المسؤولية الجنائية الدولية عن جرائم الاستعمار الفرنسي في الجزائر = The International Criminal Responsibility of French Colonialism in Algeria = La Responsabilité Pénale Internationale des Crimes du Colonialisme Français en Algérie

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-215
Author(s):  
عمير ، سعاد
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
French Colonialism

Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Human Rights Law: The Contribution of the International Criminal Court

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
The Road ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.

Proportionality in Refugee Exclusion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elif Gökşen
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Guidance Document ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
High Commissioner ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Abstract In the increased discussions about international security and terrorism, the application of the exclusion clauses in Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee Convention has become a topical and controversial issue. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) advises states to apply a proportionality test to weigh the gravity of the crime against the consequences of exclusion for cases concerning serious non-political crimes and war crimes. However, there is no uniform approach in state practice. Also, the concept of ‘gravity of the crime’ is not clarified in any guidance document of the UNHCR. Relying on the different applications of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention, this article questions whether the proportionality analysis is actually necessary for determining the exclusion, and how should the gravity of the crime be interpreted in such cases. First, the present article argues that the proportionality analysis is compatible with the overriding humanitarian aims of the 1951 Convention and that this analysis should be applicable to all the crimes listed in Article 1 F. Secondly, it demonstrates that the concept of ‘gravity of the crime’ should be interpreted by referring to the relevant concepts developed in international criminal law, and by considering the extent of the person’s individual criminal responsibility. This article asserts that exclusion from refugee status causes serious consequences, which sometimes might be heavier than criminal punishment. Therefore, Article 1 F should be applied with the utmost attention and sensitivity.

Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.

V Omission, in Particular Command Responsibility

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ambos Kai
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
General Principle ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Foundational Work ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility ◽  
General Explanation

This chapter continues the effort of this Volume to combine both comparative legal concepts with unique features of International Criminal Law. It is thus a direct result of the foundational work in Chapter II: International Criminal Law’s focus on individual criminal responsibility leads to an expressive purpose of punishments that again requires a criminalization of remote behavior by commanders and State leaders. This criminalization is based on the centuries old debate revolving around liability for omission. The chapter thus starts with a general explanation of the concept of omission vis-á-vis action. The author answers the question of whether a general omission liability exists in International Criminal Law affirmatively, recognizing a general principle of law, albeit with strict requirements. Drawing on the results from Chapter II, the author argues in favor of a criminalization of omission based on the prevention of harm and the protection of important legal goods/interests. The basis for this criminalization/liability is the respective person’s duty to act.

Challenges to Criminalizing State Responsibility for Genocide

Postgenocide ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 33-62
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
Corporate Criminal Liability ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

This chapter shows that although often states are parties in a genocide enterprise, the centrality—and responsibility—of states for genocide does not receive attention commensurate with the severity of the problem. Indeed, genocidal states are not held criminally responsibility for genocide. Underscoring difficulties at proving state criminal responsibility for genocide, the analysis compares and contrasts individual criminal responsibility and state criminal responsible for genocide. Whereas in the former case the matter has been dealt with by domestic and international criminal courts and tribunals, in the latter case there is no international judicial authority which can try states for criminal responsibility. However, non-state corporate criminal liability, and evolution of this institute in international law, may provide some transferable lessons for state responsibility for genocide. The chapter highlights the nexus between individual responsibility and state responsibility, and the failures of international genocide law in establishing state responsibility for genocide.

Defences in International Criminal LawExceptions in International Law?

2020 ◽  
pp. 347-362
Author(s):  
Kai Ambos
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Main Part ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Prosecution ◽  
Meta Level ◽  
Secondary Rule ◽  
Partial Defences ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

This chapter analyses the concept of defences in international criminal law. It starts off with some general conceptual remarks defining defences, on a meta level, as exceptions to the (secondary) rule expressed by the respective offence; as such, they do not invalidate this rule—the prohibition sub poena by the offence—but entail its non-application. In the main part, the chapter proposes a systematization along the lines of a substantive/procedural distinction (substantive reasons to exclude individual criminal responsibility versus procedural obstacles/bars to criminal prosecution) and further distinguishing between full and partial defences, justifications and excuses, failure of proof defences, and alibi. On the basis of this classification, a hierarchy of defences is suggested.

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