Do we Need a Plant Theodicy?

Lloyd Strickland

doi:10.12775/setf.2021.026

Do we Need a Plant Theodicy?

Scientia et Fides ◽

10.12775/setf.2021.026 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Lloyd Strickland

Keyword(s):

Intrinsic Value ◽

Moral Considerability ◽

Animal Pain ◽

Pain And Suffering

In recent decades, philosophers and theologians have become increasingly aware of the extent of animal pain and suffering, both past and present, and of the challenge this poses to God’s goodness and justice. As a result, a great deal of effort has been devoted to the discussion and development of animal theodicies, that is, theodicies that aim to offer morally sufficient reasons for animal pain and suffering that are in fact God’s reasons. In this paper, I ask whether there is a need to go even further than this, by considering whether effort should be made to extend theodicy to include plants as well. Drawing upon ideas found in some recent animal theodicies as well as in the work of some environmental ethicists, I offer three arguments for supposing that plants should indeed fall within the purview of theodicy: (1) the argument from non-flourishing as evil, (2) the argument from moral considerability, and (3) the argument from intrinsic value. I also consider a possible objection to each of these arguments. Having outlined and defended the aforementioned arguments for broadening theodicy to include plants as well as humans and animals, I conclude by considering what a plant theodicy might look like.

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Hybrids and the Boundaries of Moral Considerability or Revisiting the Idea of Non-Instrumental Value

Philosophy & Technology ◽

10.1007/s13347-019-00380-9 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Magdalena Holy-Luczaj ◽

Vincent Blok

Keyword(s):

Common Good ◽

Intrinsic Value ◽

Moral Considerability ◽

Instrumental Value ◽

The Common Good ◽

A Value ◽

Ethical Status ◽

Functional Value ◽

The Common

Abstract The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability.

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The Problem of Animal Pain and Suffering

The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil ◽

10.1002/9781118608005.ch8 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 113-127

Author(s):

Robert Francescotti

Keyword(s):

Animal Pain ◽

Pain And Suffering

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Toxicology and New Social Ethics for Animals

Toxicologic Pathology ◽

10.1080/01926230390175011 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 31 (1_suppl) ◽

pp. 128-131 ◽

Cited By ~ 18

Author(s):

Bernard E. Rollin

Keyword(s):

Social Ethics ◽

Animal Research ◽

Social Concern ◽

Animal Suffering ◽

The Past ◽

Animal Pain ◽

Pain And Suffering

The issue of animal treatment has emerged as a major social concern over the past three decades. This ramified in a new ethic for animal treatment that goes beyond concern about cruelty and attempts to eliminate animal pain and suffering, whatever its source. This is evidenced by laws governing animal research in many countries. Insofar as toxicology can entail significant and prolonged animal suffering, it is at loggerheads with this new ethic. Ways are suggested for the toxicological community to put itself in harmony with the ethic and thereby preserve its autonomy.

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Etika Animalitas

Gema Teologika Jurnal Teologi Kontekstual dan Filsafat Keilahian ◽

10.21460/gema.2019.42.444 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 229

Author(s):

Robert Patannang Borrong

Keyword(s):

