The Algorithms about Validity of Argument Form in Logic Mathematician

2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 276-281
Author(s):  
巧云 刘
Keyword(s):  
Argument Form

TWO SYLLOGISMS IN THE MOZI: CHINESE LOGIC AND LANGUAGE

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 589-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
BYEONG-UK YI
Keyword(s):  
Standard Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Linguistic Differences ◽  
Argument Form ◽  
Chinese Counterpart ◽  
The One ◽  
Chinese And English ◽  
Chinese Logic

AbstractThis article examines two syllogistic arguments contrasted in an ancient Chinese book, the Mozi, which expounds doctrines of the Mohist school of philosophers. While the arguments seem to have the same form, one of them (the one-horse argument) is valid but the other (the two-horse argument) is not. To explain this difference, the article uses English plural constructions to formulate the arguments. Then it shows that the one-horse argument is valid because it has a valid argument form, the plural cousin of a standard form of valid categorical syllogisms (Plural Barbara), and argues that the two-horse argument involves equivocal uses of a key predicate (the Chinese counterpart of ‘have four feet’) that has the distributive/nondistributive ambiguity. In doing so, the article discusses linguistic differences between Chinese and English and explains why the logic of plural constructions is applicable to Chinese arguments that involve no plural constructions.

THE CONCEPTHORSEIS A CONCEPT

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANSTEN KLEV
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Grammatical Subject ◽  
Argument Form ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
New Form

AbstractI offer an analysis of the sentence ‘the concepthorseis a concept’. It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, ‘the concepthorse’, indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. The argument is based on a criterion of proper-namehood according to which an expression is a proper name if it is so rendered in Frege’s ideography. The predicate ‘is a concept’, on the other hand, should not be thought of as referring to a function. It will be argued that the analysis of sentences of the form ‘Cis a concept’ requires the introduction of a new form of statement. Such statements are not to be thought of as having function–argument form, but rather the structure subject–copula–predicate.

scholarly journals Two-year-olds but not younger children comprehend it in ambiguous contexts: Evidence from preferential looking

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 255-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARBORA SKARABELA ◽  
MITSUHIKO OTA
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Visual Object ◽  
Prior Context ◽  
Argument Form ◽  
Preferential Looking ◽  
Adults And Children ◽  
English Speaking

AbstractChildren use pronouns in their speech from the earliest word combinations. Yet, it is not clear from these early utterances whether they understand that pronouns are used as substitutes for nouns and entities in the discourse. The aim of this study was to examine whether young children understand the anaphoric function of pronouns, focusing on the interpretation of the pronoun it in English-speaking children at 1;6 and 2;0. We tested whether adults and children would prefer to look at a previously introduced vs. novel visual object depending on the argument form (it, the + noun, a + noun, or silence). Results demonstrate that, like adults, two-year-olds understand that it refers to a previously introduced referent. There is no evidence that this knowledge is established in children at 1;6. This suggests that some time between 1;6 and 2;0 children come to understand that it refers to a highly accessible referent introduced in the prior context.

scholarly journals On Novels as Arguments

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Plumer
Keyword(s):  
Argument Structure ◽  
Literary Studies ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Argument Form ◽  
Analogical Argument

If novels can be arguments, that fact should shape logic or argumentation studies as well as literary studies. Two senses the term ‘narrative argument’ might have are (a) a story that offers an argument, or (b) a distinctive argument form. I consider whether there is a principled way of extracting a novel’s argument in sense (a). Regarding the possibility of (b), Hunt’s view is evaluated that many fables and much fabulist literature inherently, and as wholes, have an analogical argument structure. I argue that a better account is that some novels inherently exhibit a transcendental argument structure.

scholarly journals Refuting a Standpoint by Appealing to Its Outcomes: Reductio ad Absurdum vs. Argument from Consequences

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrike Jansen
Keyword(s):  
Specific Content ◽  
Argument Form ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum

Used informally, the Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA) consists in reasoning appealing to the logically implied, absurd consequences of a hypothetical proposition, in order to refute it. This kind of reasoning resembles the Argument from Consequences, which appeals to causally induced consequences. These types of argument are sometimes confused, since it is not worked out how these different kinds of consequences should be distinguished. In this article it is argued that the logical consequences in RAA-argumentation can take different appearances and that it therefore must be concluded that RAA cannot be characterised by a specific content, but must instead be characterised as an argument form. Furthermore, clues are provided to distinguish RAA reasoning from the Argument from Consequences.

scholarly journals The Argument Form "Appeal to Galileo": A Critical Appreciation of Doury’s Account

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Maurice A Finocchiaro
Keyword(s):  
Global Warming ◽  
Argument Form

Following a linguistic-descriptivist approach, Marianne Doury has studied debates about “parasciences” (e.g. astrology), discovering that “parascientists” frequently argue by “appeal to Galileo” (i.e., defend their views by comparing themselves to Galileo and their opponents to the Inquisition); opponents object by criticizing the analogy, charging fallacy, and appealing to counter-examples. I argue that Galilean appeals are much more widely used, by creationists, global-warming skeptics, advocates of “settled science”, great scientists, and great philosophers. Moreover, several subtypes should be distinguished; critiques questioning the analogy are proper; fallacy charges are problematic; and appeals to counter-examples are really indirect critiques of the analogy.

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