scholarly journals Ownership Structure, Executive Officer’s Payment and Firm Performance——Evidence from Electric Industry Listed Firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 13-18
Author(s):  
世尧 李
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-472
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ehikioya ◽  
Yuanjin Qin ◽  
Keifa Xie ◽  
Chen ru Yun

This study investigates how ownership structure impacts on the corporate performance of listed firms in China. The study uses sample data of firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the five year fiscal period that ended 2005. The results of the panel data regression analysis suggests firm performance to have positive and significant relation with the proportion of shares held by the institution, through the legal person holding companies. In addition, while state ownership indicates negative influence on performance, individual and foreign investors are found to have positive effect on performance, though at a minimal levels. Interestingly, the effect of ownership structure is stronger in firms experiencing the dominance of legal person share holdings over state shares. Further, firm size and ratio of debt to equity are also observed to have influence on the performance of Chinese listed firms. These findings are of great significant to policymakers, academics, shareholders and other stakeholders.


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 723-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athula Manawaduge ◽  
Anura De Zoysa

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and concentration on firm performance in Sri Lanka, an emerging market in Asia. The study estimates a series of regressions using pooled data for a sample of Sri Lankan-listed firms to investigate the impact of ownership concentration and structure on firm performance based on agency theory framework, using both accounting and market-based performance indicators. The results of the study provide evidence for a strong positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting performance measures. This suggests that a greater concentration of ownership leads to better performance. However, we found no significant impact using market-based performance measures, which suggests the existence of numerous market inefficiencies and anomalies. Furthermore, the findings of the study show that ownership structure does not have a significant distinguishable effect on performance.


Author(s):  
Muhammad Arslan

In modern organizations, there is a separation between ownership and control of the firm. On the lenses of agency theory, this study statistically examines the relationship between ownership structure (i.e., ownership concentration and owner identity) and firm performance of non-financial listed firms of Pakistan by taking firm-level control variables of size, age, liquidity, financial leverage, and growth of the firm. Secondary data is collected from annual reports of 65 non-financial listed firms for the year 2008 to 2012. The least-square dummy variable model followed by the random effect model has been employed to statistically determining the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. The results of the least square dummy variable model reveal that the ownership concentration has a significant positive impact on firm performance. The owner identity (such as dispersed, family, institutional, and government ownership) has a significant causal effect on firm performance as indicated from t and p values.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Haroon ur Rashid Khan ◽  
Waqas Bin Khidmat ◽  
Osama Al Hares ◽  
Naeem Muhammad ◽  
Kashif Saleem

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mao-Feng Kao ◽  
Lynn Hodgkinson ◽  
Aziz Jaafar

PurposeUsing a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue.FindingsThe main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is successful, the regulatory authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance.Originality/valueFirst, unlike most of the previous literature on Western developed countries, this study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies used a single indicator of firm performance, this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and firm performance by using 2SLS estimation, and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhang ◽  
Xi Li

This paper examines the motivation and impact of corporate diversification in Chinese listed firms. We find that in local government owned-firms there is a non-linear relationship between the level of firm diversification and state ownership. As state ownership increases from zero, the level of diversification decreases. After state ownership reaches a certain level, the level of diversification increases as state ownership increases. There is no evidence that ownership is related to corporate diversification in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. We also document that diversification is negatively related to firm performance in local government-owned firms. However, there is no evidence that diversification is negatively related to the firm performance in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. Our findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for local government owned-firms taking value-reducing diversification strategies.


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