Self - Excited Vibration Arising from Tribology - Dynamic Interaction

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
H. A. Sherif ◽  
A. E. Abdelraheim
Author(s):  
Xianguo Han ◽  
Huajiang Ouyang ◽  
Minjie Wang ◽  
Nurhafizzah Hassan ◽  
Yuming Mao

Vibration occurring during machining is a major limitation to the productivity and quality of products. The dynamic interaction between the cutter and the workpiece during a turning process causes self-excited vibration. If the level of vibration is sufficiently high, poor surface quality of the workpiece and excessive tool wear can occur. This article presents a dynamic model for the vibration in turning operations taking into account the time-dependent reduction of workpiece diameter and the regenerative chatter mechanism. The workpiece is modelled as a beam rotating about its longitudinal axis and the cutter provides a moving load that is a source of parametric excitation. Simulated numerical examples are presented. Turning experiments are conducted that demonstrate vibration and chatter in turning operations. It is found through comparison between the theoretical and numerical results that the established dynamic model can predict the vibration pattern of the workpieces fairly well but underestimates the magnitude of workpiece oscillation.


Vestnik MEI ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Proskuryakov ◽  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vignesh Srinivasan ◽  
Céline Bruelle ◽  
Enzo Scifo ◽  
Dan Duc Pham ◽  
Rabah Soliymani ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Paul Newman ◽  
Evelyn Patterson ◽  
Reed Smith

We consider how auditors assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and plan their audit where a possibly fraudulent auditee anticipates the assessment and planning process. The auditor uses the auditee's (possibly fraudulent) earnings report to revise his beliefs about the likelihood of fraud when formulating an audit plan. We find that as underlying earnings increase, a fraudulent auditee increases reported earnings. In turn, as the auditee's reported earnings increase, the auditor increases audit effort. We also find that the auditee (who knows the auditor will use the report for audit planning) selects reports that increase his own expected payoff, relative to reports he would select if the auditor did not observe the report before finalizing the audit plan. By contrast, the auditor is no better off using the auditee's report for audit planning. Inherent risk, detection risk, and overall audit risk can increase when the auditor uses the auditee's report. Thus, because of the dynamic interaction between the auditor and auditee, procedures that aid in assessing audit risk may not reduce that risk or result in more efficient audits.


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