هيكل الملكية في الشركات المدرجة في بورصة البحرين ودوره في تخفيض تكاليف الوكالة = The Role of Ownership Structure in Reducing Agency Costs in Bahraini Listed Firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-98
Author(s):  
علام محمد موسى حمدان ◽  
عادل محمد يسلم السريع ◽  
محمد سلامة عناسوة
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Listed Firms

scholarly journals Impact of corporate governance on financial disclosures: Evidence from India

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 874-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehul Raithatha ◽  
Varadraj Bapat
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Financial Disclosures

The paper aims at identifying impact of corporate governance variables i.e. board structure (board size, board independence, board activity and board busyness) and ownership structure (foreign promoters holding, institutional shareholding and CEO duality) on financial disclosures made by the Indian firms. Using cross sectional data of 325 listed firms for the financial year 2009-10, we compute financial disclosure score (using 171 checklist points) based on disclosure requirements of accounting standards. We find average disclosure score of 73%, maximum and minimum being 100% and 46% respectively. Our finding support agency theory in terms of monitoring role of board since board size is found to be significant however we do not find any influence of board independence on the disclosures. The study also supports resource dependency theory in terms of outside directorship which might provide exposure to different corporate environment, brings diverse perspectives and knowledge to the directors and this in turn leads to improved disclosures. We also support the notion that having foreign promoter shareholding improves disclosures

Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 883-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Rossi ◽  
Richard J. Cebula
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the debt and ownership structure of a sample of Italian-listed companies to measure the role assumed in the control and monitoring of agency costs. Design/methodology/approach This study examines a balanced panel data, using both a random effects model and a generalized method of moments model to better capture any problems related to the endogeneity of the variables in the model. Findings The results provide evidence of a positive relationship between debt and ownership concentration on the one hand and a negative relationship between debt and institutional investors on the other hand. The debt seems to assume both functions, i.e. the disciplinary role of substitute at low levels of ownership concentration and a complementary role at high levels of ownership concentration. Practical implications This study provides three practical implications. The first is that the complementarity between debt and ownership concentration provides evidence of the entrenchment effect and tends to weaken the company financially. Second, the results also provide useful prompts to policy-makers who should encourage the presence of institutional investors. Third, the policy-makers should also encourage the expansion of the stock market to enhance the protection of shareholders, reduce private control benefits and provide Italy the same opportunities as other common and civil law countries to collect risk capital, avoiding the abuse of debt. Originality/value The empirical results suggest that ownership concentration increases the degree of corporate debt, whereas institutional investors assume the disciplinary role of monitoring and controlling agency costs. The results provide evidence of both the entrenchment effect and the alignment-of-interests hypothesis and that the expropriation theory seems to prevail over the control and monitoring role.

scholarly journals Determinants of performance of closely – held (family) firms after going public: the role of the ownership structure, economy, changes in top management, partial sale, equity concentration after the IPO and shareholders in management

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Manuel Bernardo Vaz Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Activity Levels ◽  
Third Place ◽  
Going Public ◽  
Good Shape

When a closely-held (family) company goes public, there are very specific and particular determinants that have crucial influences on the post-going public operational, social and financial performance of those firms. We investigate why firms decline significantly their profitability, efficiency, employment and activity levels, and show an increase on sales and capital investment when there is a transition from private to public ownership. We conclude that this decrease in performance is significantly higher, when one or more than one of the following facts happen after firms going public: first, when there are not shareholders in management, what implies increased agency costs; secondly, when the level of equity concentration after going public is low; in third place, when the level of equity retention by the founding shareholder is low; fourth, when the economy health during the timing of the sale is not in good shape; and lastly, when the old CEO is changed.

scholarly journals Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-controlled Firms: Evidence from Pakistan

2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (4II) ◽  
pp. 161-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fahad Abdullah ◽  
Attaullah Shah ◽  
Safi Ullah Khan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Research Studies

More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) showed skepticism about the efficiency of joint stock companies because of the separation of management from ownership. He observed that managers of joint stock companies cannot be expected to watch over the business with the same anxious vigilance as owners in a partnership would. Adam Smith’s worry remained buried for a century and a half until Berle and Means (1932) rekindled interest in this area when they hypothesised in their book that dispersed shareholding is an inefficient form of ownership structure. They argued that separation of ownership and management control has changed the role of owner from being active to the passive agent. Dispersed shareholders lack incentives to monitor self-interested managers who possess only a small fraction of the total shareholdings. The propositions by Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) received some support when Jensen and Meckling (1976) tied together the elements of property rights, agency costs, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure of a firm. Jensen and Meckling asserted that agency costs are real, which the owner can reduce either by increasing ownership stake of the agent in the firm or by incurring monitoring and bonding costs. In early tests, several research studies supported the views of Jensen and Meckling. However, these studies did not account for endogeneity problem.

