scholarly journals Practise & Belief of Santhara: Right to Die

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62
Author(s):  
Choudhary Niharika ◽  
Singh Divyansh
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indian Subcontinent ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Right To Die ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
Western Perspective

The article seeks to assert that the ritual of Santhara practiced by the followers of Jainism is not a suicide and discerns from the view of the Rajasthan High Court. The authors have used various sources on Santhara for research work and have analysed various case laws on right to die with dignity. At the outset, the article discusses the eminence of Santhara in Jainism. Further, it discusses the foundation of the ‘essential practice’ doctrine through various landmark judgements. The Rajasthan High Court has erred in holding that Santhara is not an essential practice in Jainism, when the same has been proved by Jain ascetics and religious denominations. The High Court ruling also contravenes the Supreme Court judgment, which holds that the right to life includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of death and would also encompass a dignified procedure for death. The article attributes the raison-d'être of the court, to the western perspective, overlooking the religious diversity of the Indian subcontinent and the various practices associated with different religions. Lastly, the article concludes that the Supreme Court needs * Third Year, BBA LLB, National Law University, Jodhpur, India; [email protected]  Third Year, BSc LLB, National Law University, Jodhpur, India; [email protected] to lay emphasis on the difference between essentially religious and secular practices and re-affirm the right of religious freedom.

scholarly journals IS THE RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED? BAXTER V MONTANA* AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN PATIENT AUTONOMY AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhayfa Bhamjee
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Patient Autonomy ◽  
Voluntary Euthanasia ◽  
Right To Die ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

This article examines the question of whether the right to life encompasses the right to die with dignity. It looks at the concepts of autonomy and paternalism as they exist as major themes on either side of the debate. Physician Assisted Suicide (Voluntary Euthanasia) has come under the spotlight in several jurisdictions, not just our own. Most recently in Montana, USA, the issue came before the Supreme Court for deliberation. The states of Washington and Oregon have legislations specific to PAS, legitimizing assisted suicide and removing wrongfulness from the actions of a physician who assists in the prescribed manner. Montana does not have specific legislation, but instead relied on the clauses of its Constitution, and it was held that the right to die with dignity is constitutionally guaranteed in that state. Here, argument is made suggesting that the right to die with dignity, in other words, to seek and easy passing through PAS, is also guaranteed in our Constitution.

BECOMING HUMAN

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-7
Author(s):  
Christopher Jenks
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Body ◽  
Human Suffering ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Arbitrary Decision ◽  
Real Person ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

Opponents of abortion sometimes argue that a fetus "wants" to grow up into a real person. But every egg and sperm also "want" to become a person in this sense. And if that is the case, how can one defend either contraception or celibacy, both of which deny life to millions of eggs and sperms that "want" to become people, and both of which also involve repression of "natural" impulses? The question of whether abortion is morally wrong depends on when we become "human." Unfortunately, this does not happen all at once, as in medieval fantasies of the soul's entering the body. It happens bit by bit. We must therefore make some arbitrary decision about when to confer the "right to life." Because nature offers no clear guidance about where this line should be drawn, the most humane solution is to draw it so as to minimize human suffering. I doubt, however, that opponents of abortion will accept this approach, for once you accept it, you will almost inevitably be led to precisely the same "liberal" conclusion the Supreme Court reached five years ago in Roe v. Wade.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

Courts, the Law, and LGBT Politics in India

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saatvika Rai
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Reform ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Lgbt Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lgbt Community ◽  
The Right ◽  
Hiv Aids

In India, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) criminalized sodomy (penile nonvaginal sexual acts) in 1860 during British colonial rule. Under this law and the traditional cultural norms, the LGBT community faced harassment and violence from the police, medical establishment, religious and conservative organizations, and families. The Indian queer movement mobilized in the early 1990s, primarily through activism for legal reform. Criminalization of sodomy prevented the LGBT community from freely mobilizing in public spaces, reporting acts of violence and harassment, and coming forth for testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS, and therefore was an impediment to their health and well-being. LGBT rights groups challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 on the basis of violating the right to equity (Article 14), nondiscrimination (Article 15), freedom (Article 19), and life and privacy (Article 21). Decriminalization of Section 377 has been a long, three-decade battle in the courts involving multiple judicial rulings. In 2009, the Delhi High Court decriminalized sodomy and declared Section 377 unconstitutional. The ruling was challenged by conservative and religious groups in the Supreme Court for going against social norms, threatening the institution of marriage, and promoting homosexual practices that would increase the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2013, the Supreme Court heard the case, overturned the High Court ruling, and recriminalized Section 377. The Court declared that Section 377 was constitutional and applied equally to all persons. Thereafter, the Supreme Court passed three other judgments that directly impacted Section 377: It expanded the rape laws under Section 375 of the IPC to include penile nonvaginal acts (2013), provided legal rights to the transgender community as a nonbinary third gender (2014), and established the right to privacy under the Constitution (2017). The Supreme Court reassessed its decision, and on September 6, 2018, decriminalized Section 377 in a historic judgment. Legalizing queer sexuality was a positive step forward., yet considerable legal reform is still needed. The LGBT community still lack civil rights such as marriage, adoption, tax benefits, inheritance, and protection in the workplace. LGBT rights mobilization through the Indian courts has evolved from a focus on HIV/AIDS and health to broader human rights and privileges as equal citizens.

