Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Puneet Agarwal ◽  
Kyle Hunt ◽  
Shivasubramanian Srinivasan ◽  
Jun Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Loss Of Life ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Comparison Of The Results ◽  
Code Compliance

Fire-code inspection and compliance are among the highest priorities for fire-inspection agencies to reduce the loss of life and property that can result from fire incidents. Requirements for code compliance and inspection vary throughout towns and states within the United States, and building owners who violate these codes can be penalized via fines and mandated compliance measures. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has investigated the strategic behavior of players in a fire-code inspection process. This paper fills the gap by presenting the game-theoretic approach to modeling building owners’ behaviors with respect to fire-code compliance and the inspection strategies of fire-inspection agencies. Both a decentralized model (sequential game in which the fire-inspection agency moves first) and a centralized model (simultaneous game controlled by one central decision maker) are developed to identify the best inspection strategies for the agency and the best compliance strategies for the building owner. This study provides prescriptive insights that can enable policymakers to improve fire-code compliance and inspection by identifying the conditions that motivate the players to participate positively in the inspection and compliance processes. Numerical sensitivity analyses of the equilibrium strategies and the expected losses of the players are provided, along with a comparison of the results between the decentralized and centralized models.

Scheduling Multi-Workflows Over Heterogeneous Virtual Machines With a Multi-Stage Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wu ◽  
Yuandou Wang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Scientific Workflow ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Heterogeneous Cloud ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

Cloud computing, with dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to geographically distributed computational capabilities, is becoming an increasingly popular platform for the execution of scientific applications such as scientific workflows. Scheduling multiple workflows over cloud infrastructures and resources is well recognized to be NP-hard and thus critical to meeting various types of Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. In this work, the authors consider a multi-objective scientific workflow scheduling framework based on the dynamic game-theoretic model. It aims at reducing make-spans, cloud cost, while maximizing system fairness in terms of workload distribution among heterogeneous cloud virtual machines (VMs). The authors consider randomly-generated scientific workflow templates as test cases and carry out extensive real-world tests based on third-party commercial clouds. Experimental results show that their proposed framework outperforms traditional ones by achieving lower make-spans, lower cost, and better system fairness.

A game-theoretic model for roadway performance management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hesham Osman ◽  
Mazdak Nikbakht
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Asset Managers

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a socio-technical approach to modeling the behavior of roadway users, asset managers, and politicians toward roadway performance and asset management. This approach models the complex interactions that occur between these agents in a complex system. Most modeling approaches in the domain of infrastructure asset management take a purely asset-centric approach and fail to address these socio-technical interactions. Design/methodology/approach – Interactions among political decision makers, asset management strategy developers, and road users are modeled using a game-theoretic approach. The interactions are modeled as a non-cooperative game in which politicians, asset managers, and road users are the main players. Each player is autonomous and aims to come up with the set of moves to maximize their respective level of satisfaction in response to other players’ moves. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to deal with multitude of players’ goals, and the Nash equilibria of the game are south out to develop appropriate strategies for different players. Findings – An illustrative example for a road network of a Canadian city is used to demonstrate the developed methodology. The developed methodology demonstrates how behaviors of various agents involved in the sphere of asset management impacts their collective decision-making behavior. Originality/value – The developed framework provides asset managers and political decision makers with a valuable tool to evaluate the impact of public policy decisions related to asset managers on road performance and the overall satisfaction of road users.

scholarly journals The world's biomes and primary production as a triple tragedy of the commons foraging game played among plants

2016 ◽  
Vol 283 (1842) ◽  
pp. 20161993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon G. McNickle ◽  
Miquel A. Gonzalez-Meler ◽  
Douglas J. Lynch ◽  
Jennifer L. Baltzer ◽  
Joel S. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Primary Production ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Plant Production ◽  
Root Production ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Tissue Production

