scholarly journals Toward Pragmatically Naturalized Transcendental Philosophy of Scientific Inquiry And Pragmatic Scientific Realism

2013 ◽  
pp. 79-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sami Pihlström
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Scientific Practices

This paper seeks to show that the turn toward local scientific practices in the philosophy of science is not a turn away from transcendental investigations. On the contrary, a pragmatist approach can very well be (re)connected with Kantian transcendental examination of the necessary conditions for the possibility of scientific representation and cognition, insofar as the a priori conditions that transcendental philosophy of science examines are understood as historically relative and thus potentially changing. The issue of scientific realism will be considered from this perspective, with special emphasis on Thomas Kuhn's conception of paradigms as frameworks making truth-valued scientific statements possible and on Charles S. Peirce's realism about "real generals". 

scholarly journals The Tantalus’ Torments of Transcendentalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Sergey Chernov
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Complete System ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Edition ◽  
Opus Postumum ◽  
Corporeal Nature

Kant’s manuscripts of 1796–1803, which the Academic German edition of his works combined in 21–22 volumes of under the invented by H. Vaihinger name ‘Opus postumum’, still attract the attention of researchers. Was there really a significant theoretical “gap” in the system of Kant's “critical”, transcendental philosophy, which built by 1790, needed to be filled, namely, to undertake a conceptual "transition" from the already constructed a priori metaphysics of corporeal nature (metaphysical principles of natural science) to experimental mathematical physics, to the entire scientific empirical investigation of nature? In the last years of his life Kant tried to solve a problem that was really decisive for the fate of transcendentalism, which he had already realized in ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ and concretized in ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’, however he found himself in a hopeless situation, which doomed him to the “Tantalus’ torments”. The problem that he was constantly thinking about necessarily arises in the system of transcendental philosophy, but has no solution in it. ‘Opus postumum’ is an important piece of evidence on the insurmountable difficulties faced by the attempt to “save” philosophy as a perfect and complete system of absolutely reliable, "apodictic" science, based on the idea of universal and necessary conditions for the experience possibility.

A Critique of Modernist Synthesis in Islamic Thought

1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-503
Author(s):  
Masudul Alum Choudhury
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Investigation ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Islamic Thought ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Muslim Scholars

Is it the realm of theoretical constructs or positive applications thatdefines the essence of scientific inquiry? Is there unison between thenormative and the positive, between the inductive and deductivecontents, between perception and reality, between the micro- andmacro-phenomena of reality as technically understood? In short, isthere a possibility for unification of knowledge in modernist epistemologicalcomprehension? Is knowledge perceived in conceptionand application as systemic dichotomy between the purely epistemic(in the metaphysically a priori sense) and the purely ontic (in thepurely positivistically a posteriori sense) at all a reflection of reality?Is knowledge possible in such a dichotomy or plurality?Answers to these foundational questions are primal in order tounderstand a critique of modernist synthesis in Islamic thought thathas been raging among Muslim scholars for some time now. Theconsequences emanating from the modernist approach underlie muchof the nature of development in methodology, thinking, institutions,and behavior in the Muslim world throughout its history. They arefound to pervade more intensively, I will argue here, as the consequenceof a taqlid of modernism among Islamic thinkers. I will thenargue that this debility has arisen not because of a comparativemodem scientific investigation, but due to a failure to fathom theuniqueness of a truly Qur'anic epistemological inquiry in the understandingof the nature of the Islamic socioscientific worldview ...

Characteristics of Scientific Inquiry

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Miksza ◽  
Kenneth Elpus
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Scientific Reasoning ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Statistical Tools ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Historical Developments

This chapter introduces the reader to basic characteristics of science and situates the design and analysis considerations presented throughout the book within the context of scientific inquiry. A brief description of key historical developments regarding the philosophy of science is provided. An overview of the fundamental aspects of inductive and deductive scientific reasoning and the importance of falsification to scientific progress is presented. In addition, the values of objectivity and transparency as well as the importance of scientific community are stressed. The usefulness of statistical tools for helping researchers clarify their questions, establish criteria for their judgments, and communicate evidence for their claims is also discussed.

scholarly journals Two Kindred Neo-Kantian Philosophies of Science: Pap’s The A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Physical Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Modern Physics ◽  
Continental Tradition ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.

Logical Principles of a Topological Explanation

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514
Author(s):  
Ľudmila Lacková ◽  
Lukáš Zámečník
Keyword(s):  
Protein Folding ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Logical System ◽  
Valid Method ◽  
Topological Explanation ◽  
Existential Graphs

AbstractWe aim to demonstrate the applicability of Peirce’s iconic logic in the context of current topological explanations in the philosophy of science. We hold that the logical system of Existential Graphs is similar to contemporary topological approaches, thereby recognizing Peirce’s iconic logic (Beta Graphs) as a valid method of scientific representation. We base our thesis on the nexus between iconic logic and the so-called NonReduction Theorem. We illustrate our assumptions with examples derived from biology (protein folding).

scholarly journals When Does HARKing Hurt? Identifying When Different Types of Undisclosed Post Hoc Hypothesizing Harm Scientific Progress

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 308-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Literature Search ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Research Report ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Replication Crisis ◽  
Post Hoc

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report ( Kerr, 1998 ). In the present article, I discuss 3 forms of HARKing: (a) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (b) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (c) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These 3 types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these 3 types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing.

scholarly journals Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.

scholarly journals Scientific Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and History and Philosophy of Science

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
In The Wild

We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in sevenscientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesizeddimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural scientiststended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that historyand philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than naturalscientists, (iii) that van Fraassen’s characterization of scientific realism failed to clusterwith more standard characterizations, and (iv) that those who endorsed the pessimistic inductionwere no more or less likely to endorse antirealism.

scholarly journals Editor's Introduction

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Curtis Forbes
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
Realism Debate

The debate over scientific realism, simply put, is a debate over what we can and should believe about reality once we've critically assessed all the available arguments and empirical evidence. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism as a philosophical thesis requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and beyond. This issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science aims to make participating in the scientific realism debate easier for both newcomers and veterans, collecting over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the title "The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism."

Critical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Science And Society ◽  
The Real ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The World

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.

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