Friction and Decision Rules in Portfolio Decision Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Summers

In portfolio decision analysis, features comprise the objectives, alternatives, physics, and information that define a decision context. By modeling features, decision analysts forecast the expected utilities of the alternatives. A model is complete if it contains all the features. A model is well-calibrated if it correctly predicts the probability distributions of each alternative’s utility, whereas ill-calibrated models, like those that suffer the optimizer’s curse, do not. Friction identifies qualities of a situation that prevent decision analysts from creating complete, well-calibrated models. When friction is significant, can maximizing expected utility be a suboptimal decision rule? Is satisfying decision theory’s axioms a necessary or sufficient condition for good decision making? Can rules that violate the axioms outperform rules that satisfy them? A simulation study of how unbiased, imprecise forecasts of payoffs affect project selection finds that, for the example tested, the answers are yes, no, and yes, which suggests that further studies of friction may be worthwhile. Discussions of friction bookend the study, starting the paper by defining friction and concluding by presenting three frameworks, each one from a different field of study, that provide mathematical tools for studying friction.

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-343
Author(s):  
Tobias Fasth ◽  
Samuel Bohman ◽  
Aron Larsson ◽  
Love Ekenberg ◽  
Mats Danielson

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.


2000 ◽  
Vol 09 (04) ◽  
pp. 459-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUNG-HSIEN CHIANG

In this approach, we investigate the fuzzy γ-models for decision analysis and making. This methodology utilizes fuzzy γ-model as an information aggregation operator. It provides several advantages due to the fact that the input to each model is the evidence supplied by the degree of satisfaction of sub-criteria and the output is the aggregated evidence. We also generalize fuzzy γ-models as a hierarchical network in this work. Thus, the decision making process is to aggregate and propagate the evidence information through such a hierarchical network. This trainable network is able to perceive and interpret complex decisions by using those fuzzy models. The simulation study examines the learning behaviors of the fuzzy γ-models using two numerical examples.


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