scholarly journals An Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic

2019 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Damian E. Szmuc
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Interpretation

‘Appearing Equal’ at Phaedo 74 B 4 – C 6: an Epistemic Interpretation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Tuozzo
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Colour Perception ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

The argument at Phaedo 74 B 4‐C 6 that the equal itself is ‘something different from’ sets of physical equals depends on Leibniz's Law: there is a property that perceptible equals have that the equal itself does not have. What I call the ‘epistemic interpretation’ holds that the property is an epistemic one: having appeared unequal. The ‘ontological interpretation’ holds that the property is not epistemic, but simply the property of being unequal (that is: physical equals suffer the compresence of opposites, while the equal itself does not). The most natural reading of the text favours the epistemic interpretation; scholarly support for the ontological interpretation is based on the widely held view that on the epistemic interpretation the argument is manifestly invalid. But this view implicitly relies on an impoverished sense of ‘appearing’ as equivalent to ‘being thought’. Drawing on an analogy with colour perception, I elaborate an experiential sense of ‘appearing’ which makes Plato's argument on the epistemic interpretation philosophically defensible.

On the 'Evidential' Nature of the 'Epistemic' Use of the German Modals müssen and sollen

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 131-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanja Mortelmans
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
The Difference

Abstract. The difference with respect to the kind of evidence evoked by the so-called 'epistemic' uses of the German modals müssen and sollen is argued to affect the epistemic contribution of both verbs in a crucial way. With quotative sollen, a genuine subjective-epistemic moment (which should not automatically be associated with an expression of scepticism, i.e. a low commitment on the part of the speaker) remains marginal at best, whereas inferential müssen easily invites speaker-oriented interpretations to the extent that the speaker can be taken to be rather strongly committed to the factuality of the proposition. The latter 'epistemic' interpretation, however, can but need not occur.

On epistemic and ontological interpretations of intuitionistic and paraconsistent paradigms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Carnielli ◽  
Abilio Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
Technical Point ◽  
Preservation Of Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Approach ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
Excluded Middle

Abstract From the technical point of view, philosophically neutral, the duality between a paraconsistent and a paracomplete logic (for example intuitionistic logic) lies in the fact that explosion does not hold in the former and excluded middle does not hold in the latter. From the point of view of the motivations for rejecting explosion and excluded middle, this duality can be interpreted either ontologically or epistemically. An ontological interpretation of intuitionistic logic is Brouwer’s idealism; of paraconsistency is dialetheism. The epistemic interpretation of intuitionistic logic is in terms of preservation of constructive proof; of paraconsistency is in terms of preservation of evidence. In this paper, we explain and defend the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. We argue that it is more plausible than dialetheism and allows a peaceful and fruitful coexistence with classical logic.

scholarly journals Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Giada Fratantonio
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Access Problem ◽  
Metaphysical Interpretation ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

Abstract In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard's own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard's response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three interpretations comes without problems. I conclude that, until we have a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem remains a challenge for Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.

scholarly journals Kolmogorovian versus Non-Kolmogorovian Probabilities in Contextual Theories

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Claudio Garola
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Theory Of Measurement ◽  
Classical Mechanics ◽  
Quantum Probability ◽  
Statistical Interpretation ◽  
Standard Quantum ◽  
Contextual Theory ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
Ignorance Interpretation ◽  
Quantum Theory Of Measurement

Most scholars maintain that quantum mechanics (QM) is a contextual theory and that quantum probability does not allow for an epistemic (ignorance) interpretation. By inquiring possible connections between contextuality and non-classical probabilities we show that a class TμMP of theories can be selected in which probabilities are introduced as classical averages of Kolmogorovian probabilities over sets of (microscopic) contexts, which endows them with an epistemic interpretation. The conditions characterizing TμMP are compatible with classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM), and QM, hence we assume that these theories belong to TμMP. In the case of CM and SM, this assumption is irrelevant, as all of the notions introduced in them as members of TμMP reduce to standard notions. In the case of QM, it leads to interpret quantum probability as a derived notion in a Kolmogorovian framework, explains why it is non-Kolmogorovian, and provides it with an epistemic interpretation. These results were anticipated in a previous paper, but they are obtained here in a general framework without referring to individual objects, which shows that they hold, even if only a minimal (statistical) interpretation of QM is adopted in order to avoid the problems following from the standard quantum theory of measurement.