scholarly journals Concept of right to life and its protection under the Constitution of India

2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
HARSH PATHAK
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Indian Constitution ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Supreme Court Of India ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Original Sense ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
The Right

The constitution and jurist characterized Article 21 as, “the procedural magna carta, protective of life and liberty”. This right has been held to be the heart of the constitution, the most organic and progressive provision in Indian constitution, the foundation of our laws. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of it. Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e). Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person. The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. There would have been no fundamental rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Article will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.

scholarly journals Comparison of Subrogation With Cession and Regression

Law and World ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-29
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Insurance Law ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Legal Consequences

The purpose of this article is to present one of the most problematic issues in the Civil Code of Georgia, which is manifested in the confusion of the institution of subrogation in insurance law with such institutions as cession and the condition of regression. They are close in content to each other, and this fact makes it difficult to see differences between them. Seeing the difference in content between them has not only theoretical but also practical significance, as each institution is characterized by a different legal outcome, and in each specific case the proper qualification of the relationship is crucial. One of the most practical different legal consequences of the given institutions is revealed in the different terms of the statute of limitations. For example, until 2012, it was unknown to the Georgian court that the statute of limitation of a subrogation starts from the period when the insurer has the right to claim damages against the insurance underwriter. Before then, it was an unknown fact that, different from regression, only legal relationship is established with one obligation in subrogation. In this article, we have discussed the distinctive features of subrogation, cession, and the condition of regression, and the accompanying legal consequences. We have discussed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, which discuss the differences in the content and results of the above-mentioned institutions. As a result, it was revealed that the practice of the Civil Court of Georgia before 2012 was unknown about the institution of subrogation, which is a really significant problem. It can be said that a uniform practice of the Supreme Court has been established at the Subrogation Institute and the problems that existed before have been solved.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

scholarly journals La Legge 194 di fronte alle decisioni della Corte Costituzionale

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini ◽  
Marina Casini
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Crucial Point ◽  
New Born ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Il contributo prende in esame le numerose decisioni della Corte Costituzionale riguardanti la legge 194 del 1978 che ha introdotto la disciplina dell’aborto in Italia. La principale impugnazione riguarda il principio di autodeterminazione della donna, ma vengono in questione anche la mancata previsione dell’obiezione di coscienza del giudice tutelare; il ruolo subordinato ed eventuale del padre del concepito nelle procedure che portano all’autorizzazione dell’aborto; la pretesa lesione dei diritti dei genitori rispetto alla minorenne che intende abortire; il diverso trattamento delle minorenni rispetto alle maggiorenni; la mancanza di difesa del concepito dinanzi al giudice tutelare. Gli Autori esaminano anche le decisioni che riguardano l’ammissibilità dei referenda proposti contro la Legge 194, perché consentono di cogliere elementi dai quali traspare il pensiero della Corte in ordine alla L. 194/1978 sia sotto il profilo dell’interpretazione, sia sotto quello della costituzionalità. Nonostante ripetute richieste di intervento, la Corte ha sempre evitato di pronunciarsi sul punto più critico della legge, ovvero la disciplina dell’aborto infratrimestrale dominata dal “principio di autodeterminazione”. Nello stesso tempo la Consulta non ha mai negato l’umanità del concepito e in un caso ne ha affermato chiaramente il diritto alla vita. ---------- The contribution deals with the large number of Constitutional Court’s decisions concerning the law 194/1978 that has introduced the regulation of abortion in Italy. The main impugnation deals with the principle of woman’s self-determination, but also non-prevision of the tutelary judge’s objection of conscience is argued; the subordinate and possible role of the father of new born in the procedures that lead to the authorization of the abortion; the supposed damage of the parents’ rights compared with minor who intends to abort; the different treatment of minors in comparison with adults; the lack of defence of new born compared with the tutelary judge. The Authors also examine the decisions that concern the admissibility of referenda proposed against the Law 194, because they allow to understand elements from which the Court’s thought for what concern the Law 194/1978 under the interpretative and constitutionality profile is showed. Although the several intervention calls, the Supreme Court has always avoided to pronounce a decision on the crucial point of the law, i.e. the regulation on the midtrimestrial dominated by the “self-determination principle”. At the same time the Council has never denied the humanity of the new born and in one case it has clearly affirmed the right to life.

