scholarly journals Mind and Folk Psychology: A Partial Introduction

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Bruno Mölder
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology

scholarly journals Normative folk psychology and decision theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Dewhurst ◽  
Christopher Burr
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Folk Psychology

Inferences are just folk psychology

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 670-670 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Metzinger
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Functional Properties ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Causal Contribution ◽  
Phenomenological Perspective ◽  
Plausible Theory

To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.

Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
William S. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology

The anthropology of folk psychology

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-39
Author(s):  
Steven Daniel
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology

Philosophy and Folk Psychology

Mindscapes ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 52-60
Author(s):  
John Haugeland
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology

A mathematician, a physicist and a computer scientist with Asperger syndrome: Performance on folk psychology and folk physics tests

Neurocase ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 475-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Baron-cohen ◽  
Sally Wheelwright ◽  
Valerie Stone ◽  
Melissa Rutherford
Keyword(s):  
Asperger Syndrome ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Computer Scientist ◽  
Folk Physics

From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief.

1985 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 418
Author(s):  
Patricia Smith Churchland ◽  
Stephen P. Stich
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Folk Psychology

scholarly journals Folk Psychology and Its Ontology

2020 ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Peter Langland-Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Heavy Duty ◽  
Important Conclusion ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Light Duty ◽  
The Difference

The question of whether imagination can be reduced to other folk psychological states will turn, in part, on what we take those other states to be—on how we view their ontological status. There are very different views in philosophy and psychology concerning the nature of folk psychological states, ranging from eliminativism, to dispositionalism, to representationalsim. This chapter explains how those different ontological viewpoints bear on the project of explaining imagination. An important conclusion is that the explanations pursued in this book do not assume or require the existence of mental representations of any sort and thus should be of interest to theorists with quite different commitments concerning folk psychological ontology. However, in some cases, when assessing competing arguments, it will be essential to grasp the difference between “heavy-duty” (representationalist) views of folk psychological states and “light-duty” (dispositionalist) views.

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