scholarly journals Ο άγαμος μοναχικός άντρας και η πρόσβασή του στην ιατρικώς υποβοηθούμενη αναπαραγωγή στην Ελλάδα και στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο

Bioethica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Μαριάννα Βασιλείου (Marianna Vassiliou)

This paper compares the legal framework in Greece and the United Kingdom on the issue of access to medically assisted reproduction methods - and to the subsequent acquisition of a child - by a single man. Initially, the human right, particularly the right of a single man, to reproduction is presented. At the same time, the reasons for which legal systems explicitly allow access to medically assisted reproduction only to single women are explained.Then, the legal regime governing the method of surrogate motherhood in both countries is exposed, as this is practically the only method by which a single man can procreate. The presentation of the Greek legal framework follows, a framework which excludes single man from access to medically assisted reproduction, as well as the case law which sought to cover the legal vacuum, by applying in a proportional way the relevant provisions for single women. Then, the rules governing the United Kingdom on the question are analyzed, where the case law has bypassed the non-explicit inclusion of single man to the persons entitled to have a child using the methods of medically assisted reproduction.Finally, as a solution to the issue, the combination of the two systems is proposed, as well as an effective and de facto recognition of the right of single men to having a child with the help of technology.

Author(s):  
Breen Creighton ◽  
Catrina Denvir ◽  
Richard Johnstone ◽  
Shae McCrystal ◽  
Alice Orchiston

The purpose of the research upon which this book is based was empirically to investigate whether the ballot requirements in the Fair Work Act do indeed impose a significant obstacle to the taking of industrial action, and whether those provisions are indeed impelled by a legitimate ‘democratic imperative’. The book starts from the proposition that virtually all national legal systems, and international law, recognise the right to strike as a fundamental human right. It acknowledges, however, that in no case is this recognition without qualification. Amongst the most common qualifications is a requirement that to be lawful strike action must first be approved by a ballot of workers concerned. Often, these requirements are said to be necessary to protect the democratic rights of the workers concerned: this is the so-called ‘democratic imperative’. In order to evaluate the true purpose and effect of ballot requirements the book draws upon the detailed empirical study of the operation of the Australian legislative provisions noted above; a comparative analysis of law and practice in a broad range of countries, with special reference to Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; and the jurisprudence of the supervisory bodies of the International Labour Organisation. It finds that in many instances ballot requirements – especially those relating to quorum – are more concerned with curtailing strike activity than with constructively responding to the democratic imperative. Frequently, they also proceed from a distorted perception of what ‘democracy’ could and should entail in an industrial context. Paradoxically, the study also finds that in some contexts ballot requirements can provide additional bargaining leverage for unions. Overall, however, the study confirms our hypothesis that the principal purpose of ballot requirements – especially in Australia and the United Kingdom – is to curtail strike activity rather than to vindicate the democratic imperative, other than on the basis of a highly attenuated reading of that term. We believe that the end-result constitutes an important study of the practical operation of a complex set of legal rules, and one which exposes the dichotomy between the ostensible and real objectives underpinning the adoption of those rules. It also furnishes a worked example of multi-methods empirical, comparative and doctrinal legal research in law, which we hope will inspire similar approaches to other areas of labour law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


Author(s):  
Alberto Macho Carro

La vivienda habitual ha encontrado una importante vía de tutela en la interpretación extensiva que el TEDH ha venido haciendo del artículo 8 CEDH. Esta exégesis ha permitido ampliar su contenido hasta incluir en él algunas vertientes más sociales de lo habitual en un clásico derecho de libertad. En concreto, desde Connors c. Reino Unido, el TEDH ha sostenido que esta disposición impone una serie de obligaciones positivas sobre los Estados parte cuando una persona corra el riesgo de perder su vivienda habitual, incluso si tal pérdida tiene lugar conforme a causas legalmente tasadas. Además, el Tribunal ha ido desarrollando en su jurisprudencia el contenido de estas obligaciones, que en principio implicaban exigencias puramente procedimentales, para irlas dotando de un contenido más sustantivo en lo que parece una tímida aproximación a la tutela brindada por ciertos órganos internacionales de garantía de derechos sociales en materia de vivienda.   One´´´ s habitual home has found a relevant way of protection through the ECHR´´ s interpretation of the right to respect for one´´ s home (art. 8 ECHR). This interpretation has allowed an extension of the content of this right by including in it some considerations that are more “social” than usual for a classical liberty. In particular, from the case of Connors v. the United Kingdom onwards, the ECHR has held that this right imposes upon States a series of positive obligations when a person risks losing his home, even if this loss is in accordance with national law. Moreover, the ECHR has developed the content of these obligations throughout its case law, evolving from pure procedural requirements to a more substantive approach, in which seems like a shy approximation to the protection of the right to housing granted by some international committees.


Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 317-377
Author(s):  
Aina A. Kane ◽  
Julia Köhler-Olsen

In this article, we focus on how the United Kingdom, Germany and Norway govern and balance young unemployed claimants’ right to social benefits with conditions of compulsory activities, with the aim of their transition into employment. In the three countries mentioned, we have examined and compared the national legislation and regulations, as well as how case workers in job centres experience these tools in their work with activating the young unemployed.Balancing the individuals’ right of benefits with the job centre’s right and duty to impose conditions and activities as well as to sanction non-compliance, is also a matter of balancing national legislation with international human rights instruments. We have therefore analysed the three countries’ legislation and job centre conduct in light of the human right to non-discrimination and equality.To find answers to our research questions, we have studied the legal framework and human rights instruments addressing social security, conditionality and non-discrimination, and interviewed caseworkers regarding their leeway for individual professional discretion.We find that the human right of substantive equality is challenged in all three countries. Claimants’ commitments can entail stigma, stereotyping and shame, legislation can fail to provide the leeway necessary for accommodating for differences between the individuals, and sanctioning can represent a system of paternalism rather than social citizenship.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-122
Author(s):  
Faruk H. Avdić ◽  

The so-called Salduz doctrine that concerns the right to a fair trial and the right to the defense attorney emerged from the case of Salduz v. Turkey, decided on the part of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber found the violation of Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In this connection, the aim of this paper is twofold. In the first place, the paper aims to demonstrate how the European Court of Human Rights has overturned the two main tenents of the so-called Salduz doctrine derived from its landmark case of Salduz v. Turkey in its later Judgments delivered in the case of Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom and the case of Beuze v. Belgium. The two tenets derived from the Salduz doctrine being examined in the paper are the right to access to the defense attorney as a rule during pre-trial proceedings and the absolute exclusionary rule. In the second place, the paper aims to offer a critique of the standard of compelling reasons employed in the Ibrahim Judgment. In order to achieve its aim, this paper primarily analyses the jurisprudence of the European Human Court of Human Rights in the cases of Salduz v. Turkey, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom, and Beuze v. Belgium. Besides, the paper also touches upon other judgments of the European Court of Human Rights related to its subject. The paper in question, therefore, primarily relies on the case-law method in achieving its aims. The paper concludes that in overturning the Salduz doctrine in relation to aspects examined in the paper, the European Court of Human Rights has exacerbated the legal standing of the person against whom criminal proceedings are being conducted.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1037969X2199636
Author(s):  
Luke Beck

Many local councils in Australia commence their meetings with prayer. Case law in the United Kingdom holds that English local councils do not have power to commence their meetings with prayer. This article argues that the reasoning of the UK case law applies with equal force in Australia with the result that the practice of many Australian local councils of incorporating prayers into their formal meetings is unlawful.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Looijestijn-Clearie

InCentros Ltd and Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelesen (hereinafter Centros),1 the European Court of Justice ruled that it is contrary to Article 52 (now Article 432) and Article 58 (now Article 48) of the EC Treaty for the authorities of a member State (in casu Denmark) to refuse to register a branch of a company formed under the law of another member State (in casu the United Kingdom) in which it has its registered office, even if the company concerned has never conducted any business in the latter State and intends to carry out its entire business in the State in which the branch is to be set up. By avoiding the need to form a company there it would thus evade the application of the rules governing the provision for and the paying-up of a minimum share capital in force in that State. According to the Court, this does not, however, prevent the authorities of the member State in which the branch is to be set up from adopting appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud, either with regard to the company itself, if need be in co-operation with the member State in which it was formed, or with regard to its members, where it has been determined that they are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards creditors established in the territory of the member State of the branch.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Ostendorff

Is a uniform European doctrine of equivalence within reach in light of the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Actavis v. Eli Lilly? Taking a comparative approach, the thesis outlines the development of case law on the scope of patent protection in Germany and the United Kingdom by looking at the respective precedents and examines whether there is a common foundation for a uniform doctrine of equivalence in the two most important patent jurisdictions in Europe. It deals in particular with the two controversial and for practitioners very relevant problem areas of the "prosecution history estoppel" as well as the so-called selection decision and makes a proposal for a reform of the EPC.


Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer

Abstract The United Kingdom is bound by international obligations to uphold ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ and domestic legislation reflects those obligations. The courts have held that to be protected, a belief must genuine, must not be a mere opinion, must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness and importance and must be ‘worthy of respect in a democratic society’. How this plays out, however, in areas such as education, children’s rights and employment is highly sensitive to the specific facts of each case – which are often inconsistent, as the article explains. Much of the article examines the decisions of the courts in individual cases. It concludes with a discussion of the possible trajectory of domestic political debate at a time when there have been repeated calls for a ‘British Bill of Rights’ and the Westminster Government is questioning more generally the constitutional role of the judiciary.


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