Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Cox
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Common Value

Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-369
Author(s):  
Caleb A. Cox ◽  
Brock Stoddard
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Information And Communication

We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication. (JEL C72, D82, D83, H41)

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas [pre-print]

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

scholarly journals Cooperation Enforcement and Collusion Resistance in Repeated Public Goods Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2085-2092
Author(s):  
Kai Li ◽  
Dong Hao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Collusion Resistance ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Simple Strategy ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Multi Agent

Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents’ long-run interactions and things become even severer when self-interested agents work in collusion with each other to get extra benefits. It is commonly accepted that in such social dilemmas, there exists no simple strategy for an agent whereby she can simultaneously manipulate on the utility of each of her opponents and further promote mutual cooperation among all agents. Here, we show that such strategies do exist. Under the conventional repeated public goods game, we novelly identify them and find that, when confronted with such strategies, a single opponent can maximize his utility only via global cooperation and any colluding alliance cannot get the upper hand. Since a full cooperation is individually optimal for any single opponent, a stable cooperation among all players can be achieved. Moreover, we experimentally show that these strategies can still promote cooperation even when the opponents are both self-learning and collusive.

scholarly journals Methodological Aspects of Social Preferences Research in the Context of Solving Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (13) ◽  
pp. 33-37
Author(s):  
Alla Kovalenko ◽  
◽  
Albina Holovina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity

The article presents an analysis of the main methodological principles and schemes of social preferences experimental research, which are determined as a fundamental concept to understanding the behavior of decision-makers in the process of resolving social dilemmas. The models presented in the article include an analysis of the factors that determine social preferences. Among them are the factors of trust, reliability, reciprocity, rejection of inequality, unconditional altruism and competitive advantage. The article provides a description of the strengths and weaknesses of the classic methods for studying social preferences, which usually take the form of ultimatum game, dictator game, trust game and public goods game. The study reveals the importance of the Nash equilibrium as a way to interpret human behavior in resource allocation during the game. Analysis of numerous literary sources shows that the ultimatum game is a classic scheme for studying the altruistic behavior of people. The submission of a proposal and its acceptance is an example of Nash's ideal equilibrium. Deviation from this balance can be interpreted as altruism. In turn, the trust game is a classic scheme for studying the reciprocity and prosocial orientation. If the behavior of players deviates from Nash's equilibrium, it is interpreted as being caused by trust and reciprocity. The dictator game is a classic scheme for studying the rejection of inequality. The subject's behavior can be interpreted as a rejection of inequality or altruism, but not as a rejection of risk, as the offer of Player 1 is mandatory for Player 2. Public goods game is a classic scheme for studying the competitive orientation. Nash's ideal balance in this form of play is to do nothing for public consumption, but deviating from this rule is interpreted as altruistic behavior that is the opposite of competitive orientation. As a result, the design of psychological research is presented, which most accurately typologies the social preferences of the subjects and can contribute to the creation of a representative model of decision-making process.

scholarly journals Eco-evolutionary spatial dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale ◽  
Hye Jin Park
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Spatial Dynamics ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Evolutionary Trajectory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Non Linear

AbstractSpatial dynamics can promote the evolution of cooperation. While dispersal processes have been studied in simple evolutionary games, real-world social dilemmas are much more complicated. The public good, in many cases, does not increase linearly as per the investment in it. When the investment is low, for example, every additional unit of the investment may help a lot to increase the public good, but the effect vanishes as the number of investments increase. Such non-linear behaviour is the norm rather than an exception in a variety of social as well as biological systems. We take into account the non-linearity in the payoffs of the public goods game as well as the natural demographic effects of population densities. Population density has also been shown to impact the evolution of co-operation. Coupling these non-linear games and population size effect together with an explicitly defined spatial structure brings us one step closer to the complexity of real eco-evolutionary spatial systems. We show how the non-linearity in payoffs, resulting in synergy or discounting of public goods can alter the effective rate of return on the cooperative investment. Synergy or discounting in public goods accumulation affects the resulting spatial structure, not just quantitatively but in some cases, drastically changing the outcomes. In cases where a linear payoff structure would lead to extinction, synergy can support the coexistence of cooperators and defectors. The combined eco-evolutionary trajectory can thus be qualitatively different in cases on non-linear social dilemmas.

Vicious Circles and Multiple Equilibria: The Spiral

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Weak Rule

This chapter summarizes the theoretical framework of this book, and draws from it the lens through which the roots of Italy’s current decline are then retraced in its history. It exemplifies the main argument by discussing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one—employing tax evasion, corruption, and clientelism as means to appropriate private goods—and one based on enforcing political accountability. It argues that from the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several vicious circles run in parallel, reinforce each other, and lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. It concludes that in transition societies ideas, freer from the grip of the spiral, can exploit endogenous shocks to reverse it.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document