A replication of the disjunction effect in the prisoners' dilemma

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joakim Semb
Keyword(s):  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Disjunction Effect

On Application of Gorini-Kossakowski-Sudarshan-Lindblad Equation in Cognitive Psychology

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masanari Asano ◽  
Masanori Ohya ◽  
Yoshiharu Tanaka ◽  
Andrei Khrennikov ◽  
Irina Basieva
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Theory ◽  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Quantum Information Theory ◽  
Lindblad Equation ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Disjunction Effect ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

We proceed towards an application of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to cognitive psychology — the problem of decision-making in games of the Prisoners Dilemma type. These games were used as tests of rationality of players. Experiments performed in cognitive psychology by Shafir and Tversky [1, 2], Croson [3], Hofstader [4, 5] demonstrated that in general real players do not use "rational strategy" provided by classical game theory; this psychological phenomenon was called the disjunction effect. We elaborate a model of quantum-like decision making which can explain this effect ("irrationality" of plays). Our model is based on quantum information theory. The main result of this paper is the derivation of Gorini-Kossakowski-Sudarshan-Lindblad equation whose equilibrium solution gives the quantum state used for decision making. It is the first application of this equation in cognitive psychology.

scholarly journals The Prisoners’ Dilemma in collaborative carriers’ request selection

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaretha Gansterer ◽  
Richard F. Hartl
Keyword(s):  
Computational Study ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Individual Outcomes ◽  
Selection Strategies ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Trading Mechanisms ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Idle Capacity

AbstractLogistics providers have to utilize available capacities efficiently in order to cope with increasing competition and desired quality of service. One possibility to reduce idle capacity is to build coalitions with other players on the market. While the willingness to enter such coalitions does exist in the logistics industry, the success of collaborations strongly depends on mutual trust and behavior of participants. Hence, a proper mechanism design, where carriers do not have incentives to deviate from jointly established rules, is needed. We propose to use a combinatorial auction system, for which several properties are already well researched but little is known about the auction’s first phase, where carriers have to decide on the set of requests offered to the auction. Profitable selection strategies, aiming at maximization of total collaboration gains, do exist. However, the impact on individual outcomes, if one or more players deviate from jointly agreed selection rules is yet to be researched. We analyze whether participants in an auction-based transport collaboration face a Prisoners’ Dilemma. While it is possible to construct such a setting, our computational study reveals that carriers do not profit from declining the cooperative strategy. This is an important and insightful finding, since it further strengthens the practical applicability of auction-based trading mechanisms in collaborative transportation.

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

The Disjunction Effect: Does It Exist for Two-Step Gambles?

2001 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Kühberger ◽  
Dagmara Komunska ◽  
Josef Perner
Keyword(s):  
Disjunction Effect

A Cooperative Approach to the Logic of Collective Action: Voluntary Organizations and the Prisoners' Dilemma

1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Richard C. Rich
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Voluntary Organization ◽  
Voluntary Organizations ◽  
Mutual Assistance ◽  
Cooperative Approach ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
The Social ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma

A reexamination of certain tenets of Olson's logic of collective action suggests that it fails to explain some types of behavior found in voluntary organizations, especially mutual assistance groups. Specifically, Olson fails to account for non-coercive and non-individualistic factors and gives insufficient attention to the social context of voluntary organization life. A fresh applications of the prisoners' dilemma and the introduction of the concept of community expand our understanding of behaviors heretofore unexplained. Implications are discussed for the design and management of voluntary organizations under certain conditions.

Evolutionary Prisoners' Dilemma Game on Scale-Free Networks with Degree-Degree Correlation

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (10) ◽  
pp. 100201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Hong-Yan ◽  
Dai Qiong-Lin ◽  
Li Hai-Hong ◽  
Yang Jun-Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Scale Free ◽  
Degree Correlation ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Scale Free Networks
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