scholarly journals Eli Hirsch: Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Trees and Tables Crackpot Ontology: Jury Still Out

2012 ◽  
pp. vii-xv
Author(s):  
Eve Kitsik
Keyword(s):  
Quantifier Variance ◽  
Eli Hirsch

A review of Eli Hirsch "Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology".

Metaontology, Existence, and Reference

2020 ◽  
pp. 209-238
Author(s):  
Jared Warren
Keyword(s):  
Julius Caesar ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Quantifier Variance ◽  
Mathematical Objects ◽  
Ontological Realism ◽  
Eli Hirsch

This chapter presents and defends a conventionalist-friendly metaontology, thereby showing how conventionalism manages to vindicate trivial ontological realism in mathematics. After clarifying and demonstrating this entailment of conventionalism, it clarifies the metaontology involved. The chapter then defends metadeflationism about quantifiers, which entails a version of quantifier pluralism. This is a form of what has recently been called “modest quantifier variance” in joint work with Eli Hirsch. After laying out this view, it is defended from several objections. With this groundwork set out, the chapter then explains how this answers Kant’s challenge for trivial realism that was explained in the previous chapter. Finally, the chapter closes by discussing the metaphysics of mathematical objects, in conventionalist terms, addressing the Julius Caesar problem and structuralism, among other things.

scholarly journals Collapse and the Varieties of Quantifier Variance

2021 ◽  
pp. 44-64
Author(s):  
Matti Eklund
Keyword(s):  
Existential Quantifier ◽  
Quantifier Variance ◽  
Eli Hirsch

The aim of this chapter is to bring clarity regarding the doctrine of quantifier variance (due to Eli Hirsch), and two prominent arguments against this doctrine, the collapse argument and the Eklund-Hawthorne argument. Different versions of the doctrine of quantifier variance are distinguished, and it is shown that the effectiveness of the arguments against it depends on what version of the doctrine is at issue. The metaontological significance of the different versions of the doctrine is also assessed. Roughly, quantifier variance concerns there being different possible existential quantifier meanings, and often the doctrine involves a claim to the effect there is no unique “best” quantifier meaning. Much of the discussion in the chapter concerns what it is to be an existential quantifier meaning in the sense at issue.

Quantifier Variance and Realism

Noûs ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 36 (s1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eli Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
Quantifier Variance

Quantifier Variance Without Meaning Variance

Axiomathes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-325
Author(s):  
Davood Hosseini
Keyword(s):  
Quantifier Variance ◽  
Meaning Variance

The Concept of Identity by Eli Hirsch

1983 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 247-253
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Eli Hirsch

Quantifier Variance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-117
Author(s):  
Rohan Sud ◽  
David Manley
Keyword(s):  
Quantifier Variance

Ontology Without Borders

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Quantifier Variance ◽  
Indispensability Arguments ◽  
The World ◽  
Feature Characterization ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
Metaphysical Position ◽  
Usage Data

Part I is metametaphysics. Quantifier variance views are criticized, and it’s shown that ontological debate, to be cogent, requires a single existence concept shared by debate participants. Natural language expresses such a concept which has certain formal properties—univocality among them. It’s shown that an ontological neutralist interpretation of quantifier domains (both formal- and natural-language) is consistent and consistent with usage data. Finally, several puzzles, among them Hob-Nob sentences and truth-talk about fictions, are resolved using the neutralist interpretation. A result established here is crucial to establishing the metaphysics argued for in part II: the general invalidity of indispensability arguments. Part II is metaphysics. An austere metaphysical position—feature metaphysics—is presented and argued for. Features aren’t properties or relations or objects of any sort. They have no individuation conditions. A feature-characterization language, with the expressive strength provided by quantifiers, is given; and using the results of part I, it’s shown that no commitments to objects arise when using this language. Feature-characterization languages supplant predication (properties of objects) with an “is at” relation or a co-occurrence relation between features. It’s shown that the resulting notion doesn’t yield a property-bundle view. Feature metaphysics is argued for by showing that the notion of object borders (central to individuation conditions for objects) cannot be interpreted metaphysically. This is also true of the individuation conditions used by philosophers to argue for tropes over universals, or vice versa. The resulting position allows us to distinguish what we project onto the world from what we find there.

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