Plants appear to produce an excess of leaves, stems and roots beyond what would provide the most efficient harvest of available resources. One way to understand this overproduction of tissues is that excess tissue production provides a competitive advantage. Game theoretic models predict overproduction of all tissues compared with non-game theoretic models because they explicitly account for this indirect competitive benefit. Here, we present a simple game theoretic model of plants simultaneously competing to harvest carbon and nitrogen. In the model, a plant's fitness is influenced by its own leaf, stem and root production, and the tissue production of others, which produces a triple tragedy of the commons. Our model predicts (i) absolute net primary production when compared with two independent global datasets; (ii) the allocation relationships to leaf, stem and root tissues in one dataset; (iii) the global distribution of biome types and the plant functional types found within each biome; and (iv) ecosystem responses to nitrogen or carbon fertilization. Our game theoretic approach removes the need to define allocation or vegetation type a priori but instead lets these emerge from the model as evolutionarily stable strategies. We believe this to be the simplest possible model that can describe plant production.

Toward An Econometric Model of Guzman'S Theory of Customary International Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-107
Author(s):  
Ryan Luby
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Econometric Model ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Diverse Group ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The One

The United States' recent incursions into both Iraq and Afghanistan have resituated debates concerning the validity and effectiveness of customary international law (CIL). On the one hand, scholars such as Goldsmith and Bradley argue that CIL is neither valid nor effective. Recently, Guzman formulated a response to such arguments as those proposed by Goldsmith and Bradley (1997). In a lucid critique of Goldsmith's argument, Guzman categorizes such arguments as “doctrinal” (2006). Instead, Guzman proposes a game theoretic model that seeks to quantify “reputation” in order to ascertain a given norm's status as CIL. The following paper proposes an econometric model in order to operationalize Guzman's theory of CIL. Indeed, looking at a politically and economically diverse group of five countries between the years of 1960 and 2008, the analysis herein suggests a more nuanced conception of CIL than the absolutist position of Goldsmith.

scholarly journals Altruism in a Time of Crisis: Dissociable Social Valuation and Perception during COVID-19 in the United States

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Luo ◽  
Anastasia Shuster ◽  
Dongil Chung ◽  
Madeline O'Brien ◽  
Matt Heflin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
World Crisis ◽  
Natural Tendency ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Push And Pull ◽  
Perceptual Systems ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Human prosocial behaviors are constantly shaped by the push-and-pull between societal need for cooperation and one’s natural tendency to self-prioritize. Nevertheless, it remains elusive how our valuation and perceptual systems might contribute to altruistic acts under the influence of a real-world crisis. Here, using computational modeling and a game-theoretic approach, we investigated how the coronavirus pandemic perturbed altruistic choices in the United States between April and May 2020. Overall, people made more altruistic choices as the pandemic became worse, an effect primarily driven by increased preference for social welfare. Paradoxically, participants also processed self-relevant information (i.e., “self-prioritization”) more efficiently at the perceptual level, as the pandemic became worse. Furthermore, individuals’ prosocial choices and preferences did not correlate with their self-prioritization efficiency. Collectively, these results revealed a more nuanced view of human altruism — that as a dynamic and context-dependent construct, altruism can co-exist with increased attention to the self.

Coordination mechanisms for digital and sustainable textile supply chain

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patanjal Kumar ◽  
Dheeraj Sharma ◽  
Peeyush Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Virtual Organization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Game Theoretic

PurposeSupply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.FindingsOur game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.Research limitations/implicationsThis study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.Originality/valueThis study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.

Explaining the Schwarzenegger Phenomenon: Local Frontrunners in Climate Policy

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 82-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Urpelainen
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
Private Information ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Local Climate ◽  
National Regulation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The surge of local climate policy is a puzzling political-economic phenomenon. Why have local policy-makers, incapable of mitigating global warming through individual emissions reductions, adopted ambitious policies while national governments refrain from action? I construct a game-theoretic model of two-level climate policy with incomplete information over political benefits. In equilibrium, the government selects a lax national regulation, and local policy-makers with private information on high local benefits choose more ambitious policies despite incentives to free ride. The analysis also suggests that even though local policy-makers prefer not to reveal information to the government, they must do so to pursue short-term political gains. Counterintuitively, new information can lead to more ambitious national regulation even if the government learns that the local political benefits are likely lower than expected. As an empirical application, I study the evolution of climate policies in the United States.

