scholarly journals 基于谓词逻辑的归结原理研究<br>The Study of Resolution Principle Based on Predicate Logic

2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 51-56
Author(s):  
敖 友云
1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-268
Author(s):  
Ewa Orłowska

The central method employed today for theorem-proving is the resolution method introduced by J. A. Robinson in 1965 for the classical predicate calculus. Since then many improvements of the resolution method have been made. On the other hand, treatment of automated theorem-proving techniques for non-classical logics has been started, in connection with applications of these logics in computer science. In this paper a generalization of a notion of the resolution principle is introduced and discussed. A certain class of first order logics is considered and deductive systems of these logics with a resolution principle as an inference rule are investigated. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called resolution completeness of such systems are given. A generalized Herbrand property for a logic is defined and its connections with the resolution-completeness are presented. A class of binary resolution systems is investigated and a kind of a normal form for derivations in such systems is given. On the ground of the methods developed the resolution system for the classical predicate calculus is described and the resolution systems for some non-classical logics are outlined. A method of program synthesis based on the resolution system for the classical predicate calculus is presented. A notion of a resolution-interpretability of a logic L in another logic L ′ is introduced. The method of resolution-interpretability consists in establishing a relation between formulas of the logic L and some sets of formulas of the logic L ′ with the intention of using the resolution system for L ′ to prove theorems of L. It is shown how the method of resolution-interpretability can be used to prove decidability of sets of unsatisfiable formulas of a given logic.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAUS GLASHOFF

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.


1962 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley

Anyone who reads Aristotle, knowing something about modern logic and nothing about its history, must ask himself why the syllogistic cannot be translated as it stands into the logic of quantification. It is now more than twenty years since the invention of the requisite framework, the logic of many-sorted quantification.In the familiar first-order predicate logic generality is expressed by means of variables and quantifiers, and each interpretation of the system is based upon the choice of some class over which the variables may range, the only restriction placed on this ‘domain of individuals’ being that it should not be empty.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
HERMAN GEUVERS ◽  
ERIK BARENDSEN

We look at two different ways of interpreting logic in the dependent type system λP. The first is by a direct formulas-as-types interpretation à la Howard where the logical derivation rules are mapped to derivation rules in the type system. The second is by viewing λP as a Logical Framework, following Harper et al. (1987) and Harper et al. (1993). The type system is then used as the meta-language in which various logics can be coded.We give a (brief) overview of known (syntactical) results about λP. Then we discuss two issues in some more detail. The first is the completeness of the formulas-as-types embedding of minimal first-order predicate logic into λP. This is a remarkably complicated issue, a first proof of which appeared in Geuvers (1993), following ideas in Barendsen and Geuvers (1989) and Swaen (1989). The second issue is the minimality of λP as a logical framework. We will show that some of the rules are actually superfluous (even though they contribute nicely to the generality of the presentation of λP).At the same time we will attempt to provide a gentle introduction to λP and its various aspects and we will try to use little inside knowledge.


1986 ◽  
pp. 155-183
Author(s):  
Igor Aleksander ◽  
Henri Farreny ◽  
Malik Ghallab

2013 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 837-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Czajka

AbstractWe show a model construction for a system of higher-order illative combinatory logic thus establishing its strong consistency. We also use a variant of this construction to provide a complete embedding of first-order intuitionistic predicate logic with second-order propositional quantifiers into the system of Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, which gives a partial answer to a question posed by these authors.


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