العلاقة بين الحاكمية المؤسسية و توزيعات الأرباح و تأثرها بصعوبات التمويل الخارجي = The Relation between Corporate Governance and Dividend and How It Is Affected by External Financing Constraints

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-81
Author(s):  
علام محمد موسى حمدان
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financing Constraints ◽  
External Financing

Crowdfunding, Financing Constraints, and Real Effects

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (8) ◽  
pp. 3561-3580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Praveen Kumar ◽  
Nisan Langberg ◽  
David Zvilichovsky
Keyword(s):  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Spot Price ◽  
Financing Constraints ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Real Effects ◽  
Discriminating Power ◽  
Individual Demand ◽  
Novel Interactions ◽  
The Cost

We study the feasibility and optimal design of presale crowdfunding contracts where participating consumers pay a premium above the future expected spot price and financially constrained entrepreneurs balance the potential product–market distortions introduced through presale crowdfunding against the cost of traditional external financing. Our analysis shows how such crowdfunding contracts enable the execution of projects that could not be otherwise undertaken and highlights novel interactions between the cost of capital, demand uncertainty, and production. Tighter financing constraints reduce the ability of the monopolist to extract surplus but, contrary to the usual result, may increase production. We evaluate how uncertainty and market size reduce the price-discriminating power of the monopolist and affect the optimal contract regime. Nevertheless, we show how such presale price-discriminating contracts are implementable even when the number of potential consumers is relatively high and their individual demand is stochastic. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

scholarly journals Optimality of Morocco’s Currency Basket

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
AZZOUZI Asmae ◽  
BOUSSELHAMI Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Trade Balance ◽  
Foreign Currency ◽  
Financing Constraints ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Local Currency ◽  
Optimal Weights ◽  
Monetary Authorities ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

<p><em>The objective of this article is to analyze the behavior of the monetary authorities of Morocco in the readjustment of the official weights of anchor currencies in Dirham basket on April 13, 2015. To do this, we are taking into account the objective of the external financing constraints for comparing, with different scenarios, the optimal weights with the implicit weights of the currencies. Such a comparison proves that the authorities take more into consideration the structure of the commercial exchanges than that of the debt for the choice of the optimal weight of the anchor currency. In the final part of the paper, we have delved deeper into this issue by proposing a detailed sectoral study to examine the impact of the exchange rate on the trade balance for each activity sector. Our intention is to find out which foreign currency seems more volatile against the local currency in order to lead the economy to manage the stability of dirham by increasing its weight in the basket. As a result, the higher price elasticity of the Dollar against the dirham encourages Moroccan monetary authorities to increase its weight in the basket. </em></p>

Corporate strategy uniqueness, analyst herding, and financing constraints

2020 ◽  
pp. 147612702092801
Author(s):  
Yuan Wen ◽  
Surinder Tikoo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Strategy ◽  
Financing Constraints ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Security Analysts ◽  
Flow Sensitivity ◽  
Corporate Strategies ◽  
Corporate Insiders ◽  
Cash Flow Sensitivity ◽  
High Information

This study is based on the premise that firms pursuing unique corporate strategies impose a high information cost on security analysts. A difficult information environment will foster analyst herding and lead to financing constraints for firms with unique corporate strategies. We find that corporate strategy uniqueness is positively related to analyst herding, which suggests that strategy uniqueness is associated with greater information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, we find that firms with more unique strategies have higher investment–cash flow sensitivity, indicating that strategy uniqueness makes it harder for firms to obtain external financing. Our findings contribute to research about the consequences of pursuing strategies that security analysts are unwilling or unable to value.

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