The right to freedom from discrimination in Rwanda

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 156-180
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
National Unity ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Human Rights Treaties ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Discrimination is prohibited in different provisions of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (the Constitution), in different pieces of legislation and in international and regional human rights treaties ratified by Rwanda. According to the 2003 Constitution, one of the fundamental principles which have to be upheld by the State is the ‘eradication of discrimination and divisionism based on ethnicity, region or on any other ground as well as promotion of national unity’. Article 15 of the Constitution provides for equality before the law and Article 16 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination and it provides for the grounds on which a person shall not be discriminated against. Rwanda is also one of the very few African countries whose constitutions criminalise discrimination and different laws have been enacted to deal with the offence of discrimination. The Supreme Court of Rwanda, the highest court in the country, has handed down decisions on Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. The purpose of this article is to analyse these decisions and illustrate how the Supreme Court has dealt with the issues such as the definition of discrimination and the difference between discrimination and differentiation. The author also discusses the issues that the Rwandan judiciary and prosecutors are likely to face when dealing with the offence of discrimination.

scholarly journals Error Facti Pada Pembuktian Illegal Fishing Ditinjau Dari Hukum Islam

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-312
Author(s):  
Fifin Inbatun Hasanah
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Real ◽  
Illegal Fishing ◽  
Legal Consideration ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

Abstract: This article highlights the meanings of evidence used to describe the right in front of court in the form of either testimony, witness, or variety of indications that can be used as a guideline by judge to restore the right to its owner. In line with the decision No. 84 PK/Pid/2005 that legal consideration of judex facty of the Court of Gresik, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Surabaya did not consider the result of evidence revealed at the first hearing in the Court of Gresik. A public prosecutor also could not prove who is the real shipowner based on the vessel proofs. This ruling is not appropriate because in term of proof at trial, a public prosecutor should be able to bring witnesses of the shipowner used by the defendant. This is, of course, to determine whether or not anyone who asked or ordered the defendant to do something illegal fishing by transferring, loading, and purchasing the illegal fishing. This is not in accordance with al-Qur’an chapter al-Baqarah verse 282, and al-Talâq verse 2.Keywords: Islamic law, verdict, evidence, illegal fishing. Abstrak: Pembuktian merupakan segala sesuatu yang dapat digunakan untuk menjelaskan yang hak (benar) di depan majelis hakim, baik berupa keterangan, saksi, dan berbagai indikasi yang dapat dijadikan pedoman oleh majelis hakim untuk mengembalikan hak kepada pemiliknya. Dalam kasus putusan Nomor: 84 PK/Pid/2005, bahwa pertimbangan hukum judex facty Pengadilan Negeri Gresik, Pengadilan Tinggi Surabaya dan Mahkamah Agung sama sekali tidak mempertimbangkan hasil pembuktian yang terungkap di persidangan tingkat pertama (Pengadilan Negeri Gresik), termasuk Jaksa Penuntut Umum sama sekali tidak dapat/tidak sanggup membuktikan siapa pemilik kapal yang sesungguhnya sesuai surat-surat bukti. Putusan ini kurang tepat, karena dalam hal pembuktian di Persidangan, seorang Jaksa Penuntut Umum seharusnya dapat menghadirkan saksi pemilik kapal yang dipakai oleh terdakwa, untuk mengetahui benar tidaknya siapa yang menyuruh dan atau memerintahkan terdakwa untuk melakukan perbuatan illegal fishing dengan mentransfer, pemuatan, dan pembelian ikan yang tidak sah. Hal ini tidak sesuai dengan al-Qur’an Surat al-Baqarah ayat 282, dan surat al-Thalaq ayat 2.Kata Kunci: Hukum Islam, putusan, pembuktian, illegal fishing 

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