scholarly journals Pushmi-pullyu Representations and Mindreading in Chimpanzees

2017 ◽  
pp. 208-236
Author(s):  
Laura Danón
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Experimental Protocol ◽  
Capacity Increase ◽  
Complex Varieties ◽  
Goal Attribution ◽  
In Virtue Of

Lurz and Krachun (2011) propose a new experimental protocol designed to discriminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal goals to others. They suggest that chimpanzees' variety of "internal goal attribution" consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by Millikan as "pushmi-pullyu representations" (PPs). Now, Millikan (1996, 2004a, 2004b) distinguishes what I propose to call 'pure' PPs from more complex varieties of PPs, which allow their owners to respond more flexibly to their environments. But, what would happen if we tried to differentiate, analogously, between more or less sophisticated mind-readers in virtue of the sorts of PPs that they could attribute to others? What would attributing complex PPs consist in and how would such capacity increase the predictive powers of chimpanzee mind-readers? This paper offers an answer to these questions. Based on Millikan's work, I differentiate two varieties of complex PPs. Then, I examine what a basic mind-reader, only capable of attributing 'pure' PPs, would be able to do. After that, I distinguish two more sophisticated varieties of mindreading, each consisting in the attribution of one of the complex PPs previously presented, and I show how the ability to attribute complex PPs to others comes with more potent and flexible capacities to anticipate their behavior. Finally, I offer some reasons to think that attributing complex PPs is still simpler than full-blown mindreading and I briefly evaluate the prospects of extending this proposal to infant social cognition. 

The Psychology of Stereotypes

Prejudice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 26-42
Author(s):  
Endre Begby
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Information Overload ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Negative Stereotypes ◽  
Processing Strategies ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Processing Mechanism

This book has defined prejudice as involving a certain class of negative stereotypes. In chapter 2, this definition is elaborated further in light of developments in social and cognitive psychology. The human mind is an information-processing mechanism operating in real-time. Its defining problem is that of developing effective algorithms to cope with a threat of information overload. These algorithms distinctively involve compression of information, resulting in a predictable loss of fidelity. But even cognitive processing strategies involving significant filtering and compression can be cognitively optimal, relative to our contingent, “non-ideal” cognitive starting points. The basic cognitive expression of this fact is what psychologists call ‘categorization.’ Stereotyping is essentially just categorization applied to the domain of social cognition. As such, no epistemological aspersions can be cast on prejudice simply in virtue of being grounded in stereotypes. The chapter ends by explaining how this research relates to the currently popular concept of ‘implicit bias.’

scholarly journals Primate Social Cognition and the Core Human Knowledge Concept

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Core Knowledge ◽  
The Core ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Folk Epistemology

I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory) and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept.

scholarly journals Primate Social Cognition and the Core Human Knowledge Concept

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Core Knowledge ◽  
The Core ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Folk Epistemology

The author reviews recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. He argues that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory), and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept.

Refining our understanding of the “elephant in the room”

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Critical Factors ◽  
Technological Culture

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.

A little too technical: The threat of intellectualising technical reasoning

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Technological Culture ◽  
Technical Reasoning

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.

Effect of Integral Proteins on Frozen Membrane Fracture

1980 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 756-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Kirchanski ◽  
D. Branton
Keyword(s):  
Lipid Bilayers ◽  
Freeze Fracture ◽  
Covalent Bond ◽  
Erythrocyte Membranes ◽  
Glycophorin A ◽  
Experimental Protocol ◽  
Transmembrane Glycoprotein ◽  
Bond Breakage ◽  
Human Erythrocyte Membranes ◽  
Integral Proteins

We have investigated the effect of integral membrane proteins upon the fracturing of frozen lipid bilayers. This investigation has been part of an effort to develop freeze fracture labeling techniques and to assess the possible breakage of covalent protein bonds during the freeze fracture process. We have developed an experimental protocol utilizing lectin affinity columns which should detect small amounts of covalent bond breakage during the fracture of liposomes containing purified (1) glycophorin (a transmembrane glycoprotein of human erythrocyte membranes). To fracture liposomes in bulk, frozen liposomes are ground repeatedly under liquid nitrogen. Failure to detect any significant covalent bond breakage (contrary to (2)) led us to question the effectiveness of our grinding procedure in fracturing and splitting lipid bilayers.

Are Deficits in Social Cognition Linked to Autobiographical Memory in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease?

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 257-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes H. Scheidemann ◽  
Franz Petermann ◽  
Marc Schipper
Keyword(s):  
Alzheimer’S Disease ◽  
Alzheimer's Disease ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Autobiographical Memory ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Neuropsychological Test ◽  
Clinical Group ◽  
Neuropsychological Test Battery ◽  
Fluency Task

Abstract. We investigated theory of mind (ToM) deficits in Alzheimer‘s disease (AD) and its possible connection to autobiographical memory (ABM). Patients and matched controls were evaluated and compared using a video-based ToM test, an autobiographical fluency task, and a neuropsychological test battery. We found that ToM deficits were positively associated with semantic ABM in the clinical group, whereas a positive relationship appeared between ToM and episodic ABM in controls. We hypothesize that this reflects the course of the disease as well as that semantic ABM is used for ToM processing, being still accessible in AD. Furthermore, we assume that it is also less efficient, which in turn leads to a specific deficit profile of social cognition.

What Does It Take to Activate Stereotypes? Simple Primes Don’t Seem Enough

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Müller ◽  
Klaus Rothermund
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Semantic Priming ◽  
Response Priming ◽  
Priming Effects ◽  
Stereotype Activation

According to social cognition textbooks, stereotypes are activated automatically if appropriate categorical cues are processed. Although many studies have tested effects of activated stereotypes on behavior, few have tested the process of stereotype activation. Blair and Banaji (1996) demonstrated that subjects were faster to categorize first names as male or female if those were preceded by gender congruent attribute primes. The same, albeit smaller, effects emerged in a semantic priming design ruling out response priming by Banaji and Hardin (1996) . We sought to replicate these important effects. Mirroring Blair and Banaji (1996) we found strong priming effects as long as response priming was possible. However, unlike Banaji and Hardin (1996) , we did not find any evidence for automatic stereotype activation, when response priming was ruled out. Our findings suggest that automatic stereotype activation is not a reliable and global phenomenon but is restricted to more specific conditions.

Putting the Social Back Into Social Cognition

1997 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 522-523
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Whitley
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
The Social
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