Ownership structure and R&D investment: the role of identity and contestability in Spanish listed firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 405-426
Author(s):  
Laura García-García ◽  
Macarena Gonzalo Alonso-Buenaposada ◽  
M. Elena Romero-Merino ◽  
Marcos Santamaria-Mariscal
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
D Investment

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and the investment in research and development (R&D) for a sample of listed Spanish companies.Design/methodology/approachFollowing the agency theory and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, the authors propose that R&D investment is affected by ownership structure, specifically by the identity of the controlling owner (family firms and firms with an institutional investor) and the level of contestability by other shareholders. In order to test these hypotheses, the authors build an original database identifying, at a 10% threshold, the ultimate shareholders of a sample of 96 Spanish firms listed during 2008–2018 (1,002 obs).FindingsThe results show that there is no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and the R&D investment. Only when the authors consider the nature of the main shareholder, the authors find that in family firms there is an inverted U relationship between ownership and R&D, so that at low levels of ownership, the R&D increases, while at high levels of ownership (that we compute around 54%) the R&D decreases. Also, when the main shareholder is an institutional investor, the greater its ownership, the higher the R&D investment. Finally, the authors test that, contrary to what mainstream suggests, contestability in family firms is higher when ownership in the hands of other family shareholders increases.Originality/valueThe work uses an original database to test a nonlinear relationship between ownership and R&D investment in family firms. Also, the study addresses a topic hardly ever discussed in the literature about R&D as it is the role of the contestability by other controlling shareholders.

scholarly journals Moral governance: politicians, ownership, and control

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-273
Author(s):  
Paolo Di Betta
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Managerial Turnover ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Moral Governance ◽  
And Control ◽  
Different Cultures

We investigate upon the influences exerted by politicians on the Board and on ownership structure, as an application of political power to corporations. We characterize moral governance as the joint result of these efforts on managerial turnover and ownership turnover. We comment upon two Italian clinical cases of private, listed firms in which politicians enter the scene when a major event occurs (i.e., reorganization, merger, and acquisition activity). Our model could serve as a guideline and checklist for insiders to interact with politicians. We suggest this could be of interest in countries where there is a common level ground – such as in Europe – but with different cultures on the role of the politician in the business environment. It could be an instrument to detect political intervention in the economy to be also used for cross-country comparisons of business environment and for assessing transparency of companies in developed and developing countries. Recent events from the financial crisis in 2008 have increased the urge to investigate these themes.

scholarly journals Ownership Structure and Financial Performance of Listed Firms in Kenya: Mediation Role of Corporate Diversification

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-34
Author(s):  
Dr. Peninah Jepkogei Tanui ◽  
Harrison Katana ◽  
Geoffrey Alosi ◽  
Lynda Khahenda ◽  
Vincensia Emmanuel Adhiambo
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
P Value ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Panel Regression ◽  
Mediation Effects ◽  
Listed Firms

Purpose: The study aimed at examining the mediating role of corporate diversification between ownership structure and financial performance of listed firms in Kenya. Methodology/Approach/Design: As guided by explanatory research design, 65 listed firms from 2003 to 2017 were targeted. However, panel data of 35 firms were considered after excluding suspended and delisted as far as the study period is concerned. Results: The panel regression analysis finding indicated that corporate diversification positively and significantly mediated between institutional ownership and financial performance (β = .005, p-value = .000). Furthermore, there was a negative but statistically significant mediation effect of corporate diversification between foreign ownership and financial performance (β = -.0019, p-value = .023). These mediation effects existed despite the direct effect between institutional and as well foreign ownership and financial performance being statistically insignificant. Practical Implications: The study, therefore, suggested to the management of listed firms to ensure proper implementation of corporate diversification as it transmits the effect of ownership structure on financial performance. More importantly, policymakers are suggested to streamline taxation of foreign investors, tackle malpractices in the firm leading to embezzlement of investor funds. Future studies need to enlarge the scope to incorporate unlisted firms as well as firms listed in different stock exchanges in East Africa. Other types of ownership structure as managerial, family and state need to be analyzed. In addition, other forms and measures of corporate diversification could be investigated by future researchers. Originality/Value: To attain the main objective, the study used panel regression analysis and path diagrams to examine the effect of ownership structure on financial performance via corporate diversification.

Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

CFA Digest ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Gregory G. Gocek
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs
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