Fleeing a Lame Duck: Policy Uncertainty and Manufacturing Investment in US States

Nathan Falk; Cameron A. Shelton

doi:10.1257/pol.20160365

Fleeing a Lame Duck: Policy Uncertainty and Manufacturing Investment in US States

American Economic Journal Economic Policy ◽

10.1257/pol.20160365 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 135-152 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Nathan Falk ◽

Cameron A. Shelton

Keyword(s):

Policy Uncertainty ◽

Specific Measure ◽

Us States ◽

Partisan Polarization ◽

State Uncertainty ◽

Lame Duck

It is found that electorally induced policy uncertainty decreases manufacturing investment in US states. In a state with average partisan polarization, the elasticity of election-year investment to a specific measure of policy uncertainty is −0.027. When the incumbent governor is term limited, there is greater uncertainty over the outcome, providing an instrument to demonstrate this effect is causal, not simply coincidental. Moreover, manufacturing investment does not rebound following the election. Rather, own-state uncertainty is associated with a large and significant coincident rise in neighboring states’ investment. These findings suggest that policy uncertainty at the subnational level drives investment to alternate sites. (JEL D25, D72, E22, G31, L60, R11)

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Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055411000529 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 106 (1) ◽

pp. 103-122 ◽

Cited By ~ 58

Author(s):

BRANDICE CANES-WRONE ◽

JEE-KWANG PARK

Keyword(s):

Business Cycles ◽

Oecd Countries ◽

Policy Uncertainty ◽

Substantial Portion ◽

Fixed Investment ◽

Political Business Cycles ◽

Quarterly Data ◽

Partisan Polarization ◽

Private Actors ◽

Electoral Competitiveness

Studies of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in preelection periods, casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles. We develop a theory that predicts that a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the preelection period if the election is associated with sufficient policy uncertainty. In particular, policy uncertainty induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal. The resulting declines, which are called reverse electoral business cycles, require sufficient levels of polarization between major parties and electoral competitiveness. To test these predictions, we examine quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten OECD countries between 1975 and 2006. The results show that reverse electoral business cycles exist and as expected, depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization. Moreover, simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product, we uncover evidence of opportunistic cycles.

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Risk of ‘thousand-year’ rains could double for US states

Nature ◽

10.1038/d41586-019-01130-9 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 568 (7752) ◽

pp. 278-278

Keyword(s):

Us States

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Incidence of ESKD Among Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders Living in the 50 US States and Pacific Island Territories

American Journal of Kidney Diseases ◽

10.1053/j.ajkd.2020.01.008 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 76 (3) ◽

pp. 340-349.e1 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jie Xiang ◽

Hal Morgenstern ◽

Yiting Li ◽

Diane Steffick ◽

Jennifer Bragg-Gresham ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Pacific Islanders ◽

Native Hawaiians ◽

Pacific Island ◽

Us States

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The Heterogeneous Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty: How Much Do Trade Commitments Boost Trade?

10.1596/1813-9450-8567 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alberto Osnago ◽

Roberta Piermartini ◽

Nadia Rocha

Keyword(s):

Trade Policy ◽

Policy Uncertainty ◽

Heterogeneous Effects ◽

Trade Policy Uncertainty

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Investigating the President

10.23943/princeton/9780691171852.001.0001 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Douglas L. Kriner ◽

Eric Schickler

Keyword(s):

Public Policy ◽

Political Theater ◽

Policy Outcomes ◽

Presidential Power ◽

Political Pressure ◽

Comprehensive Overview ◽

Partisan Polarization ◽

Approval Rating ◽

Congressional Investigations ◽

Over Time

Although congressional investigations have provided some of the most dramatic moments in American political history, they have often been dismissed as mere political theater. But these investigations are far more than grandstanding. This book shows that congressional investigations are a powerful tool for members of Congress to counter presidential aggrandizement. By shining a light on alleged executive wrongdoing, investigations can exert significant pressure on the president and materially affect policy outcomes. This book constructs the most comprehensive overview of congressional investigative oversight to date, analyzing nearly 13,000 days of hearings, spanning more than a century, from 1898 through 2014. The book examines the forces driving investigative power over time and across chambers, and identifies how hearings might influence the president’s strategic calculations through the erosion of the president’s public approval rating, and uncover the pathways through which investigations have shaped public policy. Put simply, by bringing significant political pressure to bear on the president, investigations often afford Congress a blunt, but effective check on presidential power—without the need to worry about veto threats or other hurdles such as Senate filibusters. In an era of intense partisan polarization and institutional dysfunction, the book delves into the dynamics of congressional investigations and how Congress leverages this tool to counterbalance presidential power.

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