Stag Hunt at the Prison: Risk Dominance and Cooperation in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Jagau
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Risk Dominance ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Repeated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

scholarly journals The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 411-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Dal Bó ◽  
Guillaume R Fréchette
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Risk Dominance ◽  
Repeated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games ◽  
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Present Experimental Evidence

A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)

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