Animal Ethics ◽

Intrinsic Value ◽

Moral Standing ◽

Natural Order ◽

Moral Standard ◽

Human Beings ◽

Life And Death ◽

Ethical Concept ◽

Pain And Suffering ◽

The Right

Why animal ethics? The importance of animal ethics for the Indonesian public is to respond to the extinction threat of some animal species in Indonesia, like Tiger in Sumatera, Orang Utan in Kalimantan, Anoa in Sulawesi, and Cendrawasih in Papua. The way humans consume animals is often cruel, causing pain and suffering on the part of the animals. Such an attitude indicates the lack of moral standing in animal sphere. Philosophically and theologically, animal has sentience and intrinsic values which with humans have to recognise as the moral standard for animal.Using the theological-ethical concept that human being was created in the image of God, which means that they are not only endowed with senses but also the intellect to make them moral standing creature, this article points to the capacity as well as responsibility of humans to the environment, specifically to the animal world (animalities). As such, animals have to be regarded as having moral standing in the context of human beings’moral attitude and treat. Animals have to be respected and loved morally because they have sense, sentience and intrinsic value. Animals have feeling of pleasure and suffering which with human beings must honor and make as a moral standard. Like human beings, animals have the right to enjoy contentment and to be protected as the good creatures created by God. Although consuming animals can be considered part of natural order and natural recycle, animals have the right to enjoy liberation and prosperity during they are living, and to be avoided from suffering. In this sense, life and death must be accepted in balance. As a conclusion, in relating to animals, humans should demonstrate the virtues of respect, love, justice, and restrained attitudes. Animal ethics, thus, concerns with the sustainability of the peace and welfare of the whole creation on the planet earth.

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The Interpretation and Application of the Three Rs by Animal Ethics Committee Members

Alternatives to Laboratory Animals ◽

10.1177/026119290503300511 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 33 (5) ◽

pp. 487-500 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Catherine A. Schuppli ◽

David Fraser

Keyword(s):

Animal Ethics ◽

Ethics Committees ◽

Animal Pain ◽

Animal Ethics Committees ◽

Pain And Suffering ◽

Key Issues ◽

Animal Use ◽

The Three Rs ◽

Protocol Review ◽

Consistent Application

The Three Rs form the basis of review of animal-use protocols by Animal Ethics Committees (AECs), but little research has examined how AECs actually interpret and implement the Three Rs. This topic was explored through in-depth, open-ended interviews with 28 members of AECs at four Canadian universities. In describing protocol review, AEC members rarely mentioned the Three Rs, but most reported applying some aspects of the basic concepts. Comments identified several factors that could impede full application of the Three Rs: incomplete understanding of the Three Rs (especially Refinement), trust that researchers implement Replacement and Reduction themselves, belief by some members that granting agency review covers the Three Rs, focus on sample size rather than experimental design to achieve Reduction, focus on harm caused by procedures to the exclusion of housing and husbandry, and lack of consensus on key issues, notably on the nature and moral significance of animal pain and suffering, and on whether AECs should minimise overall harm to animals. The study suggests ways to achieve more consistent application of the Three Rs, by providing AECs with up-to-date information on the Three Rs and with access to statistical expertise, by consensus-building on divisive issues, and by training on the scope and implementation of the Three Rs.

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Clinical Update: Pain and Suffering

Guides Newsletter ◽

10.1001/amaguidesnewsletters.2003.janfeb02 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

pp. 5-5

Author(s):

Sheila Wendler

Keyword(s):

Subjective Experience ◽

Personal Injury ◽

Treatment Interventions ◽

Medical Expenses ◽

Affective Component ◽

Pain Behaviors ◽

The Social ◽

Patient’S Experience ◽

Pain And Suffering ◽

And Training

Abstract Attorneys use the term pain and suffering to indicate the subjective, intangible effects of an individual's injury, and plaintiffs may seek compensation for “pain and suffering” as part of a personal injury case although it is not usually an element of a workers’ compensation case. The AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), Fifth Edition, provides guidance for rating pain qualitatively or quantitatively in certain cases, but, because of the subjectivity and privateness of the patient's experience, the AMA Guides offers no quantitative approach to assessing “pain and suffering.” The AMA Guides also cautions that confounders of pain behaviors and perception of pain include beliefs, expectations, rewards, attention, and training. “Pain and suffering” is challenging for all parties to value, particularly in terms of financial damages, and using an individual's medical expenses as an indicator of “pain and suffering” simply encourages excessive diagnostic and treatment interventions. The affective component, ie, the uniqueness of this subjective experience, makes it difficult for others, including evaluators, to grasp its meaning. Experienced evaluators recognize that a myriad of factors play a role in the experience of suffering associated with pain, including its intensity and location, the individual's ability to conceptualize pain, the meaning ascribed to pain, the accompanying injury or illness, and the social understanding of suffering.

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