scholarly journals Teaduslik teooria kui teadusfilosoofia kategooria

2009 ◽  
pp. 32-46
Author(s):  
Rein Vihalemm

Artiklis arendatakse alternatiivset kontseptsiooni niihästi traditsioonilisele füüsikakesksele teadusliku teooria käsitlusele kui ka seisukohale, et füüsikateooriat ei saa teadusfilosoofias mõista teadusliku teooria mudelina, sest erinevates teadustes on teooriad oma loomult erinevad. Ollakse seisukohal, et teaduslik teooria on ikkagi teadusfilosoofia kategooriana teadusliku distsipliini eripärast sõltumatu. Käsitletakse põhiliselt kahte punkti: (1) miks on teadusfilosoofias põhjust kritiseerida traditsioonilist, füüsika põhjal saadud ettekujutust teaduslikust teooriast? (2) miks ei ole põhjendatud seisukoht, et nt keemias on teaduslik teooria (nt klassikaline keemilise struktuuri teooria) oma loomult füüsikateooriast (nt klassikalisest mehhaanikast) erinev? Traditsioonilise füüsikakeskse lähenemisviisi puhul ei ole piisavalt uuritud, miks õieti füüsikateooria on saanud teadusliku teooria etaloniks. Teoreetilise füüsika keskne teadusekontseptsioon on olnud ühekülgselt orienteeritudmatemaatikale ja loogikale. Kui aga lähtuda teooriast kui mudelite populatsioonist, nagu Ronald Giere on seda teinud ka klassikalise mehhaanika - füüsikakeskse teooriakäsituse traditsioonilise näite - korral, siis osutub see teooriakäsitus tõepoolest invariantseks teatavale tunnetustüübile, mida on alust nimetada teaduslikuks ja mis on selgesti omane ka nt keemiale.In this paper an alternative conception is proposed both to (1) the traditional physics-based conception of scientific theory, and (2) the view that a physical theory cannot be regarded as the model for scientific theory in philosophy of science in general because scientific theories are discipline-dependent. It is argued that scientific theory as a category of philosophy of science is independent of a particular scientific discipline. The main focus of the paper is on two questions: (1) Why is the traditional physics-based conception of scientific theory subject to criticism in philosophy of science? (2) Why is it unjustified to consider a scientific theory in chemistry (e.g., the classical chemical structure theory, which is probably the most characteristic theory of chemistry) to be different in character from a physical theory (e.g., classical mechanics, which is a prototypical example of a theory in the philosophy of science)? In case of the traditional physics-based approach not enough research has been done as to why theories of physics have become the etalon of scientific theory. The accepted view of science, centered on theoretical physics, has been one-sidedly oriented towards mathematics and logic. But when proceeding from a conception of a scientific theory as a population of models, as Ronald Giere has done for the case of classical mechanics - the traditional example of a physical theory -, this conception of a theory really does prove the invariance of a certain type of cognition that can justifiably be called scientific and that is clearly characteristic of, e.g., chemistry as well.

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 191-209
Author(s):  
Mary Hesse

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem's Le Théorie Physique, first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem's very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of instrumentalism:A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19].


1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 191-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Hesse

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem's Le Théorie Physique, first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem's very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of instrumentalism:A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19].


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.


1964 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 577-577
Author(s):  
Roald K. Wangsness ◽  
Peter B. Kahn

Author(s):  
Jill North

How do we figure out the nature of the world from a mathematically formulated physical theory? What do we infer about the world when a physical theory can be mathematically formulated in different ways? Physics, Structure, and Reality addresses these questions, questions that get to the heart of the project of interpreting physics—of figuring out what physics is telling us about the world. North argues that there is a certain notion of structure, implicit in physics and mathematics, that we should pay careful attention to, and that doing so sheds light on these questions concerning what physics is telling us about the nature of reality. Along the way, lessons are drawn for related topics such as the use of coordinate systems in physics, the differences among various formulations of classical mechanics, the nature of spacetime structure, the equivalence of physical theories, and the importance of scientific explanation. Although the book does not explicitly defend scientific realism, instead taking this to be a background assumption, the account provides an indirect case for realism toward our best theories of physics.


Author(s):  
David J. Stump

Although primarily a mathematician, Henri Poincaré wrote and lectured extensively on astronomy, theoretical physics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics at the turn of the century. In philosophy, Poincaré is famous for the conventionalist thesis that we may choose either Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry in physics, claiming that space is neither Euclidean nor non-Euclidean and that geometry is neither true nor false. However, Poincaré’s conventionalism was not global, as some have claimed. Poincaré held that only geometry and perhaps a few principles of mechanics are conventional, and argued that science does discover truth, despite a conventional element. Poincaré followed new developments in mathematics and physics closely and was involved in discussion of the foundations of mathematics and in the development of the theory of relativity. He was an important transitional figure in both of these areas, sometimes seeming ahead of his time and sometimes seeming very traditional. Perhaps because of the breadth of his views or because of the way in which philosophers focused on issues or small pieces of his work rather than on accurate history, interpretations of Poincaré vary greatly. Frequently cited by the logical positivists as a precursor, and widely discussed in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics, Poincaré’s writings have had a strong impact on English-language philosophy.


The Copley Medal is awarded to Professor Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, F. R. S., in recognition of his distinguished work in theoretical physics, including stellar structure, theory of radiation, hydrodynamic stability and relativity. Professor Chandrasekhar has been a major figure in astrophysical sciences since the 1930s. His earliest work, on dwarf stars, led to the concept of the Chandrasekhar limit of stability, which later proved to be a central concept in the origin of the natural elements. He subsequently worked on stellar dynamics and the processes of energy transfer through gaseous bodies. The latter work was followed by a detailed and intensive study of convection in buoyant, rotating and conducting systems which has been fundamental to subsequent work in the field. He also studied the stability of rotating fluid masses. His latest work concerns general relativity theory and solutions of the Einstein field equations, in particular singularities and black holes, where he has shown the importance of these solutions and elucidated their mathematical properties.


1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerd Baumann ◽  
Lester M. Clendenning ◽  
Patrick T. Tam ◽  
Susan R. McKay ◽  
Wolfgang Christian

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