theoretic models. Arrow’s theorem is the best-known result in social choice theory. Arrow showed that the rationality of individuals’ preferences could not be readily preserved at the group level when those individuals’ preferences were aggregated. That is, individual-level rationality does not ensure group-level rationality. Put slightly differently, irrationality at the group level cannot impugn rationality at the individual level. Other examples highlighting the difficulty of aggregating individuals’ preferences into a collective outcome abound. For instance, game theoretic presentations of the collective action problem highlight how individually rational decisions can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Rational choice models have been used to model interactions in a wide array of political institutions. Rational choice models have been developed to tackle some of the most challenging concepts in the social sciences, even in areas long thought impenetrable to rational choice theorizing. For instance, concepts such as ideology or personal identification have typically been used as preestablished descriptors. In contrast to treating those concepts as extant descriptors, rational choice theorists have modeled the endogenous development of ideologies and personal identification. Given the complexity of social phenomena, the relative parsimony and the clarity of rational choice models can be particularly helpful. The usefulness of rational choice models stems from their parsimony and their applicability to a wide range of settings.


Author(s):  
W. Bentley MacLeod

Abstract This paper explores the use of heuristic search algorithms for modeling human decision making. It is shown that this algorithm is consistent with many observed behavioral regularities, and may help explain deviations from rational choice. The main insight is that the heuristic function can be viewed as formal implementation of one aspect of emotion as discussed in Descarte's Error by Antonio Damasio. Consistent with Damasio's observations, it is shown that the quality of decision making is very sensitive to the nature of the heuristic ("emotion"), and hence this may help us better understand the role of emotion in rational choice theory.


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