Nash Bargaining Solution Allocation is Not Suitable for Datacenter Jobs

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 1750001
Author(s):  
Ilya Nikolaevskiy ◽  
Andrey Lukyanenko ◽  
Andrei Gurtov
Keyword(s):  
Bandwidth Allocation ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multiple Resources ◽  
Datacenter Networks ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) has been broadly suggested as an effective solution for the problem of fair allocation of multiple resources, namely bandwidth allocation in datacenters. In spite of being thoroughly studied, and provably strategy-proof for most scenarios, NBS-based allocation methods lack research on the strategic behavior of tenants in the case of proportionality of resource demands, which is common in datacenter workloads. We found that misbehavior is beneficial: by lying about bandwidth demands tenants can improve their allocations. We show that a sequence of selfish improvements leads to trivial demand vectors for all tenants. It essentially removes sharing incentives which are very important for datacenter networks. In this paper, we analytically prove that tenants can misbehave in 2- and 3- tenants cases. We show that misbehavior is possible in one recently proposed NBS-based allocation system if proportionality of demands is taken into account. Monte Carlo simulations were done for 2–15 tenants to show a misbehavior possibility and its impact on aggregated bandwidth. We propose to use another game-theoretic approach, namely Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) to allocate bandwidth in the case of proportional demands. We show that this method performs significantly better than NBS after misbehavior.

scholarly journals A network approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils W Metternich ◽  
Julian Wucherpfennig
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Model Fit ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Statistical Framework ◽  
Network Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebel organizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebel organizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the core theoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach to explicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. We argue that competitive dynamics dominate strategic behavior between rebel organizations, but these can be offset by incentives to free-ride in cases where the underlying incompatibility displays public good characteristics. Based on a network game theoretic model, we derive a statistical framework that allows for a direct test of strategic interdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence is positive, that is weaker in secessionist conflicts, and that modeling this interdependence explicitly outweighs existing empirical measures of interdependence (e.g. number of organizations). Finally, we demonstrate that the model fit of rebel organizations' fighting durations can be improved by taking strategic interdependence into account.

scholarly journals Altruism in a Time of Crisis: Dissociable Social Valuation and Perception during COVID-19 in the United States

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Luo ◽  
Anastasia Shuster ◽  
Dongil Chung ◽  
Madeline O'Brien ◽  
Matthew Heflin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
World Crisis ◽  
Natural Tendency ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
One Year ◽  
Push And Pull ◽  
Perceptual Systems

Abstract Human prosocial behaviors are constantly shaped by the push-and-pull between societal need for cooperation and one’s natural tendency to self-prioritize. Nevertheless, it remains elusive how our valuation and perceptual systems might contribute to altruistic acts under the influence of a real-world crisis. Here, using computational modeling and a game-theoretic approach, we investigated how the coronavirus pandemic perturbed altruistic choices in the United States, April-May, 2020. Overall, people made more altruistic choices as the pandemic worsened, an effect primarily driven by increased preference for social welfare. Paradoxically, participants also processed self-relevant information (i.e., “self-prioritization”) more efficiently at the perceptual level, as the pandemic became worse. These effects were not observed one year later (May-June, 2021) when the variability of the pandemic diminished. Furthermore, individuals’ prosocial choices and preferences did not correlate with their self-prioritization efficiency. Collectively, these results revealed a more nuanced view of human altruism — that as a dynamic and context-dependent construct, altruism can co-exist with increased attention to the self.

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