The electronic auction: questions of drawing up protocols

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Olga Pratura
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 76 (9) ◽  
pp. 29-33
Author(s):  
Yashwant SinghPatel ◽  
Nitish Kumar Singh
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Zhong ◽  
Song Li ◽  
Ting-Fang Cheng ◽  
Chin-Chen Chang

With the rapid development of the Internet, electronic commerce has become more and more popular. As an important element of e-commerce, many Internet companies such as Yahoo! and eBay have launched electronic auction systems. However, like most electronic commerce products, safety is an important issue that should be addressed. Many researchers have proposed secure electronic auction mechanisms, but we found that some of them do not exhibit the property of unlinkability, which leads to the leakage of users’ privacy. Considering the importance of privacy preservation, we have designed a new auction mechanism. Through symmetrical key establishment in the registration phase, all messages transmitted over the Internet would be protected and, meanwhile, achieve the property of unlinkability. The security analysis and performance analysis show that our protocol fulfills more security properties and is more efficient for implementation compared with recent works.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Ke Huang ◽  
Yi Mu ◽  
Fatemeh Rezaeibagha ◽  
Zheyuan He ◽  
Xiaosong Zhang

Electronic auction is a popular platform to sell goods, task assignment, and resources’ allocation due to reductions of transaction costs and has attracted a huge number of potential buyers. However, it is challenging to address the disputes between the buyer and the auctioneer. The main reason is, on the one hand, solving such problem leverages to the broad domain of research aspects, such as economic theory, engineering, and cryptography, and, on the other hand, it is difficult to arbitrate in a decentralized and anonymous setting. In this work, we consider a more general framework to solve the potential disputes by enforcing bidirectional confirmation and public verification. Hence, the bidding procedure is clear to inspect and potential disputes can be erased. To achieve this goal, we propose policy-driven chameleon hash and revised linkable-and-redactable ring signature as building blocks. We used these two tools to build a bidirectional and anonymous auction protocol called BA 2 P. In our BA 2 P protocol, the bidders can competitively and anonymously place their bids to outbid others. At the end of the auction protocol, everyone can verify the validity of the bidding proof and decide the winner. Thus, dispute-freeness feature is achieved. The analysis suggests that our proposal is provably secure and practically efficient, and it trades some efficiencies with dispute-freeness feature.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-179
Author(s):  
Lei Pang ◽  
Jianfeng Sun ◽  
Shoushan Luo ◽  
Bai Wang ◽  
Yang Xin

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (70) ◽  
pp. 213-222
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Tomaszewska

According to the author, creating the possibility of selling real estate by means of an electronic auction should be considered advisable and the direction of the adopted solutions should be generally assessed positively. Some of the proposed solutions need to be clarified or re-examined. Accepting the necessity of holding “remote” hearings and public sessions in a “distant” form, particularly during the state of epidemic danger or the state of epidemics, seems to be a correct solution. On the other hand the proposed regulations regarding the possibility of holding a closed hearing, are questionable. Changes concerning the possibility of communicating with the court by electronic means should, in principle, be considered desirable. However, the form of the proposed solutions – especially concerning electronic delivery – raises reservations.


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