Establishing Properties of the Control Premium

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Korting
Keyword(s):  
Control Premium

The Impact of Property Characteristics on Economic Performance of Russian Industrial Enterprises

2005 ◽  
pp. 53-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Kapeliushnikov ◽  
N. Demina
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Corporate Sector ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Industrial Enterprises ◽  
Russian Industry ◽  
Control Premium ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

The paper provides new survey evidence on effects of concentrated ownership upon investment and performance in Russian industrial enterprises. Authors trace major changes in their ownership profile, assess pace of post-privatization redistribution of shareholdings and provide evidence on ownership concentration in the Russian industry. The major econometric findings are that the first largest shareholding is negatively associated with the firm’s investment and performance but surprisingly the second largest shareholding is positively associated with them. Moreover, these relationships do not depend on identity of majority shareholders. These results are consistent with the assumption that the entrenched controlling owners are engaged in extracting "control premium" but sizable shareholdings accumulated by other blockholders may put brakes on their expropriating behavior and thus be conductive for efficiency enhancing. The most interesting topic for further more detailed analysis is formation, stability and roles of coalitions of large blockholders in the corporate sector of post-socialist countries.

Heineken's Acquisition of Asia Pacific Breweries: Accounting for Business Combinations and Changes in Ownership Interests

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pearl Tan ◽  
Chu-Yeong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Joint Control ◽  
Business Combinations ◽  
Final Offer ◽  
Control Premium ◽  
Joint Venture Partner

ABSTRACT On July 20, 2012, Heineken, a Dutch brewery offered S$5.125 billion (Singapore dollars; approximately US$4.1 billion) to buy Asia Pacific Breweries Ltd (APB; formerly, Malayan Breweries Limited) from its Singapore-based joint venture partner, Fraser and Neave, Limited. (F&N). At that point, Heineken and F&N had joint control over APB through the joint venture vehicle Asia Pacific Investments Pte Ltd (APIPL). Brewery business under the joint arrangement had moved on quite predictably from the time APB was formed in 1931. However, the calm changed to high drama when Thai Beverage, owned by one of Thailand's tycoons, made a bid for F&N and APB. Heineken was quick to respond by aggressively buying shares of APB, leading to a large control premium being paid in the final offer price. The bidding war was largely motivated by the Dutch and Thai beer giants, each wanting to own the iconic Tiger beer brand that was owned by APB and thus take control of APB's strong market share in the fast-growing market of Asia. The Heineken bid for APB presents an interesting case study regarding the motivations for acquisitions, the nature of control, and accounting for acquisitions. The case also presents rich issues in accounting for changes in ownership interests with and without gain of control.

scholarly journals The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition

1969 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 615
Author(s):  
David Cowan Bayne
Keyword(s):  
Control Premium

Control Premium and Corporate Regulatory Changes: Theory and Evidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia P. Jurfest ◽  
Ricardo D. Paredes ◽  
Julio Riutort
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Control Premium
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