scholarly journals Acerca de la articulación de la lectura epistémica del Idealismo Trascendental y una interpretación realista del concepto crítico de cosa en sí

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ileana P. Beade
Keyword(s):  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Real Entity ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

RESUMENEn este escrito proponemos examinar en qué sentido la interpretación epistémica de la distinción crítica fenómeno/cosa en sí resulta compatible con la interpretación de la cosa en sí como entidad real. Atendiendo a este objetivo, se intentará mostrar que dicha interpretación epistémica, lejos de reducir la cosa en sí a un mero concepto heurístico, conduce a una consideración de la misma como entidad efectivamente existente (más allá de las dificultades que obviamente supone la aplicación de las categorías de realidad y existencia a aquello que, por definición, jamás puede ser dado como objeto de experiencia).PALABRAS CLAVEFENÓMENO, COSA EN SÍ, PERSPECTIVA, REALIDADABSTRACTIn this paper I shall analyze in what sense the Epistemic Interpretation of the critical distinction between appearances and things in themselves is compatible with an interpretation of the thing in itself as a real entity. I will try to show that the epistemic interpretation, far from reducing the thing in itself to a mere heuristic concept, leads to a consideration of the thing in itself as an existing entity (notwithstanding the difficulties which are obviously involved in the application of the categories of reality and existence to what can never be given as an object of experience).KEYWORDSAPPEARANCE, THING IN ITSELF, PERSPECTIVE, REALITY

scholarly journals Sharing (mis) information on social networking sites. An exploration of the norms for distributing content authored by others

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lavinia Marin
Keyword(s):  
Social Networking ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Social Networking Sites ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Information Giving ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
Local Norms

AbstractThis article explores the norms that govern regular users’ acts of sharing content on social networking sites. Many debates on how to counteract misinformation on Social Networking Sites focus on the epistemic norms of testimony, implicitly assuming that the users’ acts of sharing should fall under the same norms as those for posting original content. I challenge this assumption by proposing a non-epistemic interpretation of (mis) information sharing on social networking sites which I construe as infrastructures for forms of life found online. Misinformation sharing belongs more in the realm of rumour spreading and gossiping rather than in the information-giving language games. However, the norms for sharing cannot be fixed in advance, as these emerge at the interaction between the platforms’ explicit rules, local norms established by user practices, and a meta-norm of sociality. This unpredictability does not leave us with a normative void as an important user responsibility still remains, namely that of making the context of the sharing gesture explicit. If users will clarify how their gestures of sharing are meant to be interpreted by others, they will implicitly assume responsibility for possible misunderstandings based on omissions, and the harms of shared misinformation can be diminished.

scholarly journals Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Poston
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Epistemology ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Negative Findings ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation ◽  
Unique Source ◽  
Oxford University Press

Abstract It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer, M. 1997. “Probability and Coherence Justification.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 463–72, Olsson, E. 2002. “What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” Journal of Philosophy XCIX (5): 246–72, Olsson, E. 2005. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford University Press., Bovens, L., and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford University Press, prove that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These formal results, known as ‘the impossibility theorems’ have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports must first individually confirm the target claim before the coherence of multiple reports offers any positive confirmation. In this paper, I dispute this epistemic interpretation. The impossibility theorems are consistent with the idea that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true even if the reports do not individually confirm prior to coherence. Once we see that the formal discoveries do not have this implication, we can recover a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism and these results. This paper, thus, seeks to turn the tide of the negative findings for coherence reasoning by defending coherence as a unique source of confirmation.

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