A Novel Service-orientated Incentive Compatible Reputation Model for MANETs

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 3551-3561
Author(s):  
Kangming Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Reputation Model

scholarly journals Advertisement-financed credit ratings

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer ◽  
Christian Siemering
Keyword(s):  
Business Model ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Online Advertising ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Reputation Model

AbstractThis paper investigates the incentives of a credit rating agency (CRA) to generate accurate ratings under an advertisement-based business model. To this end, we study a two-period endogenous reputation model in which a CRA can increase the precision of its ratings by exerting effort. The CRA receives a revenue not from rating fees, as is standard in the literature, but through online advertising. We show that the advertisement-based business model provides sufficient incentives for the CRA to improve the precision of signals at intermediate levels of reputation. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which truthful reporting is incentive compatible.

REPUTATION MODEL PROPOSAL FOR THE FASHION INDUSTRY

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 748-752
Author(s):  
Paula Gárgoles ◽  
◽  
Ružica Brečić ◽  
Alica Grilec
Keyword(s):  
Fashion Industry ◽  
Reputation Model

scholarly journals Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1989-1995
Author(s):  
Gagan Goel ◽  
Vahab Mirrokni ◽  
Renato Paes Leme
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Limited Access ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Available Resources

We consider auction settings in which agents have limited access to monetary resources but are able to make payments larger than their available resources by taking loans with a certain interest rate. This setting is a strict generalization of budget constrained utility functions (which corresponds to infinite interest rates). Our main result is an incentive compatible and Pareto-efficient auction for a divisible multi-unit setting with 2 players who are able to borrow money with the same interest rate. The auction is an ascending price clock auction that bears some similarities to the clinching auction but at the same time is a considerable departure from this framework: allocated goods can be de-allocated in future and given to other agents and prices for previously allocated goods can be raised.

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