scholarly journals World trade and regional trade orientation in the context of forthcoming transatlantic trade and investment partnership

Equilibrium ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Czarny ◽  
Paweł Folfas

We analyse potential consequences of the forthcoming Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States (TTIP) for trade orientation of both partners. We do it so with along with the short analysis of the characteristics of the third wave of regionalism and the TTIP position in this process as well as the dominant role of the EU and the U.S. in the world economy – especially – in the world trade. Next, we study trade orientation of the hypothetical region created in result of TTIP. We use regional trade introversion index (RTII) to analyze trade between the EU and the U.S. that has taken place until now to get familiar with the potential changes caused by liberalization of trade between both partners. We analyze RTII for mutual trade of the EU and the U.S. Then, we apply disaggregated data to analyze and compare selected partial RTII (e.g. for trade in final and intermediate goods as well as goods produced in the main sectors of economy like agriculture or manufacturing). The analysis of the TTIP region’s orientation of trade based on the historical data from the period 1999-2012 revealed several conclusions. Nowadays, the trade between the EU and the U.S. is constrained by the protection applied by both partners. Trade liberalization constituting one necessary part of TTIP will surely help to intensify this trade. The factor of special concern is trade of agricultural products which is most constrained and will hardly be fully liberalized even within a framework of TTIP. Simultaneously, both parties are even now trading relatively intensively with intermediaries, which are often less protected than the average of the economy for the sake of development of final goods’ production. The manufactured goods are traded relatively often as well, mainly in consequence of their poor protection after many successful liberalization steps in the framework of GATT/WTO. Consequently, we point out that in many respects the TTIP will be important not only for its participants, but for the whole world economy as well. TTIP appears to be an economic and political project with serious consequences for the world economy and politics.

Author(s):  
Jens Ladefoged Mortensen

In a time of trade wars, free trade skepticism, tech rivalry, and multipolar disorder, the European Union (EU) cannot evade its responsibilities the last defender of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet, it raises the question of whether the EU has power to defend the WTO. The EU is a multilateralist-oriented power of global magnitude. Unlike the United States, the EU is openly defending the WTO in the current crisis created by continued refusal to appointment WTO Appellate Body members. Like the United States, the EU is concerned with the illegitimate trade practices of China. Yet, the EU uses diplomatic pressure on China within the rules of the WTO. The EU is actively trying to rescue the rule-based trade system. Yet, it cannot do so alone. It needs support, not just form other WTO members but also from within Europe itself. The current crisis is in part rooted in the inability of the WTO members to update the WTO rulebook. The focus will be on the potential clash between a more assertive EU on sustainability and the absence of updated WTO rules on sustainable trade issues. This may force the EU to confront a deep-rooted policy dilemma. The question is whether the EU should continue to refrain from using its market power to promote sustainable trade in respect of the WTO. As the EU is about to ratify several bilateral trade agreements of commercial, geo-economic, and indeed geo-political importance, such as the EU–Mercosur or EU–Vietnam agreements, the rule-orientation of the EU faces growing domestic opposition as well as external contestation. Furthermore, the EU is modernizing its trade defense weaponry, the antidumping instrument, and has recently declared its intent to impose unilateral climate-related trade policy measures, the carbon-adjustment tariff, in the future. Thus, an incident such as the burning of the Amazon forest may force the EU to take a tougher stance on sustainability at the risk of bringing the EU on a collision course with the WTO itself, its rules, process, and member states. Consequently, the complex setup of the EU as a trade power could make it difficult to ratify WTO-compatible trade agreements in the future.


Ekonomika ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-23
Author(s):  
Anna Wróbel

Abstract. The aim of the study is to analyze the EU trade policy in the age of the World Trade Organization (WTO) crisis. In addition to the WTO membership and a number of international agreements within this organisation, the EU is a party to many bilateral trade agreements and negotiating further. It is the side effect of the protracted negotiations in the WTO under the Doha Development Round. The paper discusses the process of proliferation of bilateral trade agreements in the world economy and its importance for the EU. The article is divided into three parts. Part One identifies the determinants of the WTO crisis. Part Two discusses the process of proliferation of bilateral trade agreements in the world economy. Part Three analyzes the EU trade policy and the system of the EU preferential trade agreements. It also examines trade relations of the EU with the Republic of Korea, India, and the United States of America as an illustration of the new EU trade strategy.Key words: bilateralism, European Union, common commercial policy, World Trade Organisation


2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-127
Author(s):  
Gyoung-Gyu Choi

This paper outlines the process of China's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) with special focus given to the negotiations between the United States and China, and the European Union (EU) and China. Various economic and political issues behind the scene explain why the US refused to accept China into the WTO for the last 14 years. The economic and political changes in America coupled with the economic and political changes in China placed the two countries in a position where a U.S-China bilateral agreement could be made. The EU acted as a free rider in these negotiations such that it achieved most of its objectives from the conclusion of the Sino-US negotiation. Moreover, the EU could have topped China's concession to the US if it had taken advantage of the opportunity right before the PNTR vote carne to the US Congress.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilaria Espa ◽  
Kateryna Holzer

Abstract In the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European Union (EU) has taken the lead in promoting the inclusion of a specific chapter on energy trade and investment in order to enhance energy security and promote renewable energy. Irrespective of the success of the TTIP negotiations, the EU proposal can contribute to developing multilateral rules on energy trade and investment. This is especially important given the increased number of energy disputes filed by the EU and the United States against other leading energy market players, including the BRICS. This article provides a normative analysis of the new rules proposed by the EU and reflects on potential responses of BRICS energy regulators. It argues that, while these rules are unlikely to immediately affect BRICS energy practices, they may eventually be ‘imported’ in BRICS domestic jurisdictions in order to promote renewable energy and attract investment in energy infrastructure.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 287-294
Author(s):  
Michael Fakhri

In EC—Seal Products, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body (AB) held that the European Union (EU) Seal Regime banning the importation of seal products could be justified under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX(a) as a measure necessary toprotect public morals. It also held that the indigenous communities (IC) exception under the EU Seal Regime is inconsistent with GATT Article I:1 (Most-Favored Nation) because it discriminated against commercial fishers in Canada and Norway and was applied in a manner that favored the mostly Inuit seal hunters of Greenland, and thus ran afoul of Article XX’s chapeau. Since the entire EU Seal Regime is not likely to be done away with, the most important question for Inuit communities is: how will the EU change the discriminatory aspects of the Seal Regime and IC exception? The EU faces an October deadlineto pass its new legislation and this remains a very live issue.


2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary A. Marchant ◽  
Baohui Song

The United States leads the world in agricultural biotechnology research, adoption, commercialization, and exports. Our biotech commodities are highly dependent on international markets. Thus, any biotech policy changes by key importing countries may affect U.S. agricultural biotech product exports. This article identifies key markets for U.S. agricultural exports including biotech commodities and discusses current and proposed biotech policies in key markets for U.S. agricultural exports focusing on Canada, Mexico, Japan, the European Union (EU), and China. Among these markets, labeling of biotech products is voluntary in Canada and Mexico but is mandatory in Japan, the EU, and, most recently, in China. For the EU, U.S. corn exports were almost completely shut out, while U.S. soybean exports also declined because of the EU's biotech policies. The World Trade Organization dispute filed by the United States has yet to be finalized. China's biotech regulations raised concern by U.S. agricultural exporters. However, through U.S. Department of Agriculture education programs, U.S.–China negotiations, and China's domestic soybean shortage, China's biotech regulations do not appear to have had long-run impacts on U.S. soybean exports to China.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-182
Author(s):  
Adam Abelkop ◽  
John D. Graham ◽  
Lois R. Wise

In the casual political rhetoric about environmental regulation, it is often claimed that the U.S. government regulates on the basis of risk while the European Union (or EU member states) regulates on the basis of hazard. The implication is that the U.S. government relies on a more rigorous, scientific process of assessment than does the EU, which allegedly helps explain why the EU is more pro-regulation than is the United States.An alternative view, advanced originally by the late Professor Aaron Wildavsky of the University of California-Berkeley and amplified in a recent book by Professor Jonathan Wiener of Duke University, and colleagues, is that societies engage in a process of “risk selection.” What worries some societies does not worry others.


1977 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene Yeager

Students of late nineteenth century history have long dismissed the world industrial expositions as glittering, but not highly significant reflections of the gilded age. What emerges from the literature of the period, however, is a sense of the overriding commercial importance of these exhibitions. Nineteenth-century observers consistently linked the fairs to the general growth of world trade and to the expanding commercial hegemony of the United States. More specifically, contemporaries agreed that the expositions served to develop trade and investment ties with Latin America. Among the Latin American countries represented in the expositions, Mexico was the most important and consistent participant.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Wu

The European Union (EU) has some of the strictest standards for mycotoxins in food and feed in the world. This paper explores the economic impacts of these standards on other nations that attempt to export foods that are susceptible to one mycotoxin, aflatoxin, to the EU. The current EU standard for total aflatoxins in food is 4 ng/g in food other than peanuts, and 15 ng/g in peanuts. Under certain conditions, export markets may actually benefit from the strict EU standard. These conditions include a consistently high-quality product, and a global scene that allows market shifts. Even lower-quality export markets can benefit from the strict EU standard, primarily by technology forcing. However, if the above conditions are not met, export markets suffer from the strict EU standard. Two case studies are presented to illustrate these two different scenarios: the U.S. pistachio and almond industries. Importantly, within the EU, food processors may suffer as well from the strict aflatoxin standard. EU policymakers should consider these more nuanced economic impacts when developing mycotoxin standards for food and feed.


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